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ABSTRACT 
I. Background 
Following a review of donor funding priorities and concepts of health system 
strengthening (HSS) and resilience, this dissertation documents health system resilience 
factors existing in the Liberian health system in late 2014/early 2015 as the Ebola 
epidemic flared. The effectiveness of the WHO health system building blocks framework 
in addressing resilience was assessed, and specific factors that can promote health system 
resilience for Liberia going forward were identified.  
II. Methods 
Methods applied as part of this intrinsic case study include document and 
literature review, analysis of health facility and population-level statistics, and key 
informant and group interviews at the county and national levels. The methodology 
allowed for an in-depth assessment of how HSS (using the WHO health system building 
blocks) and resilience factors (using the WHO-defined key aspects of emergency 
preparedness) exist (or could exist) within the Liberian institutional and cultural context, 
and for tentative conclusions to be drawn about the importance of system factors to 
building specific health system capacities and overall health system resilience.  
		 viii 
III. Findings 
While dealing with myriad other public health priorities, public health 
preparedness went largely unaddressed in pre-Ebola Liberia where effectively none of the 
16 key components or their 51 essential attributes listed in the WHO table of emergency 
preparedness were in place. The lack of integration of public health preparedness into 
HSS interventions left the country vulnerable to public health emergencies.  
There are two limitations to the government’s Ebola recovery and investment 
plan: (1) lack of a holistic approach to addressing emergency preparedness; and (2) not 
integrating emergency preparedness needs and corresponding activities into the existing 
national HSS framework. 
IV. Conclusion 
By integrating emergency preparedness and response initiatives into HSS 
activities, health systems in Liberia and elsewhere can be strengthened to be more 
resilient, and thus better able to anticipate and adapt to challenges, and ultimately 
improve the system to be able to anticipate new future challenges. However, 
strengthening health systems so that they are resilient takes resources, including sector-
wide, HSS resources that can be used to build functioning, integrated systems and skilled, 
networked individuals and groups across sectors. 
  
		 ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................... xvii 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
Rebuilding Basic Health Services (RBHS) project ............................................................ 2 
Improvements in Liberian Population Health Outcomes .................................................... 3 
Dissertation Purpose and Public Health Implications ......................................................... 5 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .................................................................................... 6 
Donor Funding Priorities .................................................................................................... 6 
Global Health and Development Governance in a Rapidly Changing World ............ 6 
Changing Aid Architecture ......................................................................................... 9 
Official Development Aid versus Country Programmable Aid ................................ 10 
Development Assistance for Health: Disease-Specific Funding vs. Health System 
Support ...................................................................................................................... 11 
Development Assistance for Health in Liberia ......................................................... 14 
Factors Influencing Effective Use of DAH in Liberia .............................................. 19 
Disease-Specific Funding and Fragmentation .......................................................... 25 
Health System Strengthening ............................................................................................ 27 
How a Health System Influences Population Health: the Determinants of Health .. 27 
Management of a Health System .............................................................................. 31 
Health Systems Constraints to Promoting, Maintaining and Improving Population 
Health ........................................................................................................................ 33 
What is Health Systems Strengthening? ................................................................... 35 
Frameworks for Assessing the Health System .......................................................... 35 
WHO Health Systems Building Blocks: From Disease Silos to Building Block   
Silos .......................................................................................................................... 39 
Resilience .......................................................................................................................... 43 
Sustainability vs. Resilience ..................................................................................... 44 
Defining Resilience ................................................................................................... 45 
Resilient Health Systems vs. Health Systems with Effective Emergency 
Preparedness ............................................................................................................. 48 
METHODS ....................................................................................................................... 51 
		 x 
Aim and Objectives ........................................................................................................... 51 
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................... 52 
WHO health systems strengthening framework ....................................................... 52 
WHO Components of Effective Emergency Preparedness Programs ...................... 52 
Study Design ..................................................................................................................... 55 
Data Methods .................................................................................................................... 56 
Data Sources ..................................................................................................................... 61 
 Rebuilding Basic Health Services (RBHS) Project………………………………... 62 
I. RBHS Project Data Sources Documenting Health System Capacity .................... 66 
II. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, 2007 and 2013 ............................ 68 
III. HMIS (DHIS2) data, 2009–2015 ........................................................................ 69 
IV. Liberia (MOH and WHO) Ebola situation reports, 2014–2015 ......................... 69 
V. Open Source GIS data .......................................................................................... 70 
FINDINGS OVERVIEW .................................................................................................. 72 
2008 Mindset Shift: From Humanitarian Assistance to Development, RBHS 2008–2012
........................................................................................................................................... 72 
General Health System Capacity Findings from 2009–2014 ........................................... 75 
2014–2015 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Epidemic ........................................................... 76 
What was different in Liberia that allowed the exponential spread of Ebola? ......... 80 
Ranking Priorities According to WHO Emergency Preparedness Components .............. 86 
Step 1: Priority Ranking of Attributes and Components .......................................... 86 
Step 2: Gap Identification: Matching Priorities against Current Response, Resiliency 
and Recovery Plans ................................................................................................... 90 
FINDINGS BY WHO HEALTH SYSTEM BUILDING BLOCK .................................. 93 
Building Block 1: Delivering Essential Health Services .................................................. 93 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 .................................. 93 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health      
System ..................................................................................................................... 105 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 107 
Building Block 2: Health Workforce .............................................................................. 110 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 ................................ 110 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health      
System ..................................................................................................................... 114 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 116 
Building Block 3: Health Information Systems .............................................................. 117 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 ................................ 117 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health      
System ..................................................................................................................... 122 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 124 
Building Block 4: Access to Essential Medicines .......................................................... 127 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 ................................ 127 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health      
System ..................................................................................................................... 133 
		 xi 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 134 
Building Block 5: Health Systems Financing ................................................................. 136 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 ................................ 136 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System
................................................................................................................................. 141 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 142 
Building Block 6: Governance and Leadership .............................................................. 143 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014 ................................ 143 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System
................................................................................................................................. 148 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities ......... 150 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 154 
Creating Resilient Health Systems against Modern Disruptions .................................... 154 
The Role of County Governments, Donors and Global Governance ............................. 156 
Pre-existing Conditions ................................................................................................... 157 
From Near Collapse to Resilience: Overarching Recommendations and Logic Model . 159 
Overarching Recommendation 1: Take an All-Hazards Approach ........................ 160 
Overarching Recommendation 2:  An Integrated WHO Building Blocks Framework
................................................................................................................................. 166 
Detailed Recommendations by Building Block .............................................................. 171 
Building Block 1: Service Delivery ........................................................................ 171 
Building Block 2: Health Workforce ...................................................................... 172 
Building Block 3: Health Information .................................................................... 174 
Building Block 4: Medical products, vaccines, and technology ............................. 177 
Building Block 5: Health Financing ....................................................................... 178 
Building Block 6: Leadership and Governance ...................................................... 179 
DISSEMINATION PLANS ........................................................................................... 183 
ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 184 
Annex 1. Liberia Background Maps ............................................................................... 184 
Annex 2. Individuals Interviewed in the RBHS Mid-term Evaluation, May/June 2011 189 
Annex 3. Individuals Interviewed in the 2012 and 2014 Capacity Assessments ........... 197 
Annex 4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Case Study Design ............................. 202 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 203 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE……………………………………………………………….. 220	
  
		 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Data from the two Demographic Health Surveys conducted over the life of the 
RBHS project .......................................................................................................... 4	
Table 2. Liberia: ODA Disbursements By Purpose (in USD millions) ............................ 15	
Table 3. Health expenditure per capita (current US$ 2013) ............................................. 19	
Table 4. Constraints to Scaling up Health Services .......................................................... 34	
Table 5. Classification of Health Systems Frameworks ................................................... 37	
Table 6. Types of Resilience ............................................................................................. 46	
Table 7. WHO Key Components and Essential Attributes of Strengthened Health System 
Emergency Preparedness* .................................................................................... 53	
Table 8. Data Analysis Summary ..................................................................................... 60	
Table 9. WHO Emergency Preparedness Component and Building Block Priority  
Scores* .................................................................................................................. 88	
Table 10. GOL Post-Ebola Investment Plan Priorities ..................................................... 91	
Table 11. RBHS activities in support of provision of health services .............................. 93	
Table 12: Facilities by county and facility density (shaded cells are counties most 
severely impacted by Ebola; >100 cases) ........................................................... 106	
Table 13. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 108	
Table 14. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Workforce ............. 110	
Table 15: County distribution of health workforce based on payroll status (February 
2015) ................................................................................................................... 115	
Table 16. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 116	
Table 17. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Information      
Systems ............................................................................................................... 117	
Table 18: Comparison of PRISM Assessments 2012 – 2014 ......................................... 121	
Table 19: Status of RBHS-supported HMIS Interventions, July 2014 ........................... 122	
Table 20. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 124	
Table 21. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Supply Chain System ....... 127	
		 xiii 
Table 22. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 134	
Table 23. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Financing .............. 137	
Table 24. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 143	
Table 25. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Governance and      
Leadership ........................................................................................................... 144	
Table 26. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results ............................................... 150		
  
		 xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Geographic Trends in ODA and CPA, 1985 to 2005 ........................................ 10	
Figure 2. Total ODA, Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–2013 (millions USD) .......................... 11	
Figure 3. ODA by Sector, Liberia 2009–2013 .................................................................. 16	
Figure 4. Per Capita Spending on Health, Liberia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–2013 
(USD) .................................................................................................................... 17	
Figure 5. Spending on Health as a Percent of Total ODA, Liberia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2009–2013 ................................................................................................ 17	
Figure 6. Spending on Health, Education and Water Supply and Sanitation as Percent of 
Total ODA, Liberia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–2013 ................................... 18	
Figure 7. Proportion of Households with Poor Quality or No Toilet, Liberia, February 
2015 (2013 DHS data) .......................................................................................... 20	
Figure 8. Proportion of Households with Poor Quality Water, Liberia, February 2015 
(2013 DHS data) ................................................................................................... 21	
Figure 9. Liberia’s Poverty Profile, 2007 ......................................................................... 25	
Figure 10. Contribution of Health Determinants on Health Outcomes: Results from Three 
Studies ................................................................................................................... 29	
Figure 11. Health Systems Support versus Health Systems Strengthening ...................... 38	
Figure 12. WHO HSS Framework .................................................................................... 40	
Figure 13. Global Health Initiative HSS Results Framework ........................................... 41	
Figure 14. Rebuilding Basic  Health Services (RBHS) Project Coverage, November 
2008–February 2015 ............................................................................................. 64	
Figure 15. Liberian MOH Capacity Building Framework ................................................ 66	
Figure 16. Timeline of key events .................................................................................... 71	
Figure 17. Health Facility Distribution and Population Density, Liberia, February 2015 
(2015 HMIS and 2013 DHS data) ........................................................................ 74	
Figure 18. Relative impact of the 2014–2015 West African Ebola Outbreak .................. 77	
Figure 19. Cumulative Ebola Cases and Deaths, Liberia, March 2014–2015 .................. 78	
		 xv 
Figure 20. Number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola cases in the last 21 days, 
Liberia, Aug 2014–Jul 2015 ................................................................................. 79	
Figure 21. Cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola cases, March 
2016....................................................................................................................... 79	
Figure 22. Cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola deaths, 
March 2016 ........................................................................................................... 80	
Figure 23. Cumulative Ebola Cases and Case Fatality Rate, Liberia, February 2015 
(WHO Situation Report Data) .............................................................................. 81	
Figure 24. Cumulative Ebola Cases and Population Density, Liberia, February 2015 
(WHO Situation Report and 2013 DHS data) ....................................................... 85	
Figure 25. IPT2 in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 2009–
2015....................................................................................................................... 99  
Figure 26. 4+ ANC Visits in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 
2009–2015………………………………………………………………………. 99 
Figure 27. Skilled Deliveries in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–
Oct 2009–2015…………………………………………………………………. 100 
Figure 28. Total CYP in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 
2009–2015………………………………………………………………………100 
Figure 29. Measles Coverage (>1yr) in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, 
Aug–Oct 2009–2015…………………………………………………………… 101 
Figure 30. Penta3 Coverage (>1yr) in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, 
Aug–Oct 2009–2015…………………………………………………………… 101 
Figure 31. Malaria Diagnosed by RDT (<5yrs) in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola 
Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 2009–2015…………………………………………... 102 
Figure 32. Malaria Cases Treated with ACT (<5yrs) in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola 
Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 2009–2015…………………………………………... 102 
Figure 33. HCT Services in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 
2009–2015………………………………………………………………………103 
Figure 34. OPD Services in the Six Counties with >100 Ebola Cases, Liberia, Aug–Oct 
2009–2015………………………………………………………………………103 
Figure 35. IA Delivery Schedules from Counties to Facilities ....................................... 130	
Figure 36: Distribution of MOH spending (USD) by county (2013/2014) .................... 141	
		 xvi 
Figure 37. Logic Model Integrating Emergency Preparedness into Health Systems 
Strengthening ...................................................................................................... 170		
 	  
		 xvii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACT Artemisinin-based combination therapy 
ANC Antenatal care 
BCC Behavior change communication 
BPHS Basic Package of Health Services 
CHDC Community Health Development Committee 
CHT  County Health Team 
CYP                  Couple-years of protection 
DHS Demographic and health survey 
EBSNM Esther Bacon School of Nursing and Midwifery 
EHT Environmental health technician 
EmOP 
EPHS 
Emergency operational plan 
Essential package of health services 
GOL Government of Liberia 
gCHV (General) community health volunteer 
HIS Health information system 
HMIS Health management information system 
HR Human resources 
HSS Health systems strengthening 
iHRIS 
IPT2 
integrated human resource information system 
Intermittent preventive treatment of malaria (in pregnancy), 2nd dose 
JSI JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc. 
LBNM Liberia Board of Nursing and Midwifery 
MOH Ministry of Health (formerly Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NHSWPP National Health and Social Welfare Policy and Plan 2011–2021 
PBC Performance-based contract 
PBF Performance-based financing  
QA Quality assurance 
RBHS Rebuilding Basic Health Services 
		 xviii 
TNIMA Tubman National Institute for Medical Arts  
UNMEER United National Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia  
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USG United States Government 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
		
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Liberia suffered two devastating civil wars lasting 14 years from 1989–2003, 
severely weakening the government health system. As a result, the majority of health 
services in Liberia were being provided by relief organizations during this same period.i ii 
iii  The successful transition to power of a popularly elected president in 2005 led to 
greater political stability and improved security throughout the country.  
 Within this still relatively new government, the Ministry of Health (MOH)1 
emerged as one of the strongest and most effective among the government’s ministries. 
Between 2005 and 2009, the MOH demonstrated strong leadership and vision by 
developing a sound National Health Policy and Plan, and through coordinating 
effectively and transparently with international partners. While the health sector would 
clearly require substantial external assistance for years to come, it was clear that the 
MOH was taking the lead in setting national policies, strategies, and plans.2  
 Nonetheless, a decade after the war ended—despite progress made in building 
many of the underlying systems necessary for Liberia’s growth and development—84% 
of Liberians continued to live in multi-dimensional poverty3; ranking second worst in the 
world.iv The UNDP’s Human Development Index for 2013 listed Liberia 12th lowest 
among all countries.v In early 2014, Liberia was engulfed in a devastating Ebola 
outbreak, further weakening the already fragile health system. 																																																								
1 In 2015, the Government of Liberia moved Social Welfare out from the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MOHSW) to join with the Ministry of Gender and Development. For consistency, it is 
referred to as the MOH throughout this document. 
2 The cornerstone of the Liberian National Health Plan is the MOH’s Basic Package of Health 
Services (BPHS), now the Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) which outlines the essential 
3 Multidimensional poverty is defined as overlapping deprivations in health, education and 
standard of living (UNDP) 
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Rebuilding Basic Health Services (RBHS) project 
The Rebuilding Basic Health Services project ran from November 2008 to 
February 2015 and was the major health intervention in Liberia during this time. At the 
start of RBHS, Liberia was beginning to demonstrate gradual and encouraging progress 
in a range of political, economic, and social outcomes. The health sector was as severely 
impacted as any other by the wars, with limited resources, loss of staff, destruction and 
deterioration of infrastructure, and major disruption of health systems and programs. 
Today, the national health system continues to depend on international donors, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and faith-based organizations—up to 82% of health 
facilities depend on external assistance to ensure on-going functioning.vi  
Funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
led by JSI Research and Training Institute, Inc. (JSI), RBHS was designed to help 
transition Liberia’s health sector from relief to development by supporting the MOH in 
increasing access to and use of quality health services through increasingly decentralized 
health system management. This was to be accomplished through a three-pillared 
strategic approach: (1) improve and expand service delivery; (2) strengthen the health 
system specifically in the areas of human resource (HR) management, infrastructure, 
policy development, monitoring and evaluation; and (3) promote healthy behaviors 
through behavior change communication (BCC) and community mobilization.  
 About half-way through the project, USAID changed the focus from service 
delivery, BCC and community mobilization to capacity development of the MOH at 
central and county levels. The second half of the project was explicitly guided by the 
		
3 
World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) health systems building blocks framework.4 Thus, 
the scope of the second pillar of the original three-pillared approach—health system 
strengthening (HSS)—was significantly broadened in the final three years, and the other 
two pillars re-formulated and de-emphasized.  
Improvements in Liberian Population Health Outcomes 
During the first three years of the RBHS project, Liberia saw notable 
improvements in health outcomes and health services, and the project was credited with 
supporting improvements by both central and county MOH staff.vii RBHS project and 
government health management information system (HMIS) data showed increased 
utilization among a range of health services, including couple years of contraceptive 
protection provided, deliveries with a skilled birth attendant, coverage of intermittent 
presumptive treatment for malaria in pregnancy, and HIV testing and counseling. Quality 
of care also improved, as documented by adherence to clinical standards.viii ix x xi  
Over roughly the same time period, the 2007 and 2013 Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) results showed reductions in the infant mortality rate, and increases in 
antenatal (ANC) visits, deliveries by skilled attendants in facilities, contraceptive 
prevalence rate, full vaccination coverage, and knowledge of HIV (see Table 1).xii xiii  
In the second half of the project, with all health service provision under the direct 
management of the resource-stretched MOH, some of the health service statistics waned 
a bit, though net gains were maintained and system capacity improvements 
																																																								
4 RBHS provided direct services from 2009–2012 in seven of Liberia’s 15 counties: Bomi, Bong, 
Grand Cape Mount, Lofa, Montserrado, Nimba, and River Gee. In the project redesign in 2012, 
capacity building activities focused on the Central MOH and Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties only. 
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documented.xiv    
Table 1. Data from the two Demographic Health Surveys conducted over the life of 
the RBHS project  
Indicators DHS 2007 DHS 2013 
Total Fertility Rate 5.2 4.7 
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 11% 19% 
Antenatal Care Visits (4+) 66% 78% 
Intermittent Presumptive Treatment (2 doses) 
(IPT2) 
31%1 48% 
Facility-based Skilled Birth Attendance 37% 51% 
Pentavalent (3 doses) 50% 68% 
Complete Vaccination Coverage 39% 55% 
Stunting 39% 32% 
1 Data not collected in 2007 DHS. Figure is from project-supported facility data as of 
2009. Same facilities in 2013 reported IPT2 coverage of 51%. 
 
However, in March 2014, seeing Ebola for the first time in Liberia, the country 
faced the worst Ebola epidemic ever recorded globally.xv The initial Liberian government 
response was slow, and the health system response inadequate; ultimately impacting their 
capacity and credibility to respond.xvi The rapid increase in health care worker infections 
exacerbated fear and doubt among Liberians in the abilities of the already fragile public 
health system. xvii xviii  At the same time, ill-equipped health care workers were refusing to 
go to work and many health facilities completely ceased to provide services.xix xx xxi The 
result was a partial collapse of the health system and a need for a massive international 
response.  As Ebola comes under control, the Liberian government is looking to build on 
both what has worked in the past and new lessons learned to restore essential services and 
ultimately rekindle efforts to rebuild a more resilient health system.  
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Dissertation Purpose and Public Health Implications 
The dissertation identifies features that promote health system resilience and 
documents the existence or lack thereof of such characteristics in Liberia in late 
2014/early 2015 when Ebola struck. This facilitated an assessment of the successes and 
limitations of the WHO health system building blocks framework in building resilience, 
and the identification of specific factors that can promote health system resilience for 
Liberia going forward. Findings from the dissertation are intended to:  
(1) Help Liberia restructure and rebuild a more resilient health system; 
(2) Inform other countries as they examine their health systems and their resilience to 
stressors;  
(3) Guide donor and technical assistance agencies investing in national health 
systems to target their interventions more efficiently and effectively. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
This dissertation, in part, documents improvements in health outcomes and health 
system capacities over the life of the RBHS project. Despite these improvements, the 
country’s response to the Ebola epidemic proved inadequate. In part this was due to the 
scale of the epidemic, the multiplicity of donors and partners, and the imperative to act 
quickly which posed significant challenges for overall response coordination and 
management. However, it draws into question the scope and focus of donor and Liberian 
government HSS priorities and interventions over the last decade. This section 
summarizes (1) official development assistance funding, priorities and actors in recent 
years; (2) the dominant literature on health systems strengthening, and (3) theories, 
methods and tools to measure elusive concepts such as capacity, sustainability and 
resilience, and complex-adaptive systems such as a health system. Subsequent sections 
document Liberian health system capacity gains according to the WHO HSS building 
blocks framework, the impact Ebola had on the Liberian health system, and then capacity 
gains re-analyzed through a resilience lens, followed by conclusions and 
recommendations.  
Donor Funding Priorities 
Global Health and Development Governance in a Rapidly Changing World 
As the world becomes more interconnected through increased travel on local, 
regional, and global scales, human populations are increasingly in contact with one 
another and with animals. Since the majority of infectious diseases are of animal origin 
(zoonotic), and 75% of emerging zoonoses have wildlife origins,xxii the increased 
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frequency of high-risk contacts between wild animal hosts and people allows for more 
efficient epidemic spread of pathogens such as Ebola.xxiii Human activities including land 
use changes for agriculture and livestock purposes, resource extraction, and increased 
human population density and urbanization—all which contribute to lessened wildlife 
biodiversity—are linked to a multitude of outbreaks, including SARS, Ebola, and Nipah 
virus. xxiv  
A timely example in Liberia involves the palm oil company, Golden Veroleum 
Liberia, currently being accused of taking advantage of the fear and panic surrounding 
the Ebola crisis to exploit seven local communities by buying their farmland at deeply 
discounted prices. The land will be clear-cut and turned into palm oil plantations; further 
encroaching into the buffer zone between humans and wildlife in Liberia. In addition to 
the local disease implications there are other health, and potentially economic, 
implications resulting from lessened local agricultural production of diverse food 
products such as rice, cassava, and vegetables.xxv Collectively, these smaller, regionalized 
land use changes have much wider implications.  
The growth of major emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China has increased the global demand for food, fossil fuels and other resources; 
increasing pressures on the environment resulting from land use changes and increasing 
population density and urbanization. Concerns on the impact of these pressures on the 
climate is demonstrated by global representation and concern expressed the November 
2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. Such rapid and recent changes raise 
questions about whether donor priorities, and actors—including global governance 
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entities such as the WHO—are still reflective of the current global needs and priorities. 
In fact, the recent Ebola epidemic has brought to the forefront questions about 
WHO’s role in global governance and development. WHO was established in 1948 to 
coordinate international health work; assist governments to strengthen health services; 
provide technical assistance; provide epidemiological and statistical services; promote 
better health; eradicate disease; and propose regulations to improve health.xxvi However, 
as the world becomes increasingly interconnected, global health has also become 
increasingly complex with more donors and development agencies; donors increased 
from 38 in 1990 to about 150 in 2000.xxvii During the West African Ebola outbreak, 
WHO was widely perceived as being slow to respond with technical and coordination 
assistance, which was largely picked up by Médecins Sans Frontières and existing NGOs 
already in place in Liberia such as JSI.  
World Bank is increasingly visible in the area of health, starting with the Bank’s 
1993 report Investing in Health, and more recently in Liberia where they have 
dramatically increased their role in funding health services restoration following Ebola.5 
Other active groups working in global health include United Nations agencies (UNICEF, 
UNDP) and increasingly their country- and event-specific entities (UNMEER, UNMIL6), 
regional development banks (African Development Bank), and numerous NGOs and 
foundations (Rockefeller). Also, the G7/8 and G20 are active in global health decision 
																																																								
5 Since the start of the Ebola epidemic in Liberia, World Bank has committed $385 million for 
Liberia, plus an additional $260 million for Guinea and $318 million for Sierra Leone 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/brief/world-bank-group-ebola-fact-sheet)  
6 UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNMEER: United National Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response 
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making and priority setting, as is the United States Department of State, working jointly 
with the USAID. xxviii  Even the United States Government (USG) military has increased 
their humanitarian and general development activities in the last decade, including in 
Pakistan, Haiti, Indonesia, Nepal, and most recently in Liberia as part of the emergency 
Ebola response.xxix xxx With the myriad of other donors and development partners 
increasingly stepping in to provide services and serve both coordination and response 
functions in health emergency situations, the role of WHO is increasingly unclear. 
Changing Aid Architecture 
As of 2015 there are an estimated 203 major global health agencies and 
organizations that play a prominent role in improving health, including JSI.xxxi  
Of the myriad of actors, many are further specialized within the sector to address 
specific diseases, regions or sub-populations. For example, the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) was established in 2002 to intensify the 
global response to specifically address these three major pandemics.xxxii While such 
specialized agencies and approaches have demonstrated increases in local capacity of 
both the public and civil service/NGO sectors, promoted community involvement, and 
strengthened governance of public health, they tend not to be designed using a sector-
wide or overall health systems strengthening approach, and thus, as is the case in Liberia, 
typically result in parallel financial, procurement, reporting and information systems. 
(See Health Systems Strengthening section below). 
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Official Development Aid versus Country Programmable Aid 
According to a 2007 report, between 1985 and 2005, despite an increase in 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding, the actual real proportion of Country 
Programmable Aid (CPA)—or the percentage of ODA funds that are available for 
development projects and programs—has shown almost no increase for sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA).xxxiii Figure 1 shows geographic trends in ODA and CPA between 1985 and 
2005; showing that while ODA has increased substantially in SSA, funds available to 
SSA countries for use in development projects and programs have remained virtually 
unchanged over the 20 year time period. 
 
Source: Homi Kharas, “Trends and Issues in Development Aid” (Wolfensohn Center for 
Development at the Brookings Institution, November 2007). 
Figure 1. Geographic Trends in ODA and CPA, 1985 to 2005 
 	 Further, over the past few years, between 2009 and 2013, there have been 
declining levels of ODA going to those countries most in need, including those in SSA 
(see Figure 2).xxxiv xxxv So not only has CPA remained stagnant for SSA between 1985 
and 2005, but overall ODA has also begun to decline for many countries most in need.  
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Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 
2015  
Figure 2. Total ODA, Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–2013 (millions USD) 
 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the importance of official development assistance is lessening in many 
countries with the rise of development aid being provided by non-traditional, non-OECD 
DAC countries. However, for countries such as Liberia marked by long-term conflict and 
fragility, ODA is expected to continue to play a vital role.  
Development Assistance for Health: Disease-Specific Funding vs. Health System Support 
Keeping in mind that overall ODA has decreased for SSA in the past few years 
and that country programmable aid has stagnated, over a much longer time period global 
development assistance for health (DAH) has indeed increased substantially; from $6.9 
billion disbursed in 1990 to $35.9 billion disbursed in 2014.xxxvi  
However, while DAH increased, the proportion that went for sector-wide 
31110.7	
29546.3	
28729.2	
27742.9	
27162.2	
2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
		
12 
approaches, or health system strengthening (SWAps/HSS)7 remained more or less 
unchanged, and the proportion for maternal health, (comprising some of the worst health 
indicators in poor countries including Liberia), actually decreased over time. Maternal 
health outcomes are heavily influenced by strong community outreach and linkages to 
formal care. In turn, strong outreach and linkages necessitate adequate health systems 
including adequate facility- and community-based health information, human resources, 
drugs and medical supplies, among others. Thus, the relative flat funding for HSS 
interventions may have a double negative impact on maternal health.  
Funds for HIV/AIDS increased substantially, largely due to the establishment of 
the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Of the $458.0 
billion DAH provided between 1990 and 2014, the USG alone accounted for over one-
third, with 71% of USG funds channeled through USG agencies. Of the USG DAH, 41% 
was specifically for HIV/AIDS. While PEPFAR funding has resulted in significant 
reductions in all-cause adult mortality between 2004 and 2008, without equivalent 
systems strengthening support (e.g., funding for SWAps/HSS), it is unclear how 
sustainable the improved health outcomes will be. The majority of funding for 
SWAps/HSS is from the United Nations. xxxvii 
Unlike the United Kingdom (UK), the United States does not tend to support 
sector-wide activities, including health system budget support. Since budget support 
																																																								
7 SWAps/HSS definition: sector wide approach or programs; budget support; health systems 
strengthening; human resources; health information system; integrated people-centered health 
services; national health policies, strategies and plans; early warning alert and response system; 
capacity building; access to essential medicines; access to health technologies, medical equipment, 
surgical equipment; strengthening regulatory capacity; adequate facilities, construction 
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necessitates less external technical assistance, this translates into fewer job opportunities 
for Americans (among likely other economic and political factors)—and thus a tougher 
sell to the US Congress to approve foreign aid budgets. As a result, the USG tends not to 
fund general budget support in favor of disease- and, more recently, health sector area-
specific interventions (e.g., supply chain, information systems, human resources for 
health).  
In addition to the UK, the Global Fund is among the few donors that funds sector-
wide programs. A content analysis of Global Fund Round 8 investments found that a 
substantial portion, 37% (US$ 362 million), was allocated to health systems 
strengthening. However, of that, 62% ($223 million) was for disease-specific system 
support, and only 38% (US$ 139 million) was for generic system-level interventions. 
Overall, around 82% of health systems strengthening funding (US$ 296 million) was 
allocated to service delivery, human resources, and medicines and technology. Very little 
was allocated to the cross-cutting health sector areas of governance, financing, and 
information.xxxviii 
Between 1990 and 2014 there were 38 primary agencies and organizations 
providing resources to 146–183 (depending on year) developing countries.xxxix Roughly, 
this was an average of $1.2 billion of DAH allocated for HSS, or $6.6 million per 
country; that’s just over $276,000 per year per country for HSS over a 24 year period 
(and that is the proportion of ODA earmarked for health, but not necessarily funds 
actually available for health interventions (i.e., CPA)).  
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Development Assistance for Health in Liberia 
Like overall DAH globally, in Liberia DAH has also increased significantly since 
2000. Total ODA disbursements in Liberia rose from $21.23 million in 2000 to $506.92 
million in 2010.8 Over the same time period, ODA disbursements for health, or DAH, 
increased from $2.57 million (or 12% of total ODA), to $89.22 million (or 18% of total 
ODA). xl  Net ODA received per capita9 in Liberia has increased from $67 spending per 
person in 2004, the first year post-war, to $124 per person in 2013 (current US$).10 
However, over the past few years, between 2009 and 2013, Liberia has seen a relative 
decrease in ODA for social infrastructure and services, which includes health and 
population, education and water supply and sanitation. 																																																								
8 Figures in constant 2009 US$ 
9 Net ODA per capita consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote 
economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients; and 
is calculated by dividing net ODA received by the midyear population estimate. It includes loans with 
a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). 
10 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
“Perhaps	the	most	embarrassing	failure	of	international	development	agencies	has	
been	their	excessive	focus	on	programming	for	past	problems	instead	of	anticipating	
the	challenges	of	the	future.	Black	swans*	have	derailed	many	a	development	
budget	by	forcing	the	reallocation	of	scarce	resources	to	address	game-changing	
events	no	one	anticipated.”	
	
--Andrew	S.	Natsios,	Former	USAID	Administrator	
Source:	The	Future	Can’t	Wait:	Over-the-Horizon	Views	on	Development	
	
*	A	“black	swan”	is	a	metaphor	for	events	that	are	extreme	outliers	yet	have	a	major	effect.	They	are	
typically	rationalized	by	hindsight,	as	if	it	could	have	been	expected	(i.e.,	relevant	data	were	available	
but	unaccounted	for	in	risk	mitigation	programs).	Source:	
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory	
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Table 2 documents ODA disbursements from Development Assistance Countries 
by purpose between 2009 and 2013 in Liberia. It shows a reduction in ODA for Social 
Infrastructure and Services (and the three sub components of health,  education and 
water), compared to increases in every other area; most notably in energy.  
Table 2. Liberia: ODA Disbursements By Purpose (in USD millions) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Population (millions) 3821 3958 4080 4190 4294 
Life Expectancy (years) 59 59 60 60 - 
Social Infrastructure & 
Services 237.7 215.4 193.6 204.7 162.7 
  Education 35.7 48.6 38.1 36.6 29.8 
  Health & Population 80.7 46.2 37.4 56.3 50.1 
  Water Supply & Sanitation 7.5 14.1 7.7 11.7 6.1 
Economic Infrastructure & 
Service 87.6 105.3 43.0 111.7 187.8 
  Energy 31.4 59.3 11.1 94.8 123.6 
  Transport & 
Communications 46.3 13.2 29.7 8.3 58.4 
Production Sectors 34.3 40.3 35.2 9.8 49.2 
  Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 29.7 32.2 34.7 9.2 41.2 
  Industry, Mining, 
Construction 4.3 4.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 
  Trade & Tourism 0.3 3.6 0.4 0.1 7.8 
Multisector 13.7 19.9 15.5 16.9 19.6 
Program Assistance 14.5 20.1 59.5 38.7 18.4 
  Food Aid 14.5 20.1 45.7 38.7 18.4 
Humanitarian Aid 17.4 13.9 78.5 40.3 40.2 
Other & 
Unallocated/Unspecified 1.9 0.5 1.3 2.4 1.8 
TOTAL 407 415.4 426.6 424.5 479.6 
Note: table excludes action relating to debt 
Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 
2015  
 
In the past five years, the Government of Liberia (GOL) has prioritized economic 
infrastrucure and services (energy and transportation) over health, education and water 
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supply and sanitation (social infrastructure). The 14 years of civil war destroyed much 
Liberia’s economic and social infrastrucutre, and one would expect significant upticks in 
investements in both areas following the end of the conflicts in 2003. Of note is the 
decline in investment in social infrastructure (see figures 3 and 6). 
 
Data Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries 2015  
Figure 3. ODA by Sector, Liberia 2009–2013  
 
Figure 3 shows the increase in economic and infrastructure funds (energy and 
transportation) alongside the decrease in social infrastructure and services. It also 
displays the relative stagnation at low levels of funding for the production sector 
(agriculture, forestry, fishing; industry, mining, construction; trade and tourism) and for 
multisector funding. Data from 2014 and 2015 will likely show marked increases in 
funding for food and humanitarian aid as a result of the Ebola epidemic. 
 Looking just at health and population funding shows that while per capita funding 
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for health is slightly higher than in SSA overall (Figure 4), spending on health as a 
percent of total ODA is notably lower in Liberia; only 10% of ODA is allocated to health 
compared to about one-quarter in SSA (Figure 5). 
 
Data Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries 2015  
Figure 4. Per Capita Spending on Health, Liberia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–
2013 (USD) 
 
Data Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries 2015  
Figure 5. Spending on Health as a Percent of Total ODA, Liberia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2009–2013 
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 Adding water supply and sanitation and education to the graph (Figure 6) 
illustrates how hugely underfunded each area of social infrastructure and services is in 
Liberia compared to SSA averages. In particular, the investment in water supply and 
sanitation is notably small. In 2013, the per capita ODA investment in Liberian water and 
sanitation was just $1.42 per person. 
Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 
2015  
Figure 6. Spending on Health, Education and Water Supply and Sanitation as 
Percent of Total ODA, Liberia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–2013  
 
 
According to World Bank data, health expenditure in Liberia is vastly lower than 
in wealthier countries such as the United States and the UK than global and SSA 
averages, and second lowest among its neighboring countries (see Table 3). 	  
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Table 3. Health expenditure per capita (current US$ 2013)  
Country  Health expenditure per capita 
Guinea 25 
Liberia 44 
Cote d'Ivoire 87 
Sierra Leone  96 
Sub-Saharan Africa  101 
World  1,042 
United Kingdom 3,598 
Euro area 4,018 
United States  9,146 
Source: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.15 
Factors Influencing Effective Use of DAH in Liberia 
Factor: Lack of Investment in Water and Sanitation in Liberia 
 The 2013 Liberian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) shows that there have 
been effectively no improvements in sanitation or access to safe water for over a decade. 
The 1999–2000 DHS showed national access to improved sanitation was only 11%. In 
2007, it was 10%, and, in the 2013 DHS, increased only marginally to 17% (26% urban, 
5% rural). This translates to millions of people, one-quarter of those living in urban areas 
and three-quarters of those in rural areas, with no toilet or latrine facility. Overall, close 
to half of the Liberian population, 45% of households, have no toilet facility. Figure 7 
shows the proportion of households in each county with inadequate toilet facilities. 
According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and 
Sanitation, in 2013 almost half, or 48% of Liberians practice open defecation; in 2007 it 
was a similar 51%.xli 
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Figure 7. Proportion of Households with Poor Quality oNo Toilet, Liberia, February 2015 (2013 DHS data) 
Over a quarter of Liberians do not have access to an improved source of drinking 
water. Of the approximately 6,370 “fully functional” water points, about one in six 
households report a perceived water quality problem. One in five rural households get 
their drinking water from lakes and ponds, and 82% of households do not treat water 
before drinking. Finally, the 2013 DHS found that only 2% of households had a hand 
washing place, and of them, 27% had no water, soap, or any other cleansing agent at the 
hand washing place.xlii xliii See Figure 8. 
The above map illustrates that the majority of Liberian households have limited access to adequate 
toilet facilities. Overall, close to half of the Liberian population, 45% of households, have no toilet 
facility, which translates to millions of people--one-quarter of those living in urban areas and three-
quarters of those in rural areas--with no toilet or latrine facility. Household access to no or poor 
quality toilet was mapped using natural breaks.  
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Factor: Lack of Funding for Prevention 
Liberia’s first National Health Accounts (NHA) estimation was conducted in 
2007/2008. The purpose of the NHA is to detail the flow of funding from financial 
sources (e.g., donors, Ministry of Finance [MOF]), to financing agents (i.e., those who 
manage the funds, such as the MOH or NGOs), to providers (e.g., public and private 
facilities) and finally to end uses (e.g., inpatient and outpatient care, pharmaceuticals). 
The NHA is intended to facilitate an assessment of how well resources are targeted to 
The above map shows the proportion of Liberian households with poor quality water. 
Unimproved water is one of the leading health risk factors in Liberia.  Household access to 
poor quality toilet was mapped using natural breaks.  
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health system goals and priority areas. In 2007/2008, half (45%) of health funds were 
spent on curative (inpatient and outpatient) health care, but only 34% on prevention and 
public health programs. xliv In 2009/2010, the proportion spent on curative care increased 
to 49% and that spent on prevention decreased to 28%.11xlv The first 2007/2008 NHA 
disaggregated donor funds by health priority area showing that: 44% of the total health 
expenditure was spent on malaria and of that 69% was for curative services; 14% was 
spent on child health, again with the majority, 64%, on curative care. Subsequent NHAs 
have not disaggregated by health focus area.  
As a comparison, the United States allocated even less than Liberia, with only 9% 
of the US national health expenditure for prevention. However, there were 798,398 active 
physicians in the US in 2010 for 309.3 million people, or 1 doctor for every 387 people, 
with the majority of doctors being specialists (less than one-third being primary care 
providers).xlvi In contrast, when Ebola struck in 2014, Liberia only had 50 trained doctors 
providing services for 4,602,514 people, or 1 doctor for every 92,050 people.xlvii  
Priority services are listed in the Liberian Essential Package of Health Services; 
the vast majority being preventive services that are provided by cadres other than 
physicians (nurses, registered midwives, trained traditional midwives, etc.). The relative 
lack of allocation toward prevention is notable considering 11 of the top 25 diseases in 
Liberia are communicable diseases for which effective preventive and therapeutic options 
exist. These include, in order of severity: malaria, diarrheal diseases, lower respiratory 
infections, neonatal sepsis, protein-energy malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, preterm birth 																																																								
11 According to the WHO Global Health Expenditure database online, in 2010 Liberia allocated 
even less, or 22% to prevention services (http://apps.who.int/nha/database) 
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complications, meningitis, tuberculosis, neonatal encephalopathy, maternal disorders. 
These 11 diseases accounted for 73% of years of life lost in Liberia in 2010.xlviii 
Factor: Lack of General Budget Support 
Donors finance a significant amount of total health expenditure in Liberia, 82%, 
making the Liberia’s health system vulnerable to donor funding fluctuations.xlix However, 
general budget support—that allows a country to allocate funds to self-identified versus 
donor priorities—has only been provided to Liberia since FY2009/10 by the World Bank, 
the African Development Bank, and the European Union (primarily UK). In FY2010/11, 
budget support amounted to only about 14% of ODA, while program and project aid 
represented approximately 86%.l  
In 2009–2010, the largest source of DAH disbursements in Liberia was the USG 
(providing over one-third, 35%), followed by the UK and the Global Fund, (each 
accounting for another 13%).li Of the $89.2 million for health in 2010, Millennium 
Development Goal 6 (MDG6) (control of HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria) accounted for 
47% of all disbursements, largely funded by the USG. Health policy and administrative 
management accounted for 17% of all health disbursements, predominantly funded by the 
UK.lii  
In addition to supporting MDG6, a large portion of DAH in Liberia goes to fund 
reproductive health and family planning. To some extent, these global funding priorities 
have paralleled Liberian MOH priorities, which include malaria, reproductive health and 
child health; representing the majority of disease burden in the country.liii liv However, 
little budget support has been provided to Liberia that the country could use to address 
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other health, or sector-wide, resilience-related priorities. 
Factor: Lack of Financial Accountability and MOH Budgetary Control 
According to the IMF’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
Assessment between 2007 and 2013, donor practices in Liberia have failed to build 
capacity in financial accountability, which in turn leads to delays in actual disbursements. 
Further, annual deviations between estimated direct budget support and actual provision 
of funds have been substantial; in FY2010/11 it was 33% below, and in FY2011/12, 36% 
below estimates. lv Such discrepancies between estimated and actual make it challenging 
to plan and implement activities, and have implications for building the sustainable 
capacity, or resilience, of the health system. 
The central MOH has limited control of its own budget. JSI’s 2014 capacity 
assessment of the MOH at central and county levels, conducted as part of the RBHS 
project, found that while capacities improved at both the systems level (e.g., monitoring 
and evaluation, human resources, pre- and in-service training practices), and individual 
levels (e.g., County Health Teams (CHTs) able to strategically plan based on need and 
local epidemiology), the funding allocated and stipulated from the Ministry of Finance 
has specific allocations established down to the county level. Thus, while CHTs may be 
able to forecast and budget in order to meet their needs, and while the central MOH may 
compile and submit these requests up the chain to the MOF and Congress, once they 
receive their allocation it is not only consistently less than requested (often by two-
thirds), but also earmarked for distribution regardless of need or local epidemiology.lvi 
Certain rural areas have a very high prevalence of poverty, whereas others have a very 
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high absolute number of impoverished persons (e.g., Bong, Lofa, and Nimba). See Figure 
9. The allocation of the health budget from the central to county levels is typically not 
only inadequate, but also inequitably distributed across counties. 
Area Number 
of Poor 
Poverty 
Headcount 
(2007 LISGIS) 
Share of 
Population 
Greater Monrovia 288,695 49% 22% 
Bong,  Nimba, Lofa 660,129 68% 36% 
Gbarpolu, Bomi, Grand Cape 
Mount 
206,547 76% 10% 
Montserrado (outside Monrovia), 
Margibi 
262,678 59% 17% 
Grand Gedeh, Sinoe, River Cess 181,713 77% 9% 
Grand Kru,  Maryland, River Gee 126,044 68% 7% 
National 1,725,806 64% 100% 
Figure 9. Liberia’s Poverty Profile, 2007lvii 
And while vertical programs and interventions may ensure their specific activities 
are carried out, it handicaps the CHTs to implement other, non-vertically-funded 
activities as needed. Thus, effective capacity to translate inputs (DAH) and outputs 
(increased worker skills and improved systems) into health outcomes is constrained. The 
health sector does not operate independent from the rest of the GOL. As such, these 
challenges, at all levels and across sectors, must be addressed for Liberia to develop a 
truly transformative and resilient health system. 
Disease-Specific Funding and Fragmentation 
Money flows (Global Fund, PEPFAR, Gates, etc.) to address priority infectious 
diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, etc.) have brought many benefits including reductions 
in HIV/AIDS related morbidity and mortality, yet have also shifted attention away from 
integrated, systems-thinking toward maximizing disease-specific outcomes and regular 
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donor reporting. Due to weak health information systems, disease-specific interventions 
have necessitated the establishment of parallel management systems (for HR, supply 
chain, service delivery, and health information).  
Fragmentation leads to inefficient, non-integrated service delivery systems and 
impacts the sustainability of health outcomes due to, in part, inefficient allocation of 
resources (time, budget, human resources) and excessive burden on clinical staff. A co-
coverage study of eight essential interventions (DTP, BCG, measles, TT, vitamin A, 
ANC, skilled delivery, safe water supply) in eight countries showed that less than 1% of 
households had access to all these interventions at the same time.lviii Though integration 
of services (e.g., HIV and family planning) is often indicated as a priority in donor 
solicitations, the funding rarely supports substantial, comprehensive integration. Ensuring 
coverage of the eight essential interventions noted in the study above would not only 
require integrated services within the health sector, but also multisector approaches that 
are historically vastly under-funded (multisector programs accounted for just 4% of total 
ODA in Liberia in 2013).lix 
However, fragmentation is not the only influential factor. Developing country 
health systems, such as that in Liberia, often have limited absorptive (financial) capacity 
(or ability to translate available resources into effective public investments), inadequate 
supply of skilled human resources, issues with poorly designed systems, protocols and 
procedures (i.e., “bureaucratic sclerosis”,  or marked system inefficiencies12), and 
corruption.  																																																								
12 Dr. Theo Lippeveld described inefficient health system operations as typified by “bureaucratic 
sclerosis.” 
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Health System Strengthening 
According to WHO, a health system consists of all the actors, institutions and 
resources that undertake actions (e.g., removing barriers to delivery, use, and quality of 
care), where the primary intent is to promote, restore or maintain population health. This 
is done through interrelated inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes (e.g., ensuring that 
the financial burden of paying for health is fairly distributed across households; that 
services are responsive to client needs and culture), ultimately improving or maintaining 
health. According to WHO’s Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, the four 
vital functions of health systems are: 
(1) Stewardship: government oversight inclusive of defining the vision and direction 
of health policy, exerting influence through regulation, and collecting and using 
key data. 
(2) Resource generation: encompassing critical inputs such as human resources, 
physical capital, and drugs and medical supplies; 
(3) Service provision: including formal and informal, public and private, and includes 
management of service delivery; and 
(4) Financing: including the volume and sources of financial resources available for 
the health system, including mechanisms for pooling resources and transferring 
them to service providers.lx  
How a Health System Influences Population Health: the Determinants of Health 
In order to maintain or improve population health, a health system must influence 
one or more of the five major determinants of health: genetics, behavior, social (including 
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economic) circumstances, environmental and physical influences, and medical care.lxi lxii 
While no consensus has been established for the relative contribution of various health 
factors on health outcomes, recent studies have reliably estimated that access to clinical 
care accounts for no more than one-fifth of health outcomes.lxiii lxiv Figure 10 shows the 
results from three studies on the estimated relative contribution of health determinants on 
health outcomes. While each study measured a slightly different set of variables, it is 
clear across all three that health behaviors is a leading determinant, whereas the clinical 
care accounts for not more than 10–20% of health outcomes. 
While clinical care itself has a smaller impact on health than individual behaviors 
or social and economic factors, the larger health care sector can also influence these other 
factors; in particular health behavior. Further, it is possible that in Liberia the physical 
environment may make up a somewhat higher proportion than the 5–20% estimates 
presented in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. Contribution of Health Determinants on Health Outcomes: Results 
from Three Studies  	
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Sources, from top to bottom: 
 
(1) Bridget Booske et al., “County Health Rankings Working Paper Different 
Perspectives for Assigning Weights to Determinants of Health,” February 2010. 
(2) J. Michael McGinnis, Pamela Williams-Russo, and James R. Knickman, “The 
Case For More Active Policy Attention To Health Promotion,” Health Affairs 21, 
no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 78–93, doi:10.1377/hlthaff.21.2.78. 
(3) Center for Prevention Services (U.S.) and Health Analysis and Planning for 
Prevention, Ten Leading Causes of Death in the United States, 1977. (Atlanta, 
Ga.: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Center for 
Disease Control, Bureau of State Services, Health Analysis and Planning for 
Preventive Services, 1980). 
 
The 2010 Global Burden of Disease study found that of the top 15 risk factors in 
Liberia, many are directly influenced by the physical environment. Water, sanitation and 
indoor air pollution account for the majority of diarrheal and lower respiratory infections 
in Liberia. The risk of diarrheal disease from sub-optimal breastfeeding (e.g., 
supplementing with bottle feeding in areas with poor water quality) is also strongly 
associated with environmental factors.lxv 
There is vast literature on the significant impact on health outcomes resulting 
from targeting specific, mostly behavioral health determinants such as smoking cessation 
or diet and physical exercise.lxvi lxvii lxviii lxix  On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged 
that health behaviors take place within and are heavily influenced by larger social and 
economic contexts.lxx lxxi lxxii Thus, health behaviors, or any one of the five major 
determinants, should therefore not be thought to be the sole drivers of health outcomes. 
Acknowledging this, many studies recommend increased focus on linking HSS activities 
to health outcomes.lxxiii lxxiv lxxv lxxvi  lxxvii 
To maximally influence health outcomes, actions must address multiple 
determinants (quality medical care, health behaviors, social and physical environments), 
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but also simultaneously address these determinants through all sectors (health, education, 
government, private/business and NGO). And while it is ideal that all projects would link 
their actions to impacts beyond the specific disease and sector of interest, it is unrealistic 
to think that any one project or organization would be able to take on all health 
determinants and work through all sectors simultaneously. Thus, part of the role of a 
MOH is to ensure that the largest drivers of health, the primary determinants in a country, 
are adequately being addressed through the myriad of health-related interventions and 
programs in the country. As of now Liberia, like many other countries, does not possess 
this capacity. Similarly, the role of WHO should in part be to encourage holistic, 
systems-wide approaches to assessing the key health determinants in a country, and to 
provide tested models for local adaption and implementation.  
Management of a Health System 
While the government is responsible for all four of the main functions of a health 
system (stewardship, resource generation, service provision and financing), there are 
other essential actors. The main actors in a health system include: (1) the government as 
steward, financing body, health service provider, and for health promotion; (2) NGO 
sector as health service provider and/or health promotion; (3) in some countries, 
parastatal health services, such as those operated by corporations solely for the benefit of 
their employees (e.g., Liberia Firestone), (4) traditional health care providers (e.g., 
traditional healers, traditional birth attendants); (5) private sector; and (6) patients/clients 
and the community at large. 
According to Theo Lippeveld, Vice President JSI’s International Division, a 
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national health system has specific management functions related to (1) individual care 
management, (2) health unit management, and (3) health system management.lxxviii lxxix 
At the individual care/client management level, the health system: 
• Makes curative/preventive case management decisions based on evidence-based 
standardized guidelines (quality of care); 
• Ensures follow-up with patients with chronic disease or risk episodes (continuity of 
care); and 
• Reduces missed opportunities by checking immunization and nutritional status 
(integrated care) 
At the health facility level, the health system has service delivery and 
administrative functions: 
• Provides a standard package of services to target groups in the facility catchment 
area;  
• Ensures quality of care of the services provided; 
• Ensures sufficient supplies of essential drugs; 
• Ensures financial management of the health facility (adapted to financing 
mechanisms of the health services); and 
• Improves client satisfaction (e.g., reduce waiting times). 
At the health system level (e.g., county/district and central levels), the health 
system is responsible for coordination and management support for delivery of health 
care services and for public health functions: 
• Health legislation and regulation;  
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• Resource allocation decisions; 
• Prevention and control of disease, including emergency response to disease 
outbreaks; 
• Improving access to and utilization of health services and commodities; 
• Health promotion and education;  
• Providing supportive supervision to the health facilities; 
• Managing the health information systems (facility/services, human resources, supply 
chain, financial, ad hoc studies and population-based surveys, census, etc.); and 
• Other public health services such as school health, occupational health, veterinary 
health services, and public health laboratories. lxxx lxxxi 
Collectively, a national health system oversees the four main functions of 
stewardship, resource generation, financing, and service provision, which includes and 
necessitates long-term planning and day-to-day management.  
Health Systems Constraints to Promoting, Maintaining and Improving Population Health 
Global experience shows that while lack of funding is often a major constraint, 
one cannot expect progress by just pouring money into an ineffective health system. A 
number of analogies have been made between a functioning health system and a 
functioning plumbing system.lxxxii lxxxiii Equating water to funding, WHO described a 
viable health system as follows: “[W]ater cannot be provided to a building simply by 
filling storage tanks. There must be pipes through which the water can flow and these 
must not be too narrow, or clogged, or full of holes; there must be valves that direct it to 
where it is needed; and the system of pipes and valves must extend throughout the 
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building.”lxxxiv 
According to WHO, the key constraints to scaling up health services in order to 
achieve the ultimate objective of a health system—population health—can be categorized 
into five areas. These areas, along with specific constraints in each, are listed in Table 4. 
  
Table 4. Constraints to Scaling up Health Services 
Level of Constraint Types of Constraint 
I. Community and 
household level 
■ Lack of demand for effective interventions 
■ Barriers to use of effective interventions: physical, financial, social 
II. Health services 
delivery level 
■ Shortage and distribution of appropriately qualified staff 
■ Weak technical guidance, program management, and supervision 
■ Inadequate drugs and medical supplies 
■ Lack of equipment and infrastructure, including labs and 
communications) and poor accessibility of health services 
III. Health sector 
policy and strategic 
management level 
■ Weak and overly centralized systems for planning and management 
■ Weak drug policies and supply system 
■ Inadequate regulation of pharmaceutical and private sectors and 
improper industry practices 
■ Lack of inter-sectoral action and partnership for health between 
government and civil society 
■ Weak incentives to use inputs efficiently and respond to user needs 
and preferences 
■ Reliance on donor funding that reduces flexibility and ownership 
■ Donor practices that damage country policies 
IV. Public policies 
cutting across 
sectors 
■ Government bureaucracy 
■ Poor availability of communication and transport infrastructure 
V. Environmental 
characteristics 
A. Governance and overall policy framework 
■ Corruption, weak government, weak rule of law and enforceability 
of contracts 
■ Political instability and insecurity 
■ Low priority attached to social sectors 
■ Weak structure for public accountability 
■ Lack of free press 
B. Physical environment 
■ Climatic and geographic predisposition to disease 
■ Physical environment unfavorable to service delivery 
Source: Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, Strengthening Health Systems: 
The Role and Promise of Policy and Systems Research. (Geneva: Alliance for Health 
Policy and Systems Research, 2004). 
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While some countries may face a few of the constraints listed in the above table, 
Liberia’s National Health and Social Welfare Policy and Plan 2010–2021 outlines health 
system constraints at each of the five levels.lxxxv lxxxvi In order to sustainably scale up 
health services in Liberia, health systems strengthening is needed at each level. 
What is Health Systems Strengthening? 
In June 2009, the Global Fund defined health systems strengthening as “building 
capacity in critical components of [the] health system to achieve more equitable and 
sustained improvements across health services and health outcomes.”lxxxvii   
WHO lists two definitions of health systems strengthening in their HSS 
Glossary:lxxxviii  
1) the process of identifying and implementing the changes in policy and practice in 
a country’s health system, so that the country can respond better to its health and 
health system challenges;lxxxix and  
2) any array of initiatives and strategies that improves one or more of the functions 
of the health system and that leads to better health through improvements in 
access, coverage, quality, or efficiency. xc 
Frameworks for Assessing the Health System 
Over the years, researchers have developed a number of frameworks in an attempt 
to describe and summarize complex health systems. According to Van Olmen et al., 
health system frameworks typically attempt to: (1) conceptualize and describe,13 (2) 																																																								
13 E.g., health system functions (financing, governance, service provision, human resources, 
medicines and technologies, information), participants (households, governments, political leaders 
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analyze processes and outcomes,14 or (3) analyze specific aspects of the health system.15 
xci 
As summarized by Shakarishvili, some of the most common health system 
frameworks include: 
• Actors framework (Evans R, 1981) 
• Fund flows and payment framework (Hurst J 1991) 
• Demand-supply framework (Cassels, 1995) 
• Performance framework (WHO, 2000) 
• Control knobs framework (Hsiao, 2003) 
• Reforms framework (Roberts M, Hsiao W, Berman P, Reich M 2004)  
• Public management framework (Khaleghian, Das Gupta, 2004) 
• Capacity framework (Mills A, Rasheed F, Tollman S, 2006) 
• Building blocks framework (WHO, 2007) 
• Essential public health functions framework (PAHO, 2008) 
• Systems framework (Atun, 2008) 
• Primary Health Care (WHO, 2008). xcii 
Hsiao and Siadat further classified major health systems frameworks into 
descriptive, analytical, and deterministic and predictive categories (see Table 5).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
and constituents, private sector, donors, global initiatives, providers), attributes (fairness, 
responsiveness, effectiveness, choice) 
14 E.g., inputs and processes (information, drugs, finance, human resources, infrastructure, 
technology, incentives), outputs (volume and distribution of services delivered), outcomes (health 
status improvements) 
15 E.g., levels (community, local, national, regional, global), health problems (TB, HIV, malaria, 
pneumonia, diarrhea), beneficiaries (poor, women, rural, children, sick, chronic patients) 
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Table 5. Classification of Health Systems Frameworks 
Type Perspective Researchers / Organizations 
Descriptive  
Sub-systems  Various 
National 
Roemer (1991, 1993) 
European Observatory (HiTS) 
Analytical 
Funds Flow 
OECD, Hurst (1992) 
Anell and Willis (2000) 
Docteur and Oxley (2003) 
Functional 
 
Londono and Frenk (1997) 
WHO (2000) 
Mills and Ranson (2001, 2006) 
The World Bank (2007) 
The Global Fund (2008) 
Statistical Correlation 
Nixon and Ulmann (2006) 
Anand and Bärnighausen 
(2004) 
Deterministic and 
predictive 
Actuarial models Office of the Actuary, CMS 
Economic models 
Yett, Drabak, Intriligator, et al. 
(1972) 
Feldstein-Friedman (1976) 
Macro-policy model 
Hsiao (1997) 
Roberts, et. al. (2003) 
Source: George Shakarishvili et al., “Converging Health Systems Frameworks: Towards 
a Concepts-to-Actions Roadmap for Health Systems Strengthening in Low and Middle 
Income Countries,” Global Health Governance 3, no. 2 (2010), 
http://www.ghgj.org/Shakarishvili_Converging%20Health%20Systems%20Frameworks.
pdf. 
 
 Chee et al.’s HSS cube is one attempt at summarizing the array of initiatives and 
strategies that improves one or more of the functions of the health system. Based on the 
WHO Building Blocks framework, Chee et al. differentiate between activities that simply 
support a health system, and those that strengthen the health system in their HSS cube in 
Figure 11. 
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Source: Grace Chee et al., “Why Differentiating between Health System Support and 
Health System Strengthening Is Needed,” The International Journal of Health Planning 
and Management 28, no. 1 (January 2013): 85–94, doi:10.1002/hpm.2122.  
Figure 11. Health Systems Support versus Health Systems Strengthening 
 
For each of the six WHO health system building blocks, Chee’s cube identifies 
performance drivers at the individual/behavioral level, the organizational/health unit level 
and at the systems level/policies and regulation. The cube is useful in that by linking the 
WHO building block framework with WHO’s health system management level 
framework, it identifies specific areas of potential intervention that drive performance at 
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each management level, thus facilitating both long-term planning and day-to-day 
management. Examples include actions in each of the six building blocks:  
• Strengthened clinical quality assurance and quality improvement; 
• Increase the availability and deployment of providers, including community workers; 
• Improve the availability and use of high-quality information;  
• Reduce stock-outs of essential commodities; 
• Reduce financial barriers to essential services; and 
• Increase accountability for resources and results. 
The history and evolution of health systems frameworks was described by Van 
Olmen et al., notes that the development of new frameworks “does not reflect a 
progressive accumulation of insights” but rather is a reflection of the political and 
economic environments and the paradigms of their authors.xciii 
Established frameworks vary from linear (e.g., building blocks) to more interdependent 
and complex (e.g., systems). What most have in common is an attempt to understand and 
simplify the complexity of health systems, and to help guide both design of HSS 
interventions and monitoring and evaluation of those interventions.  
WHO Health Systems Building Blocks: From Disease Silos to Building Block Silos 
In 2007, WHO published their landmark article on health systems strengthening, 
Everybody’s Business: Strengthening Health Systems to Improve Health Outcomes: 
WHO’s Framework for Action. Subsequently, like the RBHS project, the majority of HSS 
program interventions and evaluations reviewed were based on the WHO Health Systems 
Building Blocks framework, or some modification thereof.xciv xcv xcvi The framework, in 
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Figure 12. WHO HSS Framework 
Figure 12, outlines six key building blocks that make up health systems, four functions 
the health system aims to fulfill related to health services (center), and four overall 
goals/outcomes. 
 
 The widespread use of the building blocks framework may be in part attributable 
to the adoption of the framework by the USG. Figure 13 shows the USG Global Health 
Initiative HSS Results Framework that has been agreed on by all USG partners within the 
Obama administration (e.g., CDC, USAID, DOD, Peace Corps). The framework is based 
on the WHO building blocks framework, and includes key processes and outputs, four 
outcomes (financial protection, essential package of health services, population coverage, 
and responsiveness), leading to sustained system performance and health outcomes. 	  
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Figure 13. Global Health Initiative HSS Results Framework  
Source: “United States Government Global Health Principles Monitoring and Evaluation 
Resource Guide — MEASURE Evaluation,” Publication, accessed August 18, 2015, 
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/measure/publications/ms-14-85.
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Despite its widespread use, the building blocks framework has been criticized for 
being too linear, ignoring the complexity and causal loops inherent in a health system. 
In 2007, WHO defined HSS as “improving these six health system building blocks and 
managing their interactions in ways that achieve more equitable and sustained 
improvements across health services and health outcomes. It requires both technical and 
political knowledge and action.” xcvii At the time, managing the interactions between and 
among building blocks was an explicit objective in the WHO building blocks framework. 
However, in practice, the systems-wide focus on assessing and managing interactions 
among building blocks was lost. 
The common focus by donors and implementing partners on only one or a few 
building blocks at a time, and the general lack of addressing the interactions between and 
among them, is not in line with the original intent of the framework as outlined in 
WHO’s landmark document.xcviii Nonetheless, the misapplication of the framework is 
prevalent even within WHO itself.  
In 2010, three years after the development of the building block framework, 
WHO’s Monitoring the Building Blocks of Health Systems: A Handbook of Indicators 
and their Measurement Strategies, noted that the building block framework:  
“The building blocks approach is a useful means for locating, describing and 
classifying heath system constraints, for identifying where and why investments are 
needed, what will happen as a result, and by what means the change can be monitored.”  
 
--George Shakarishvili et al., “Converging Health Systems Frameworks: Towards a Concepts-to-
Actions Roadmap for Health Systems Strengthening in Low and Middle Income Countries,”  
Global Health Governance 3, no. 2 (2010) 	
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“does not address the underlying social and economic determinants of health, 
such as gender inequities or education, and also does not deal with the substantial 
and dynamic links and interactions that exist across each component. On the other 
hand, focusing on these separate components helps put boundaries around this 
complex construct and permits the identification of indicators and measurement 
strategies for monitoring progress.” xcix  
Thus, it is not surprising that a majority of HSS program interventions and their 
respective evaluations neglected to measure multiple building blocks nor the interactions 
among them.  
One study found that “out of 106 evaluations, less than half (43%) asked broad 
research questions to allow for comprehensive assessment…across multiple HS building 
blocks.” In this same study, only seven of the 106 evaluations reviewed explored impact 
across multiple building blocks, illustrating the limitations to date of HSS programs, and 
evaluations of HSS interventions.c  
According to Chee et al., we are now siloing building blocks whereas before it 
was siloing diseases. Financing is linked to information, and the information being 
prioritized and collected is linked to commodities or specific sub-components.ci  
Resilience 
Measuring complexity of health systems includes measuring capacities (at 
individual, organizational and systems levels), sustainability of capacities, and, as of late, 
resilience (incorporating the concepts of emergency preparedness). These three related 
and often elusive terms have each gained in popularity in the health and development 
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field over the past few decades.  
In addition to each being described as both processes and outcomes, they each 
have multiple (often overlapping) definitions, and a multitude of (often similar) 
approaches undertaken to increase capacity, sustainability, and resilience at each of the 
health system levels.cii ciii civ Capacity, sustainability and resilience are all part of a 
complex-adaptive health system. Each relies on the other, and on consideration of the 
larger, complex, influential contexts in which they are promoted.cv Further, capacity, 
sustainability and resilience are each required at each level of the health system: 
individual, organizational, and systems.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, I will primarily focus on the system level, and 
define capacity as an outcome, sustainability as an attribute of capacity, and resilience as 
a process that supports sustainable health outcomes and capacities.  
Sustainability vs. Resilience 
Capacity is defined simply as: “the ability to carry out stated objectives.”cvi 
According to Dr. Christopher Gill at BUSPH, “capacity is not a fixed construct, but a 
relative quality whose adequacy depends on one’s objectives.” 
At the system level, sustainable capacity is achievable through adequate 
“personnel and economic management, planning systems, logistics, decision-making 
systems, flow of information, institutional development, creativity and external 
relations”.cvii  In other words, a health system is sustainable when there is adequate 
capacity in each of the WHO health system building blocks so that they are effectively 
functioning and interacting. Sustainability is a desired attribute of improved capacities.  
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 While the concept of resilience as applied to health systems has its roots in the 
crisis and disaster management fields, both sustainability and resilience refer to a 
system’s ability to adapt to shocks (e.g., Ebola) while maintaining basic functioning (e.g., 
basic health services). However, sustainability is an attribute; something is either 
sustainable or it is not. Resilience, on the other hand, is a process; it can increase (or 
decrease) over time. Thus, as resilience is enhanced, an entity is better able to mitigate 
identifiable stresses and shocks, and better able to respond to those that cannot be 
predicted or avoided. Building resilience in a health system requires: (1) collaboration 
across disciplines, sectors and organizations; (2) ongoing, iterative learning; and (3) 
transformational leadership.  
Defining Resilience 
Resilience is not a new topic. Like systems thinking, resilience research has 
historically been applied in diverse fields such as biology, engineering, economics and 
ecology, though has been gaining increased momentum in public health over the past five 
years.cviii This is evidenced by the fact that USAID, a major international development 
donor, has incorporated the concept into their most recent mission statement: “We partner 
to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our 
security and prosperity.”cix  
There are a multitude of specific resilience definitions corresponding to all the 
sectors in which the term has been applied. In health, resilience has largely been part of 
the vernacular in crisis and disaster management, which is reflected in the definitions. 
Castelden et al. conducted a systematic review of 61 research papers on concepts of 
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resilience. In doing so, they summarized the main types of resilience relevant to public 
health protection (see Table 6).	
Table 6. Types of Resilience 
Type of Resilience Definition 
Disaster resilience Capability of a community or society to resist and 
recover from a disaster 
Community resilience Capability (or process) of a community adapting 
and functioning in the face of disturbance 
Ecosystem or social–ecological 
resilience 
Capacity of natural and social systems to absorb 
disturbance while remaining within the same 
functional state 
Infrastructure resilience Capacity of built infrastructure to continue 
functioning during disasters. This might include 
roads, buildings and bridges 
Individual or psychological 
resilience 
Capacity of individuals or groups of people to cope 
with adversity and continue functioning. 
Network resilience Fault tolerance in a physical network (e.g., 
communications, water, power systems) 
Urban resilience  Capacity of a city/urban area to resist and recover 
from disturbances 
Organizational resilience Capacity of an organization to resist and recover 
from disturbances 
Source: Matthew Castleden et al., “Resilience Thinking in Health Protection,” Journal of 
Public Health (Oxford, England) 33, no. 3 (September 2011): 369–77, 
doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdr027. 
 
According to Castleden et al., the relevance of the resilience concept to public 
health protection is that it focuses on the capacity of public health systems to “cope with 
broad societal and environmental changes; links between biodiversity and health, and 
climate change and health.” cx 
Common themes emerged from Castleden et al.’s review of definitions of 
resilience across very different disciplines.  These include:  
• Communication (including physical telecommunication, organizational 
communication, and via social networks that promote community cohesion) 
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• Adaptive capacity 
• Risk awareness 
• Trust and social cohesion (or social capital) 
• Good governance 
• Adequate planning and preparation 
• Redundancy of critical systems 
• Regional economic capacity and economic diversification 
• Population’s underlying physical and mental health.cxi 
For use in social sciences, the above themes have been repackaged by numerous 
researchers. For example, Speranza et al. define resilience in the context of social-
ecological dynamics, simplifying the above aspects into three elements: 
• Buffer capacity: including understanding of assets (human, natural, financial, social 
and physical capital) and vulnerabilities;  
• Self-organization: including institutions, cooperation and networks, network 
structure, opportunity for self-organization, and reliance on own resources; and 
• Capacity for learning: knowledge of threats and opportunities, shared societal 
(collective) vision, commitment to learning, knowledge identification capability, 
knowledge sharing capability, knowledge transfer capability, and functioning 
feedback mechanisms.cxii 
Grouping many of the above elements into five categories, Kruk et al. define a 
resilient health system as being:  
• Aware: possessing an up-to-date asset map highlighting strengths and vulnerabilities; 
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• Diverse: addressing multiple health needs in times of calm (ideally universal health 
coverage) resulting in enhanced public trust; 
• Self-regulating: ability to quickly identify threat and target resources to it while 
minimizing disruption to essential health services, and redundant capacity; 
• Integrated: including pre-existing legislation that can facilitate rapid reassignment of 
resources (funds, personnel, etc.) as needed (i.e., adequate planning and preparation, 
good governance); and  
• Having adaptive capacity.cxiii 
In her book, The Resilience Dividend: Being Strong in a World Where Things Go 
Wrong, Rodin lists the same five elements but explicitly adds ‘redundant capacities’, 
(which Kruk et al. incorporate into the ‘self-regulation’ category). Rodin defines 
redundant capacity as having explicit lines of command for managing unexpected shocks, 
and thus being able to target and reassign resources as needed (which Kruk puts into the 
‘integration’ category).cxiv  
Acquiring knowledge of, communicating information on, and effectively 
responding to and learning from threats and disruptions is a common theme across all 
frameworks.  
Resilient Health Systems vs. Health Systems with Effective Emergency Preparedness  
In addition to there being considerable overlap among the different resilience 
frameworks, there is also a profound similarity between the definition of resilience and of 
emergency preparedness. 
		
49 
Public health emergency preparedness is: “the capability of the public health and 
health-care systems, communities, and individuals to prevent, protect against, quickly 
respond to, and recover from health emergencies, particularly those whose scale, timing,  
or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine capabilities.”cxv 
Similarly, resilience is defined as “the capacity of any entity—an individual, a 
community, an organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover 
from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience.”cxvi 
Emergency preparedness and resilience are both processes. They both include the notion 
of a system being able to prepare for, respond to and recover from disruptions. The main 
difference is in the explicit addition of the concept of adaptability in the resilience 
definition. While one may argue adaptability is implicit in the emergency preparedness 
definition; it is explicit in the resilience definition. 
It is important to note that in addition to there being significant overlap in 
definitions of increased resilience and emergency preparedness, there is also overlap in 
the specific activities that constitute resilience building and emergency preparedness, as 
well as routine public health practice and system strengthening activities. For example, 
routine public health activities such as promoting safety and health, reducing the burden 
of disease, and building social capital can also be viewed as building community 
resilience. Similarly, public health emergency preparedness, such as strengthening 
communities to resist health hazards through regular public health communication can be 
viewed as general community health or systems strengthening activities. cxvii  
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Core Concepts: 
 
Capacity: the ability to carry out stated objectives. Capacity is not a fixed construct, 
but a relative quality whose adequacy depends on one’s objectives. 
Sustainability: the ability to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., Ebola) while 
maintaining basic functioning (e.g., basic health services). Sustainability is a desired 
attribute; something is either sustainable or it is not.  
Emergency preparedness: the capacity to prevent, protect against, quickly respond to, 
and recover from emergencies, particularly those whose scale, timing, or 
unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine capabilities. Emergency preparedness 
is a process; there can be different levels of emergency preparedness. 
Resilience: the capacity to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and 
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience.  Resilience is a process; 
there can be different levels of resilience. Resilience incorporates the concept of 
emergency preparedness. For an overall health system to be sustainable, to maintain 
basic functioning in times of shock, it must have high resilience. 
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METHODS 
Aim and Objectives 
This dissertation aims to provide evidence to the GOL that will help them build a 
more resilient health system in the post-Ebola period. To achieve this aim, there are three 
objectives. 
Objective 1: Using the WHO Health System Building Blocks framework, 
identify the post-war capacity gains in the Liberian health system across each of the six 
building blocks from 2009–2014. 
Objective 2: Document the impact of the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic on the 
Liberian health system across each of the six WHO Health System Building Blocks. 
Objective 3: Using the WHO-defined key emergency-preparedness components 
and attributes, assess the extent to which each WHO Health System Building Block 
incorporated resilience to threats into its structure and function as of 2015, and into 
current recovery and resilience plans through 2021.  
The presence or absence of key WHO-defined emergency-preparedness 
components and attributes in the Liberian system in 2015, organized according to the six 
WHO Health System Building Blocks, was compared to current government priorities 
outlined in the Liberian Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System 2015–
2021, and the April 2016 draft National Epidemic Preparedness and Response Plan. 
Identified gaps in necessary resilience components form the basis for recommendations 
to the Liberian MOH aimed at ensuring a more resilient health system with an increased 
ability to prepare for, respond to, and adapt from future epidemics and other shocks. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The dissertation is guided by the WHO health systems strengthening framework 
and the WHO essential health system emergency preparedness components and 
attributes.  
WHO health systems strengthening framework 
An underlying premise on which the WHO health systems strengthening 
framework was built is that all system building block gaps should be addressed 
simultaneously (see Figure 12 above). This framework was applied to: (1) measure the 
capacity changes in the health system during the time frame in which the USAID-funded 
Rebuilding Basic Health Services project was implemented, from 2009–2014; (2) 
organize the impact of the Ebola epidemic on the health system; and (3) structure the 
assessment of resilience using the WHO emergency preparedness components and 
attributes. 
WHO Components of Effective Emergency Preparedness Programs 
Improving the six WHO health system building blocks theoretically strengthens 
the internal function of routine health care service provision and management. The 
building blocks framework does not however incorporate components and attributes 
within each building block that address emergency preparedness or crisis management in 
times of non-routine situations. Thus, in addition to applying the WHO building blocks 
framework, an emergency preparedness framework was applied to assess resilience, 
allowing for a deeper analysis of the six WHO building block components in light of 
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health system resiliency.  
To do this, the WHO-defined 16 elements and 51 attributes of effective 
emergency-preparedness programs was used to assess the current resiliency of the 
Liberian health system (as of 2015), as well as to guide a review of the Liberian 
Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System 2015–2021 and April 2016 draft 
National Epidemic Preparedness and Response Plan, thus identifying whether current 
government priorities address each of the necessary resilience components.cxviii cxix cxx cxxi 
Table 7 outlines the WHO-defined key components and essential attributes of 
strengthened health system emergency preparedness, organized according to the six 
WHO Health System Building Blocks. 
Table 7. WHO Key Components and Essential Attributes of Strengthened Health 
System Emergency Preparedness* 
6 WHO 
Building 
Blocks 
16 Key components 
 
51 Essential attributes 
 
1. Leader-
ship and 
governance 
(BB6) * 
 
1.1 Legal framework 
for national multi-
sectoral emergency 
management 
1. Laws, policies, plans and procedures relevant to 
national multi-sectoral emergency management 
2. National structure for multi-sectoral emergency 
management and coordination 
1.2 Legal framework 
for health-sector 
emergency 
management 
3. Laws, policies, plans and procedures relevant to 
health-sector emergency management 
4. Structure for health-sector emergency management 
and coordination 
5. Regulation of external health-related emergency 
assistance 
1.3 National 
institutional 
framework for 
multi-sectoral 
emergency 
management 
6. National committee for multi-sectoral emergency 
management 
7. National operational entity for multi-sectoral 
emergency management 
1.4 National 
institutional 
8. National committee for health-sector emergency 
management 
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framework for 
health-sector 
emergency 
management 
9. National operational entity for health-sector 
emergency management 
10. Mechanisms of coordination and partnership-
building 
1.5 Components of 
national programme 
on health-sector 
emergency 
management 
11. National health-sector program on risk reduction 
12. Multi-sectoral and health-sector programs on 
emergency preparedness 
13. National health-sector plan for emergency 
response and recovery 
14. Research and evidence base 
2. Health 
workforce  
 
2.1 Human 
resources for health-
sector emergency 
management 
15. Development of human resources 
16. Training and education 
3. Medical 
products, 
vaccines 
and 
technology 
 
3.1 Medical supplies 
and equipment for 
emergency-response 
operations 
17. Medical equipment and supplies for prehospital 
and hospital (including temporary health facilities) 
activities and other public health interventions 
18. Pharmaceutical services 
19. Laboratory services 
20. Blood services 
4. Health 
information  
 
4.1 Information-
management 
systems for risk-
reduction and 
emergency 
preparedness 
programs 
21. Information system for risk assessment and 
emergency preparedness planning 
22. National health information system 
23. National and international information-sharing 
24. Surveillance systems 
4.2 Information-
management 
systems for 
emergency response 
and recovery 
25. Rapid health-needs assessment 
26. Multi-sectoral initial rapid assessment (IRA) 
27. Emergency reporting system 
4.3 Risk 
communication  
28. Strategies for risk communication with the public 
and the media 
29. Strategies for risk communication with staff 
involved in emergency operations 
5. Health 
financing  
 
5.1 National and 
subnational 
strategies for 
financing health-
sector emergency 
management 
 
30. Multi-sectoral mechanisms of financing 
emergency preparedness and management 
31 Health-sector financing mechanisms 
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6. Service 
delivery  
(BB1) * 
 
6.1 Response 
capacity and 
capability  
32. Subnational health-sector emergency-response 
plans 
33. Surge capacity for subnational health-sector 
response 
34. Management of prehospital medical operations 
35. Management of situations involving mass-fatality 
and missing persons 
6.2 EMS system and 
mass-casualty 
management 
36. Capacity for mass-casualty management 
6.3 Management of 
hospitals in mass 
casualty incidents 
37. Hospital emergency-preparedness program 
38. Hospital plans for emergency response and 
recovery 
6.4 Continuity of 
essential health 
programs and 
services 
39. Continuous delivery of essential health and 
hospital services 
40. Prevention and control of communicable diseases 
and immunization 
41. Mother-and-child health care and reproductive 
health 
42. Mental health and psychosocial support 
43. Environmental health 
44. Chronic and non-communicable diseases 
45. Nutrition and food safety 
46. Primary health care 
47. Health services for displaced populations 
6.5 Logistics and 
operational support 
functions in 
emergencies 
48. Emergency telecommunications 
49. Temporary health facilities 
50. Logistics 
51. Service-delivery support function 
*Note: The WHO Emergency Preparedness Framework swaps the number of the building blocks so 
that Leadership and Governance is Building Block 1 and Health Services is Building Block 6; this is 
opposite in the WHO Building Block framework. In this dissertation, I use the WHO Building Block 
Framework designations: Building Block 1 always refers to Health Services provision and Building 
Block 6 always refers to Governance and Leadership 
Source: Strengthening Health-System Emergency Preparedness (Copenhagen: World 
Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, 2012). 
	
Study Design 
The dissertation uses an intrinsic case study methodology that is explanatory in 
nature, with the primary intent to better understand the Liberian health system (i.e., the 
case), while seeking to explain how it could fail after years of noted health systems 
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improvements. According to Stake, case studies can be intrinsic (to better understand the 
case), instrumental (to understand some abstract construct or build theory), or collective 
(to explore differences within or between cases).cxxii Yin further delineates case studies as 
exploratory (when intervention being evaluated has no clear set of outcomes), or 
explanatory (seeking to explain presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are 
too complex for experimental strategies).cxxiii The methodology allows for an in-depth 
assessment of how HSS (using the WHO health system building blocks) and resilience 
factors (using the WHO-defined key aspects of emergency preparedness) exist (or could 
exist) within the Liberian institutional and cultural context, and for tentative conclusions 
to be drawn about the importance of system factors to building specific health system 
capacities and overall health system resilience.  
Data Methods 
Methods applied as part of the case study include document and literature review, 
review of health facility statistics, and key informant and group interviews at the county 
and national levels.  
The literature review above provides an overview of historic donor funding 
priorities, commonly accepted and promoted HSS interventions, and a summary of 
research on resilience. This is followed by: (Objective 1) an analysis of the process and 
associated outcomes of Liberian HSS activities between 2009 and 2014 according to the 
WHO HSS framework (using RBHS project, DHS, and Liberian HMIS data); (Objective 
2) documentation of the impact of Ebola on the health system according to the WHO 
HSS framework (via literature review and using Liberian HMIS data and WHO and 
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MOH Ebola Situation Reports); and (Objective 3) a re-analysis of health system 
capacities through a resilience lens using WHO-defined critical components of 
emergency preparedness.  
Corresponding descriptive health statistics and indicators of health system 
functioning over time were produced and mapped. Mapping was used to help visualize 
basic health, social and economic aspects of Liberia, and relationships, patterns and 
trends in data related to the three objectives. Using ArcGIS 10.3, spatial data was 
manipulated and analyzed to develop maps using DHS, HMIS and GOL data, and WHO 
and MOH Ebola Situation Report data.  
Objective 1: Using the WHO Health System Building Blocks framework, 
identify the post-war capacity gains in the Liberian health system across each of the six 
building blocks from 2009–2014 
The findings for Objective 1 were derived from data obtained for the RBHS 
project, DHS data, and Liberian health facility statistics (HMIS data). A detailed 
qualitative description of health system capacities according to each WHO HSS building 
block was completed. All qualitative data on the health system capacity were collected 
prior to the rapid escalation of the Ebola epidemic in July 2014.  
Using quantitative HMIS data from 2009–2015, counties with over 100 Ebola 
cases throughout the epidemic were grouped and included in the analysis. This consisted 
of six of Liberia’s 15 counties: Bomi, Bong, Lofa, Margibi, Montserrado, and Nimba. 
Data from the same three months (August, September, October) for each of the seven 
years was compared. This allowed for a comparison of health and system indicators over 
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the course of the two phases of the RBHS project (when it oversaw direct service 
provision 2009–2012, and when MOH took over direct service provision in 2013), during 
the Ebola epidemic in 2014, and into the post-Ebola period in 2015.  
Indicators that were graphed as part of the analysis for Objective 1 and Objective 2 
include: 
(1) Health outcomes: 
• Maternal health: skilled deliveries, ANC4, IPT2, couple-years of protection (CYP) 
• Child health: penta3, measles 
• Malaria: Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) usage <5 years of age, RDT 
usage <5 years of age 
(2) Health system indicators: 
• Health services provision: HCT, OPD services  
(3) Ebola cases.  
A detailed description of the data sources, as well as of the RBHS project from 
which the qualitative data for this objective are derived, are described in the following 
section. 
Objective 2: Document the impact of the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic on the 
Liberian health system across each of the six WHO Health System Building Blocks 
The analysis of the impact of the Ebola epidemic on the health system begins with 
an overview of the 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola outbreak, summarized in the Findings 
Overview section. The specific impact of Ebola on each health system component is 
included in the detailed findings for each WHO building block in order to document 
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which capacities identified under Objective 1 withstood the public health emergency, and 
which did not. Liberian HMIS data and WHO and MOH Ebola Situation Report data 
were used to produce maps and time-series graphs (described above) showing changes in 
key health service provision and health system indicators before, during, and after the 
peak in the Ebola epidemic. Maps of Ebola case fatality rates and population density 
were overlaid with cumulative Ebola cases, visually showing correlation between the 
variables. Additional maps showing key social and economic conditions were produced 
and included in Annex 1. 
Objective 3: Using the WHO-defined key emergency-preparedness components 
and attributes, assess the extent to which each WHO Health System Building Block 
incorporated resilience to threats into its structure and function as of 2015, and into 
current recovery and resilience plans through 2021.  
Using the WHO Health System Building Blocks to organize the analysis of the 
health system as of 2015, the presence or absence of 16 WHO-defined emergency-
preparedness key components and 51 key attributes was assessed. This was done by 
ranking each attribute as existing/functioning, partly existing/planned, or non-existent. To 
fill gaps in existing data and confirm scores, additional data were collected from Liberian 
MOH and international NGO key informants who are members of the Epidemic 
Preparedness and Response (EPR) Consortium. The EPR Consortium is currently funded 
by OFDA, and will be absorbed into the MOH Division of Disease Prevention and 
Control once the current Incident Management System (IMS) is deactivated in December 
2016.  
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Findings were then compared to current government priorities outlined in the 
Liberian Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System 2015–2021, and in the 
April 2016 draft Epidemic Preparedness and Response Plan. Identified shortcomings in 
necessary resilience components form the basis for recommendations to the Liberian 
MOH aimed at ensuring a more resilient health system with an increased ability to 
prepare for, respond to, and adapt from future epidemics and other shocks. 
Table 8 summarizes for each of the three objectives the data sources, analysis 
methods, timeframe, geographical scope, software used and guiding framework. 
Table 8. Data Analysis Summary 
Objective  
 
Data 
Sources Method
1 Timing of Collection 
Geographic 
Scope 
Analytic 
Software 
Guiding 
Framework 
Objective 1 
Using the 
WHO HSS 
Building 
Blocks 
framework, 
identify the 
post-war 
capacity gains 
in the Liberian 
health system 
DHS  Re-analysis 2007, 2013 
All 15 
counties;  
5 regions 
Microsoft 
Excel 
WHO 
Building 
Blocks  
 
DHIS2 
(HMIS) data  Re-analysis 2009–2013 
All 15 
counties 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
ArcGIS 
10.3 
RBHS Mid-
term 
evaluation 
and 
Performance 
Based 
Contractor 
(PBC) data 
KII, group 
interview, 
document 
review 
2011 
Central 
MOH; 
Bomi, Bong, 
Grand Cape 
Mount, 
Lofa, Mont-
serrado, 
Nimba, 
River Gee 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
Word 
Capacity 
assessments  
 
KII, group 
interview, 
scoring and 
ranking, 
document 
review 
2012, 2014 
Central 
MOH; Bong, 
Lofa, Nimba 
counties 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
Word 
PRISM 
KII, group 
interview, 
document 
review 
 
2012, 2014 
Central 
MOH; Bong, 
Lofa, Nimba 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
Word 
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Objective 2 
Document the 
impact of the 
Ebola 
epidemic on 
the Liberian 
health system 
Literature 
review; 
MOH 
documents 
Document 
review n/a National 
Microsoft 
Word 
WHO 
Building 
Blocks  
 
DHIS2 
(HMIS) data  Re-analysis 2014–2015 
All 15 
counties 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
ArcGIS 
10.3 
WHO / MOH 
Ebola 
Situation 
Reports 
Document 
review 
May 29, 
2014 –Nov 
2015 
All 15 
counties 
Microsoft 
Excel, 
ArcGIS 
10.3 
Objective 3: 
Liberian 
resilience gaps 
and 
government 
priorities  
MOH 
Investment 
Plan 2015–
2021; 
Epidemic 
Preparedness 
& Response 
Plan April 
2016 
 
Document 
review 2014–2015 National 
Microsoft 
Word 
WHO 
Building 
Blocks, 
WHO 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Key 
Concepts 
and 
Attributes 
1 KII=key informant interviews 
Data Sources 
The dissertation draws upon vast qualitative and quantitative data from the 
following sources: RBHS project data and assessments (2011 RBHS mid-term review, 
2012 and 2014 Performance of Routine Information Systems Management (PRISM) 
assessments, 2012 and 2014 MOH capacity assessments); routine service statistics 
obtained through Liberia’s HMIS; Liberia (MOH and WHO) Ebola situation reports; 
Liberia Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System 2015–2021; April 2016 
draft Epidemic Preparedness and Response Plan; 2007 and 2013 DHS reports and 
datasets; and publicly available geographic information system (GIS) data.  
This section begins with an overview of the RBHS project, geographical scope, 
capacity development process, and evaluation tools and methods to help document the 
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context from which qualitative health system capacity data used for this dissertation were 
obtained. This is followed by a detailed description of each project and non-project data 
source that was used as part of this thesis. 
Rebuilding Basic Health Services (RBHS) Project 
The RBHS Project was the USG's key project in support of the Liberian MOH’s 
National Health Plan and Policy, implemented between November 2008 and February 
2015. JSI Research and Training Institute, Inc. implemented the project in partnership 
with three US-based organizations: Jhpiego, Johns Hopkins University Center for 
Communication Programs (JHU/CCP), and Management Sciences for Health (MSH).  
The first three years of RBHS focused on making sure Liberian citizens had 
increased access to health care services. The MOH had introduced performance-based 
contracting as a component of its five-year transitional National Health Plan in 2007. To 
support this, RBHS entered into five performance-based contracts with four international 
NGOs (and one performance-based grant with a local organization), requiring them to 
provide a core package of basic health services, covering seven of Liberia’s 15 counties. 
The focus was on shifting the mindset and operating practices of existing health 
implementing partners (i.e., traditional humanitarian organizations) from relief to 
development.  
In response to USAID’s new Global Health Initiative, USAID FORWARD, in 
September 2011, USAID began providing direct government to government assistance to 
the MOH through a four-year fixed amount reimbursement agreement (FARA) for up to 
$42 million to support the implementation of Liberia’s National Health and Social 
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Welfare Policy and Plan 2011–2021 (NHSWPP). The FARA mechanism replaced the 
previous arrangement in which USAID funds for service delivery were provided through 
RBHS. The FARA shifted the focus of RBHS from managing service delivery to 
strengthening the MOH’s capacity and contributing to sustainability by increasing the use 
of country systems and institutions to implement development assistance programs. The 
preparation for FARA highlighted capacity-building needs at the central and county 
levels to enable the MOH to carry out required activities and meet deliverables.  
As a result, though the project was measuring clear improvements in project 
indicators, at about the project half way point, RBHS was reconfigured by USAID to 
move from direct management of service delivery in seven counties to MOH capacity 
building and HSS focused on the central MOH and the three USG focus counties: Bong, 
Lofa and Nimba. RBHS turned over management of the PBCs to the MOH, repackaged 
as performance based financing (PBF) which created an internal PBF unit in charge of 
managing the PBC with NGOs. Figure 14 shows the map of RBHS focus counties from 
2009–2012, and then from 2012–2015. 
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This map illustrates RBHS project coverage in the first half of the project, from 2009-2012 and in 
second half of the project,  from mid 2012-2015.  
 	 The NHSWPP highlighted decentralization as a key policy in which Liberia’s 
CHTs would incrementally increase their responsibility for managing all aspects of 
county health service delivery. Recognizing the complexity of decentralization challenges 
and the multi-level solutions necessary to address them, MOH, donors, and partners—
including RBHS—expanded their strategies to include county-and central-level capacity-
building. RBHS efforts focused on efficient use of investments, HSS according to the 
WHO six health system building blocks, and performance improvement, thereby leading 
to better processes and health outcomes. The project focused on simultaneous capacity-
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building at three levels: individual, organizational, and system.  
The capacity-development process, developed jointly by the MOH and RBHS, 
was structured to identify causes of performance gaps, address those gaps through a wide 
array of performance solutions, and enable cyclical processes of continuous performance 
improvement through the establishment of performance monitoring systems.  
The capacity-development process in the second half of the project involved 
assessing baseline capacity and using findings to create capacity-building strategic and 
operational plans addressing each of the three levels. In 2012, RBHS conducted a 
baseline capacity assessment at the central MOH and in Bong, Lofa, and Nimba counties. 
The baseline assessment identified and prioritized capacity strengths and weaknesses at 
both the central and county levels according to the six WHO building blocks of a health 
system.  
Based on the assessment results, the MOH prioritized areas to build capacity with 
technical assistance from RBHS. Following prioritization, a strategic plan was developed 
to address capacity-building in the priority areas. The strategic plan was implemented 
with the help of an operational plan, whereby MOH and RBHS jointly identified 
interventions to build capacity in the priority areas. Figure 15 shows the MOH capacity 
building framework, around which the second half of RBHS was designed. 
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Figure 15. Liberian MOH Capacity Building Framework 
	
I. RBHS Project Data Sources Documenting Health System Capacity 
JSI implemented an internal project assessment in mid-2011 that documented changes 
in health outcomes and health system capacities during the first phase of the project when 
it was responsible for direct service provision. In 2012, a baseline assessment of the 
central and county health sector capacities, and a detailed PRISM assessment of the 
health information system were implemented. In 2014, using the same assessment tools, 
RBHS conducted end of project capacity assessments. The same mixed methods 
approach was used for all assessments including review of RBHS project, MOH and 
USAID documents and key informant and group interviews at the national and county 
levels with the central and county MOH, pre-service training institutions, and 
professional boards.   
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RBHS project data are used in this document to identify capacity changes 
according to the WHO health system building blocks. These data were supplemented 
with health service utilization and outcome data based on 2007 and 2013 DHS, and data 
obtained from Liberia’s HMIS from 2009–2015, each described below. 
RBHS Project Data: 2011 Mid-term Assessment and PBC Data from 2009–2012 
The RBHS project mid-term evaluation, conducted in May 2011, documented 
system capacity and health outcomes as of project mid-term, following which the scope 
and focus shifted away from direct health service management to MOH capacity building 
(see Annex 2 for a list of individuals interviewed in the RBHS mid-term evaluation). This 
included the collection of data from the performance based contracts with five NGOs 
providing direct services in seven counties from 2009–2012. Though many of the WHO 
HSS building blocks were addressed in the first half of the RBHS project, it was not 
designed specifically to address the building blocks, and thus the mid-term evaluation 
was organized by USAID intermediate results.  
RBHS Project Data: Central and County MOH Capacity Assessments, 2012 and 2014 
Corresponding to the RBHS project change in scope, in 2012, a ‘baseline’ 
capacity assessment was conducted with the central MOH and CHTs using the WHO’s 
HSS building blocks framework. The initial assessment led to the establishment of a 
baseline to develop a capacity development action plan across each of the WHO building 
blocks. In May–June 2014, a follow-up capacity assessment was implemented using the 
same tools and framework as the one in 2012 (see Annex 3 for a list of individuals 
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interviewed in the 2012 and 2014 capacity assessments). The tool consisted of a 
quantitative self-assessment and an interview-administered qualitative component, 
addressing each of the six HSS building blocks. 
RBHS Project Data: PRISM Assessments, 2012 and 2014 
Under the RBHS revised project description, the aim of capacity building under 
Building Block 3: Health Information Systems was to improve HMIS performance, 
defined as: 1) the production of quality data; and 2) use of the information generated for 
improved decision-making. To measure HMIS performance, RBHS used the 
Performance of Routine Information System Management (PRISM) tools that are based 
on the PRISM framework. This framework promotes strengthening HMIS performance 
through better data quality and improved information use. It looks into not only technical 
issues related to data generation, but also organizational and behavioral factors that 
hinder the effective use of information. An initial assessment undertaken in May 2012 led 
to the establishment of a baseline to develop an HMIS strengthening action plan. A 
second assessment was undertaken in May 2014. 
II. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, 2007 and 2013 
DHS data was reviewed for key health outcomes associated with Liberia’s essential 
package of health services for which the RBHS project was responsible. While DHS data 
in 2013 was collected to be representative at the county level, it was only sampled at the 
regional level in 2007. Thus, DHS data are only presented at the national level in this 
thesis. 
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III. HMIS (DHIS2) data, 2009–2015 
The national HMIS collects data from public, and to a very limited extent, 
private/mission health facilities throughout Liberia. Data include health services provided 
and outcomes seen and measurable at the facility level. Liberia’s HMIS is built upon 
District Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) software.16 DHIS2 data are used to 
document and map health outcomes, service provision and utilization by county over 
time. HMIS data on health service provision and health outcomes are assessed from 
2009–2013 prior to the Ebola outbreak, during the epidemic in 2014, and following the 
Ebola outbreak in 2015. 
IV. Liberia (MOH and WHO) Ebola situation reports, 2014–2015 
WHO Ebola Situation Reports (http://apps.who.int/ebola/en/ebola-situation-
reports-archive) summarize current and cumulative data and information on all of the 
effected countries in the current West African Ebola outbreak. Data contained in these 
Situation Reports were derived from the affected country’s Ministries of Health. During 
active transmission, case detection and laboratory confirmation of suspected cases, the 
statistics between what was reported in the MOH and WHO Situation Reports varied 
slightly as suspected and probable cases were reclassified as confirmed or not. Over time, 
however, the two data sources should be equivalent. Both WHO Ebola Situation Reports 
and Liberian MOH Situation Reports are used as a cross reference. 
																																																								
16 DHSI2 was developed by HISP, a global south-south-north collaborative network, and is 
supported by the University of Oslo. 
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V. Open Source GIS data 
Data on GPS coordinates for Liberian health facilities and geographic boundaries 
were obtained from the following sources: 
• USAID-funded DHS Spatial Repository (http://spatialdata.dhsprogram.com/data/#/) 
• Tech4Relief: Pushing Humanitarian Relief Head-First into the Tech Age 
(http://www.tech4relief.com/gis) 
• Humanitarian Data Exchange 
(https://data.hdx.rwlabs.org/dataset?q=ebola&sort=metadata_modified+desc&page=2
) 
• Open Humanitarian Data Repository 
(http://ohdr.nethope.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets?q=Liberia&page=5&sort_by=relev
ance) 
Figure 16 shows the timeline of key events and data collection of sources used for 
this dissertation. 
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Figure 16. Timeline of key events  
The researcher and author, Ms. Deirdre Rogers, was directly involved in the 
design and implementation of the RBHS mid-term review and MOH capacity 
assessments, collected as part of the RBHS project evaluation through key informant 
interviews and stakeholder group interviews. The available data and the author’s existing 
familiarity with the RBHS project and Liberia provide a unique opportunity to address 
poorly understood questions about the intersection between activities designed to 
strengthen health systems and those that build resilience.  
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FINDINGS OVERVIEW 
2008 Mindset Shift: 
From Humanitarian Assistance to Development, RBHS 2008–2012 
Following the prolonged civil war, the country was entrenched in a humanitarian 
response with international organizations implementing all basic health services and 
reporting directly to their organizational headquarters, totally independent of the weak 
MOH. Paralleling this were significant disease-specific funding streams into Liberia. This 
resulted in a myriad of vertical programming and associated fragmented systems intended 
to increase the likelihood of short-term outcomes but at the expense of building 
sustainable capacity within the national health system. In late 2008, the GOL and donors 
were transitioning from a humanitarian to a development model, and the RBHS project 
commenced in part with the goal of helping with this transition. 
RBHS took a health systems strengthening approach to deliver capacity-building 
services based on the WHO six health system building blocks. The theory was that 
building capacity—at the individual, organizational, and system levels—within each of 
these six building blocks would contribute to strengthening the entire health system. The 
design acknowledged the dynamic linkages between the building blocks as well as the 
three levels, and that changes in one area influence other areas. The intent was thus to 
address each level and building block simultaneously—either directly through RBHS 
project activities or through other complementary activities undertaken by other 
implementing partners and projects. In addition to the six building blocks, the capacity-
building framework (see figure 15) was in alignment with the National Health Policy and 
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Plan, and driven by the county operational plans and the USG’s FARA funding 
mechanism.  
The interventions and technical areas listed at the beginning of each building 
block section below were designed to address capacity gaps and their root causes agreed 
upon between RBHS staff and Central and County-level MOH staff. RBHS project 
interventions provided extensive training and mentorship of MOH staff at both the 
national and county levels with the aim of promoting sustainability by also strengthening 
systems and processes, i.e., ensuring gains were not personnel dependent. 
In the first half of the project, between 2009 and 2012, RBHS: (1) directly 
managed NGO contracts to provide a basic package of health services in 118 health 
facilities in seven counties or Bong, Lofa, Nimba, River Gee, Grand Cape Mount, Bomi 
and Montserrado (see Figure 17 for a map of Liberian health facilities by county); (2) 
conducted BCC campaigns on malaria prevention, early diagnosis and treatment, and on 
maternal and child health topics; (3) implemented community mobilization efforts 
through general Community Health Volunteers (gCHVs) and trained traditional 
midwives; and (4) completed facility infrastructure improvements—all related to building 
block 1,  delivering health services. RBHS also (5) built the capacity of pre-service health 
training institutions, updating and standardizing curricula of existing and new cadres of 
staff (building block 2, health workforce); and (6) supported the MOH to design and 
operationalize the country’s HMIS using open-source DHIS2 software (building block 3, 
health information systems). While RBHS procures drugs and commodities for the 
RBHS-supported facilities under the PBCs from 2009–2012, another JSI project, 
		
74 
USAID|DELIVER was responsible for capacity strengthening of Liberia’s national 
supply chain (building block 4, access to essential medicines).  
 
	
The above map shows the distribution of health facilities in Liberia agasint population density. Due to 
a lack of available data, the map does not show varinces in capacity and service availability at each 
facility. Further, during Ebola, an estimated 50% of all health facilities closed, though obtaining 
reliable data on specific facility closures was  not possible. Population density was mapped using 
natural breaks.  
	
As will be discussed in more detail under the findings for building block 1 below, 
performance-based contractor data and findings from the 2011 RBHS project mid-term 
review showed that during the first half of the project there was increased access to and 
use of health services, and significant associated health outcome improvements in the 
seven RBHS-focus counties.  
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General Health System Capacity Findings from 2009–2014 
Following the restructuring of the project in 2012, RBHS shifted its focus from 
primarily a direct service management project in five counties (plus additional services in 
two more) to primarily a capacity development project working with the central MOH 
and three target counties. The project handed over direct management of PBCs to the 
MOH and supported them in this effort at the Central level to create and operationalize a 
PBF Unit through an embedded staff member (building block 6, governance and 
leadership). Other support was given at the policy level related to human workforce 
management and support for pre-service education (building block 2, health workforce), 
identifying tailored health financing options (building block 5, health financing), health 
information strengthening (building block 3), and BCC. Thus the focus on various health 
system building blocks, and the activities to address each, varied over time. Consistent 
activities throughout the project included pre-service education efforts, support of the 
health information system, infrastructure, and BCC activities at the national level. 
The same capacity assessment tools that measured the new project baseline in 
2012 (both building blocks and PRISM assessments) were used to assess capacity 
improvements in the endline assessment in 2014. The assessments employed a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative measures, and assessed utilization rates; quality of care; 
supervision health workforce motivation; supply management; quality of health 
information data; facility infrastructure; and community involvement. 
Each of the project evaluation tools—sub-contractor data, the mid-term review, 
and capacity and PRISM assessments—show that the MOH recognized RBHS’ 
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contributions in improving capacity at three levels: at the systems level through the 
development of policies and operationalization of an HMIS, at the institutional level 
through the placement of staff in key positions and through training opportunities, and at 
the individual level through both in-country and international training opportunities.  
Endline capacity assessment data from 2014 suggest that systems strengthening 
and decentralization has resulted in greater accountability among health sector workforce, 
at all levels, who have shown increased commitment to realizing “the efficient and 
effective delivery of comprehensive, quality health and social welfare services that are 
equitable, accessible and sustainable for all people in Liberia.”cxxiv In spite of the 
constraints facing the health sector (e.g., over-reliance on donors, budgets well below 
needs), capacity gains were noteworthy across all six building blocks between 2012 and 
2014; though capacity remained uneven within the divisions and units of the MOH, and 
across the three CHTs that RBHS shifted to focus attention on in the second half of the 
project.cxxv   
2014–2015 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Epidemic 
Ebola virus is among a class of filoviruses that are among the most feared 
pathogens in the world, with mortality rates as high as 90% and newsworthy morbidity 
including rapid decline and massive hemorrhaging. In countries where major outbreaks 
have occurred, Ebola has had devastating consequences in terms of social human cost and 
economic cost resulting from reduced trade and global travel.cxxvi  
However, Ebola is not airborne and has an incubation period from 2 to as long as 
21 days during which infected persons are not a source of infection, and thus the 
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magnitude of the 2014 outbreak was not anticipated by public health professionals in 
West Africa or elsewhere. The twenty previous Ebola outbreaks in other African 
countries, also with inadequate human, financial and material resources were each 
managed effectively and contained.cxxvii 
The following graphic from the Economist shows the relative impact of the 2014 
West African Ebola outbreak compared to all previous outbreaks.  
Figure 18. Relative impact of the 2014–2015 West African Ebola Outbreak	
Source: “Ebola in Africa: The End of a Tragedy?,” The Economist, January 14, 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-12. cxxviii  	
		
78 
 The 2014–2015 outbreak of Ebola disease in West African nations began with a 
suspected natural reservoir (bat)-to-human spillover of the Zaire Ebola virus in Guinea in 
February 2014. The first case in Liberia was the following month in March 2014, but was 
largely ignored within Liberia until mid to late June. A long six months after the first case 
was confirmed in Guinea, WHO declared the outbreak a “public health emergency of 
international concern." By its peak in October, the epidemic was already at least thirty 
times larger than the largest Ebola virus disease outbreak in recorded history.cxxix Since 
the first case in Guinea, 28,642 cases of Ebola virus disease, and 11,319 deaths, have 
been reported in eight of the affected nations.cxxx  
 
 
Data Source: WHO and Liberia MOH Ebola Situation Reports, 2014–2015 
Figure 19. Cumulative Ebola Cases and Deaths, Liberia, March 2014–2015 
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Data Source: WHO and Liberia MOH Ebola Situation Reports, 2014–2015 
Figure 20. Number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola cases in the last 21 
days, Liberia, Aug 2014–Jul 2015 
 
 Figures 19 and 20 above show the cumulative cases and deaths from Ebola in 
Liberia and Ebola incidence over the course of the epidemic. Figures 21 and 22 below 
show the cumulative number of Ebola cases and deaths worldwide resulting from the 
2014 West African Ebola outbreak.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
Figure 21. Cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola cases, 
March 2016 
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Source: WHO Ebola Situation Report, March 2016 
Figure 22. Cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected Ebola deaths, 
March 2016 
	
In West Africa, country-specific case fatality rates ranged from 28% in Sierra 
Leone to 67% in Guinea. The overall case fatality rate was 40%, with Liberia having the 
highest number of deaths during the epidemic, and a 45% case fatality rate. Figure 23 
shows case fatality rates from Ebola in each county with actual numbers of cases (blue 
circles overlaid over each county to allow for a visual representation of the regional 
impact of Ebola.  
What was different in Liberia that allowed the exponential spread of Ebola? 
 The health system was experienced in dealing with intermittent cases of Lassa 
virus, another hemorrhagic fever virus endemic in the West African region. While Lassa 
has a much lower overall case fatality rate (~1%) and upwards of 80% are asymptomatic, 
it too can be transmitted person-to-person where poor infection control practices are 	
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While counties in the South East saw higher case fatality rates, there were relatively few cases 
compared to Lofa and Grand Cape Mount that were most severely impacted facing both high numbers 
of cases and high case fatality rates. Fatality rates and cases were mapped using natural breaks, and 
cases include totals for probable, suspected and confirmed. 	
present, and can	have	particularly	deadly	consequences	for	pregnant	women.		Like	Ebola,	Lassa	is	spread	through	direct	contact	with	the	blood,	urine,	feces,	or	other	bodily	secretions	of	a	person	infected	with	the	virus. cxxxi	Nonetheless,	when	Ebola	hit	Liberia	in	March	2014,	the	health	system	proved	to	be	almost	totally	unprepared	to	cope	despite	experience	with	Lassa	and	despite	massive	recent	international	support	for	health	systems	strengthening	and	associated	targeted	capacity	development	interventions,	including	those	of	JSI’s	RBHS	project.	
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 In 2014, the health system remained fragile with significant deficits in human, 
financial and material resources, including basic infrastructure, resulting in compromised 
ability to mount an adequate Ebola outbreak control response. Further, due to a chronic 
delay in receiving pay, government health worker strikes took place in November 2013 and 
then again in February, March and April 2014, just as the first cases of Ebola were being seen 
in Liberia. At the peak of the epidemic, Ebola cases were being turned away at the door of 
both health facilities and Ebola Treatment Units with insufficient beds and capacity to meet 
the need. cxxxii The failure to mount a timely response on the part of the government, NGOs 
and international agencies was in part due to the lack of timely and accurate information, as 
well as the demands of addressing significant competing priorities within the fragile health 
system.  
 Due to misunderstandings related to Ebola (mode of transmission, incubation 
period, symptoms confused with malaria) and rapid unnoticed transmission due to 
frequent cross-border travel between the three West African countries and then onto each 
of the populated capital cities—Conakry, Guinea; Monrovia, Liberia; and Freetown, 
Sierra Leone—information on Ebola infections was incomplete and under-valued, and 
the community response slow due to it being an unknown disease. Ultimately, the high 
number of infections identified among health-care workers—highlighting inadequate 
infection control practices and a dire lack of basic infrastructure such as access to water 
and gloves—served to increase fears among the community that the health system was a 
major source of infection, thus to be avoided, and that clearly there was nothing that 
could be done once infected. cxxxiii cxxxiv    
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Religious leaders reinforced misperceptions by denying the existence of Ebola 
and calling people to come close together to pray, while promoting the continued burial 
practice of thoroughly washing the body, and placing hands on the deceased, at which 
point the levels of virus were at their peak. Burial teams were ill-equipped to cope, and 
resembling witches in their PPEs, reinforced a belief that Ebola was witchcraft, further 
limiting their success in carrying out their jobs.cxxxv In the height of the epidemic in 
Liberia, family members refused to allow burial teams wearing PPEs to remove corpses, 
and many corpses were left in the open on the densely populated urban streets.  
By way of comparison, when faced with Ebola patients arriving from Liberia, 
Nigeria demonstrated significantly stronger capacity to respond to and contain a 
threatened epidemic in their country; from individual health care worker competencies to 
government systems.cxxxvi In 2012, in response to a spike in polio cases, Nigeria 
developed an emergency command center to assess and document infections and guide 
response activities. This same system was immediately called up after notification of the 
first cases of Ebola two years later in 2014. Having developed clear emergency 
operations, despite 20 confirmed and proposal cases of Ebola, Nigeria was nonetheless 
able to contain the spread of Ebola. Within a few days, Nigerian officials had identified 
894 contacts with those cases and conducted 18,500 visits with contacts to monitor for 
Ebola symptom.cxxxvii   
 According to McKenzie et al.:  
“[T]he health system [in Nigeria] was not overwhelmed by Ebola. Disease 
surveillance worked well: index cases were identified, contacts traced and 
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assessed for symptoms and signs of Ebola and, where appropriate, quarantined. 
Political capital was mobilised and significant financial resources were released. 
The government communicated regularly and repeatedly with media and the 
public at large, updating all on the state of play.”cxxxviii  
Unlike in Liberia, the Nigerian health system was resilient enough to fend off any 
escalation of Ebola once it entered the country. 
The impact of Ebola on the health system in Liberia raised questions among the 
international public health community about current Liberian health system capacities, as 
well as about the nature and design of international public health priorities and associated 
interventions—were the wrong things being prioritized in public health programs and/or 
were there gaps in how they were being designed and implemented?  
But again, the 20 previous Ebola outbreaks were contained with only small 
fraction of the devastation caused in Liberia and neighboring Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
The countries in these other outbreaks also faced severe poverty and major health facility 
and road infrastructure constraints. But the combination of these, along with other factors 
tipped the health system beyond its ability to cope. Other factors include: sorely 
insufficient skilled human resources; inconsistent availability of basic supplies such as 
access to water and sanitation at health facilities; irregular supply of health commodities 
and laboratory reagents; lack of laboratories and adequate triage and isolation areas; high 
mobility across national borders and limited expertise in contact tracing and effective 
isolation; community misunderstanding and fear of the disease, and distrust of the health 
system.cxxxix  cxl cxli Rapid spread to more densely populated urban centers, however, was 
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somewhat unique in the West African Ebola outbreak; prior outbreaks were often 
contained within rural communities. 
The map in Figure 24 below shows Ebola cases (confirmed, probable and 
suspected) overlaid on population density of Liberian counties. Population density data 
are from 2008 GOL Census estimates. 
	
The map shows that cases roughly correlate with population density other than in Maryland in the 
South East.  Ebola first entered Liberia via Lofa County that shares a porous border with Guinea; the 
spread of the virus to the South East occurred somewhat later in the epidemic after control efforts 
were more established. Population density and cases were mapped using natural breaks, and cases 
include totals for probable, suspected and confirmed. 	
	
One additional factor may be the relatively greater levels of asymptomatic 
transmission compared to previous outbreaks. While the existence of asymptomatic EVD 
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cases has been shown to occur in previous outbreaks, research is now showing potentially 
very high levels of asymptomatic transmission during the 2014 Ebola outbreak.cxlii On the 
other hand, a recent meta-analysis of Ebola secondary attack data by Dean et al. 
estimated that 27% of Ebola cases are asymptomatic, though only about 1% of secondary 
infections not due to direct contact with a symptomatic person.cxliii If high levels of 
symptomatic transmission in the West African epidemic were substantiated, this fact 
would also help explain the difficulties in initially understanding the magnitude and 
rapidly responding, as well as some of the challenges in contact tracing.  
While dealing with myriad other public health priorities, public health 
preparedness went largely unaddressed in pre-Ebola Liberia. The government, donors and 
implementing partners were focusing on strengthening basic health services through a 
rapidly decentralizing system. The lack of integration of public health preparedness into 
HSS interventions left the country vulnerable to public health emergencies. 
Ranking Priorities According to WHO Emergency Preparedness Components 
Prior to Ebola, effectively none of the 16 key components or their 51 essential 
attributes listed in the WHO table of emergency preparedness were in place. For this 
thesis, the existence of the 16 key components and 51 essential attributes was analyzed as 
of July 2016, over a year since the last Ebola case in Liberia. This was done in a two-step 
process. 
Step 1: Priority Ranking of Attributes and Components 
The WHO Building Block framework was developed with the underlying premise 
that each of the six components is equally essential to the functioning of the health 
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system. In the WHO list of essential attributes and components for emergency 
preparedness, it was also assumed that each of the 16 components was equally critical to 
their respective building block (e.g., BB6: Leadership and Governance has 5 components, 
thus each component contributed to one-fifth, or 20% of the total function of BB6). 
Following the same logic, it was assumed that each of the component attributes was 
equally critical to its respective component (e.g., BB6 Component 1.1 has two associated 
attributes, thus each was equal to one-half, or 50% of the score for that component). 
In conjunction with the JSI/Liberia HSS and Ebola response staff, as well as with 
input by the EPR consortium and members of the current Incident Management System 
in Liberia, the 51 essential attributes were then classified as: absent (receiving a score of 
0), plan in place but not yet implemented (receiving a score of 1), or actively being 
implemented (receiving a score of 2).  
The average score for each component was calculated, resulting in the following 
ranking in Table 9 of identified priority areas, with the lowest scores representing the 
largest health system emergency preparedness unmet needs. 	  
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Table 9. WHO Emergency Preparedness Component and Building Block Priority 
Scores* 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemented 
(2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
1. Leader-
ship and 
governance 
(BB6) * 
1.1 Legal framework for 
national multi-sectoral 
emergency management 
SCORE=0.00 
1. Laws, policies, plans and 
procedures relevant to national multi-
sectoral emergency management 
0 
2. National structure for multi-
sectoral emergency management and 
coordination 
0 
1.2 Legal framework for 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.33 
3. Laws, policies, plans and 
procedures relevant to health-sector 
emergency management 
1 
4. Structure for health-sector 
emergency management and 
coordination 
2 
5. Regulation of external health-
related emergency assistance 1 
1.3 National institutional 
framework for multi-
sectoral emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.00 
6. National committee for multi-
sectoral emergency management 1 
7. National operational entity for 
multi-sectoral emergency 
management 
1 
1.4 National institutional 
framework for health-
sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=0.33 
8. National committee for health-
sector emergency management 0 
9. National operational entity for 
health-sector emergency management 1 
10. Mechanisms of coordination and 
partnership-building 0 
1.5 Components of 
national programme on 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=0.75 
11. National health-sector program 
on risk reduction 1 
12. Multi-sectoral and health-sector 
programs on emergency preparedness 0 
13. National health-sector plan for 
emergency response and recovery 1 
14. Research and evidence base 1 
2. Health 
workforce  
2.1 Human resources for 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.00 
15. Development of human resources 1 
16. Training and education 1 
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3. Medical 
products, 
vaccines 
and 
technology  
3.1 Medical supplies and 
equipment for 
emergency-response 
operations SCORE=0.00 
17. Medical equipment and supplies 
for prehospital and hospital 
(including temporary health facilities) 
activities and other public health 
interventions 
0 
18. Pharmaceutical services 0 
19. Laboratory services 0 
20. Blood services 0 
4. Health 
information  
4.1 Information-
management systems for 
risk-reduction and 
emergency preparedness 
programs SCORE=0.63 
21. Information system for risk 
assessment and emergency 
preparedness planning 
0 
22. National health information 
system 1 
23. National and international 
information-sharing 1 
24. Surveillance systems 0.5 
4.2 Information-
management systems for 
emergency response and 
recovery SCORE=0.00 
25. Rapid health-needs assessment 0 
26. Multi-sectoral initial rapid 
assessment (IRA) 0 
27. Emergency reporting system 0 
4.3 Risk communication 
SCORE=1.00  
28. Strategies for risk 
communication with the public and 
the media 
1 
29. Strategies for risk 
communication with staff involved in 
emergency operations 
1 
5. Health 
financing  
5.1 National and 
subnational strategies for 
financing health-sector 
emergency management 
SCORE=1.00 
30. Multi-sectoral mechanisms of 
financing emergency preparedness 
and management 
0 
31 Health-sector financing 
mechanisms 2 
6. Service 
delivery 
(BB1) * 
6.1 Response capacity 
and capability 
SCORE=0.00 
32. Subnational health-sector 
emergency-response plans 0 
33. Surge capacity for subnational 
health-sector response 0 
34. Management of prehospital 
medical operations 0 
35. Management of situations 
involving mass-fatality and missing 
persons 
0 
6.2 EMS system and 
mass-casualty 
management 
36. Capacity for mass-casualty 
management 0 
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SCORE=0.00 
6.3 Management of 
hospitals in mass casualty 
incidents SCORE=0.00 
37. Hospital emergency-
preparedness program 0 
38. Hospital plans for emergency 
response and recovery 0 
6.4 Continuity of essential 
health programs and 
services SCORE=0.78 
39. Continuous delivery of essential 
health and hospital services 1 
40. Prevention and control of 
communicable diseases and 
immunization 
1 
41. Mother-and-child health care and 
reproductive health 1 
42. Mental health and psychosocial 
support 1 
43. Environmental health 1 
44. Chronic and non-communicable 
diseases 0 
45. Nutrition and food safety 1 
46. Primary health care 1 
47. Health services for displaced 
populations 0 
6.5 Logistics and 
operational support 
functions in emergencies 
SCORE=0.25 
48. Emergency telecommunications 0 
49. Temporary health facilities 1 
50. Logistics 0 
51. Service-delivery support function 0 
*Note: The WHO Emergency Preparedness Framework swaps the number of the building blocks so 
that Leadership and Governance is Building Block 1 and Health Services is Building Block 6; this is 
opposite in the WHO Building Block framework. In this dissertation, I use the WHO Building Block 
Framework designations: Building Block 1 always refers to Health Services provision and Building 
Block 6 always refers to Governance and Leadership 
 
Step 2: Gap Identification: 
Matching Priorities against Current Response, Resiliency and Recovery Plans  
In order to identify gaps, identified priorities from the above table were compared 
to those outlined in the National Epidemic Preparedness and Response Plan (April 2016 
draft), and the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia 2015–
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2021, which is meant to be an addendum to the National Health Plan 2011–2021. A 
summary ranking of the GOL post-Ebola health sector priorities, as listed in the 
Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia 2015–2021, is 
summarized in Table 10.  
Table 10. GOL Post-Ebola Investment Plan Priorities  
Priority Building Block 
1 BB2 Human resources 
2 Infrastructure and technology 
3 Epidemic preparedness and response* 
4 BB4 Medical products, vaccines and technology 
5 (tie) BB1 Health services 
5 (tie) BB3 Health information 
5 (tie) BB6 Governance and leadership 
5 (tie) Community engagement 
6 BB5 Health financing 
*Including surveillance and early warning and alert response network (EWARN) 
structures at all levels. 
 
The two post-Ebola government plans continue to prioritize the six WHO 
building blocks, however they add three additional components to the list: (1) 
infrastructure and technology, (2) epidemic preparedness and response, and (3) 
community engagement. 
In the WHO emergency preparedness framework, infrastructure and technology, 
and epidemic preparedness and response activities are specifically integrated into the 
existing six building blocks. Similarly, community engagement is a cross-cutting feature 
of building blocks 1 Health Services, 2 Human Resources, 3 Health Information, and 6 
Governance and Leadership (e.g., formally incorporating community health workers, 
gCHVs, into the public sector workforce, placing them on payroll and routinely 
supporting and supervising them, tapping into their ability to collect community level 
data for capture in a newly developed C-HMIS). Comparisons of WHO Emergency 
		
92 
Preparedness framework findings with those from the two post-Ebola government plans 
are further discussed in detail under Objective 3 within each building block section 
below.  
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FINDINGS BY WHO HEALTH SYSTEM BUILDING BLOCK 
 
 This section documents findings for each of the three objectives organized by the 
six WHO health system building blocks. Under each building block there is an 
assessment of the health system capacity changes from 2009–2014 (Objective 1), the 
impact the Ebola epidemic had on the health system in 2014 (Objective 2), and an 
assessment of health system resilience using WHO-defined emergency preparedness 
components and attributes (Objective 3). 
Building Block 1: Delivering Essential Health Services 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014   
Table 11 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 11. RBHS activities in support of provision of health services 
 RBHS Intervention/Technical Support Areas 
Capacity 
Building Level 
Sub-component Evaluated in 
RBHS Capacity Assessment 
of MOH 
BB1: 
delivering 
essential 
health 
services 
Reorienting services provided by 
NGOs (e.g., PBCs) 
Organizational, 
systems 
-Access, availability, 
timeliness, responsiveness, 
satisfaction 
-Quality and safety of care 
provided 
-Public–private partnerships 
around service provision 
Public-private partnerships (e.g., 
PBF MOH contracting with NGOs) 
Organizational, 
systems 
Community involvement (e.g., 
Community Health Development 
Committees) 
Organizational 
Community outreach (e.g., gCHV, 
trained traditional midwives) 
Individual, 
organizational 
Quality improvement: clinical 
supportive supervision 
Individual, 
organizational 
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From 2009–2014, the RBHS project made significant contributions to improving 
the country’s health indices. Since the implementation of the Basic Package of Health 
Services in 2007—replaced by the Essential Package of Health Services in 2011—health 
outcomes and health practices in Liberia have shown significant improvement.  
RBHS Activities 
In the first half of the RBHS project, through the BPHS, the government 
prioritized maternal and child health services, rebuilding/building health facilities to 
expand physical access to care, and increasing human resources for health in order to fill 
identified gaps. PBF was also prioritized by the MOH in their National Health Plan as a 
promising approach to accelerate quality implementation of the EPHS, and thus became a 
core intervention in the first half of the project.17  cxliv 
Between 2009 and 2012, RBHS designed and implemented PBF contracts with 
five NGOs in seven counties covering 118 facilities, and subsequently supported the 
MOH to directly manage PBCs from 2012–2014. Over 250 health facilities in 12 of 
Liberia’s 15 counties implemented PBF during the life of RBHS.  At the same time, 
RBHS was actively supporting the MOH’s decentralization strategy through system 
strengthening at the central level, and particularly in the areas of human resources (see 
building block 2) and HMIS (see building block 3). RBHS embedded staff in central 
units of the MOH including PBF, health promotion/BCC, and mental health. Other 
project staff, while not officially embedded, worked closely with other Central MOH 
																																																								
17 PBF uses incentives to achieve desired health outcomes by rewarding facilities and providers 
contingent upon achieving targets. 
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units including County Health Services, Community Health Services, and the 
Infrastructure Unit.  
In support of health service provision, RBHS helped the MOH develop 
inpatient clinical standards, and prioritize those to be rolled out in the first phase of 
EPHS implementation. The EPHS was designed to be rolled out in two phases, first 
focusing on higher-priority health services (largely those that comprised the earlier 
BPHS) and eventually scaling up to include mental health, school health and other 
services. High priority was given to standards for obstetrics/neonatal, pediatrics, and 
infection prevention, based on their proven effect on reducing maternal, neonatal, and 
child mortality.cxlv  
When RBHS began capacity building activities, the interaction between the 
central MOH and CHTs was limited to budget and health service planning activities. 
There was very little interaction when it came to maintaining the health facilities and 
assessing community health needs. Supervision at both central and county levels was 
inconsistent. RBHS worked to standardize supervision tools and practices, as well as 
developing infrastructure building standards for the health sector, and completing the 
construction of new EmONCs, facility upgrades and national drug store (NDS) 
construction planning. 
Health Outcomes and Health System Changes 
In interviews as part of the RBHS mid-term assessment, the MOH credited the 
project as being a significant contributor to realizing targeted health outcomes.cxlvi This is 
substantiated by RBHS endline capacity assessment data, NGO performance data from 
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the PBCs, national HMIS data and DHS data.  
In the 2012 baseline capacity assessment, the central MOH scored low on 
supervising the CHTs in their use of health service delivery standards. Likewise, the 
CHTs scored low on the extent of interaction with their health facilities in the use of these 
standards. cxlvii The RBHS 2014 endline capacity assessment found that overall 
supervision had improved and been “institutionalized.” A standardized set of tools for 
supportive supervision was developed, and were being used at all supervisory visits. 
Supportive supervision visits from the county level to the health facilities were conducted 
on a monthly schedule and the findings from these visits were being used to improve 
performance. The central MOH was conducting quarterly supervision visits to all 
facilities and to communities on EPI activities. cxlviii  
The capacity to deliver essential health services was also positively influenced by 
improved health infrastructure, including the development of maternal waiting homes, 
drug storage facilities, and upgraded or newly constructed facilities.cxlix Further, facilities 
funded and provided bonuses based on performance showed improved health services 
and outcomes. The mechanism also reinforced a culture of information and use of data 
for decision-making.cl cli These improved capacities are also reflected in annual 
accreditation survey scores. 
Population survey data also confirm health gains made during the life of the 
RBHS project. Between 2007 and 2013, Liberia saw: a lower infant mortality rate (IMR) 
from 71 to 54 deaths per 1,000 live birth; increases in antenatal visits from 79% to 96% 
(and four+ ANC visits from 66% to 78%); increased deliveries by skilled attendants and 
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in facilities from 37% to 51%; increased contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 11% 
to 19%; full vaccination coverage rise from 39% to 55% (and penta3 from 50% to 68%); 
and HCT coverage rates increase from 87% to 92% among women and from 80% to 88% 
among men (see table 1). Due to facility improvements and upgrading, access to health 
services within 5 km or 1 hour walk from a health facility increased from 46% to 71%. In 
the three USAID focus counties – Bong, Lofa and Nimba – which are the most populous 
and generally perform below national averages, performance across all these parameters 
also showed significant improvement.clii cliii These improvements are attributable, at least 
in part, to increased capacity of the MOH to deliver essential health services including 
increased levels of engagement between the central MOH and CHTs, and between the 
CHTs and health facilities. cliv 
Below is a summary of findings organized by health outcome indicators (maternal 
health, child health, malaria), and health system indicators (availability of HCT, OPD 
visits). HMIS data are presented in bar graphs from 2009–2015 showing changes over the 
first half of the RBHS project 2009–2012 when directly managing health services via 
PBCs, when MOH took over direct management in 2013, the impact of the Ebola 
epidemic in 2014, and the early post-Ebola recovery period in 2015. The HMIS data 
analysis looked at the same three months over seven years for the six counties most 
severely impacted by Ebola: Bomi, Bong, Lofa, Margibi, Montserrado and Nimba.18 
RBHS actively worked in all the counties excluding Margibi. Across indicators, the 
graphs of HMIS data show a gradual improvement from 2009 to 2012; at times a slight 																																																								
18 As noted in the Methods section, for the analysis, “most severely impacted by Ebola” was 
defined as having >100 cases in 2014. 
		
98 
stagnation corresponding to MOH first taking over direct management of PBCs in 2013; 
a marked drop in performance corresponding with Ebola in 2014; and then a post-Ebola 
recovery, though not always complete, in 2015. 
Maternal Health Services, HMIS Data, 2009–2015 
RBHS PBC data show the percent of pregnant women provided with a 2nd dose of 
IPT to prevent malaria increased by 22% in RBHS facilities, compared to 14% in non-
RBHS facilities; ANC4 increased 10% in RBHS facilities, compared to 3% in non-RBHS 
facilities.clv 
In RBHS facilities, estimated protection provided by contraceptive methods 
increased over three-fold from 7,835 in program year one (July 2009–June 2010) to 
26,872 in program year six (July 2013–June 2014). clvi 
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Figure	25.	IPT2	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	Cases,	
Liberia,	Aug-Oct	2009-2015	
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	Figure	26.	4+	ANC	Visits	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	
Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct	2009-2015	
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Figure	28.	Total	CYP	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	
Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	2009-2015	
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Figure	27.	Skilled	Deliveries	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	
Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct	2009-2015	
	
Child Health, HMIS Data, 2009–2015 
  Childhood vaccinations are provided both at health facilities and via expanded 
program on immunizations (EPI) vaccination campaigns in the community. DHS data—
which captures the effect of both facility-based and community campaign vaccination—
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Figure	29.	Measles	Coverage	(>1yr)	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	
>100	Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	2009-2015	
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Figure	30.	Penta3	Coverage	(>1yr)	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	
Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	2009-2015	
shows marked increased between 2007 and 2013 (see table 1). HMIS data in the graphs 
below show more steady coverage over time between 2009 and 2015, indicating the need 
for continued community-level vaccination through regular campaigns. The impact of 
Ebola on facility-based measles and pentavalent vaccine coverage is clear in the above 
graphs. 	 	
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Malaria, HMIS Data, 2009–2015 
 In RBHS-supported facilities, the percentage of malaria cases with a confirmed 
diagnosis increased by 15% between program year one (July 2009–June 2010) to 26,872 
in program year six (July 2013–June 2014). clvii 
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Figure	31.	Malaria	Diagnosed	by	RDT	(<5yrs)	in	the	Six	
Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	
2009-2015	
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Figure	32.	Malaria	Cases	Treated	with	ACT	(<5yrs)	in	the	
Six	Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	
2009-2015	
Note: The national treatment guidelines changed in 2011 to include treatment 
of children under 5 years of age with ACT as the preferred first line 
treatment; as a result, there were no data on this indicator prior to 2011.  
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HIV Counseling and Testing Utilization, HMIS Data, 2009–2015  
	
Outpatient Department Visits, HMIS Data, 2009–2015 
	
Both out-patient department utilization and facilities providing HCT showed 
marked increases in 2011. This is likely in part due to increases in facility adherence to 
reporting requirements into the then relatively new HMIS system. Again, the impact of 
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Figure	33.	HCT	Services	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	
Ebola	Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	2009-2015	
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Figure	34.	OPD	Visits	in	the	Six	Coun8es	with	>100	Ebola	
Cases,	Liberia,	Aug-Oct,	2009-2015	
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Ebola is clearly seen in 2014. 
From 2009–2010, RBHS was working with the MOH to institute DHIS2 as the 
new HMIS, and to operationalize the system at the central and county levels in the seven 
counties in which PBC were being managed.  With international relief NGOs having 
been responsible for the majority of all health service provision for almost two decades, 
reporting into the government HMIS was not commonplace. As a condition of funding, 
RBHS required that NGOs report both into the new national HMIS as well as to the 
project directly. These data were routinely correlated to ensure complete, accurate and 
timely submission into the HMIS, thus helping institutionalize reporting from the facility 
level up. The above graphs reflect the gradual increase in reporting between 2009 and 
2011, as well as increases in coverage. 
By 2012, clear increases in service utilization and outcomes can be seen. The 
following year, 2013, marks the first year in which the MOH took over direct 
management of NGO PBCs, with JSI in a supportive, capacity-strengthening role. As the 
Ministry adapted to the new role, slight decreases in performance can be seen across 
some indicators. The above graphs clearly show the marked impact the Ebola epidemic 
had on these indicators in 2014, and the recovery, though not always complete, in the 
same period one year later, 2015, following the last cases of Ebola.  
Prior to Ebola, the 2013 Health Facility Assessment Report found that gCHVs 
were significantly involved in the delivery of health services including: integrated 
community case management of diarrhea, pneumonia and malaria; health and hygiene 
promotion; social mobilization; directly observed therapy for tuberculosis; and also 
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providing support to vertical program activities (e.g., HIV/AIDS, TB, leprosy, malaria). 
However, most of the gCHV projects were partner-led with minimal support from or 
formal interaction with the county and district health teams. Further, the report 
highlighted inconsistent training levels, and lack of consistent availability of equipment 
and commodities. clviii While often not formally on the government payroll, gCHVs play a 
critical role in strengthening community engagement and improving environmental and 
community health in underserved areas. clix Their role in helping to ultimately curb the 
Ebola epidemic at the community level has yet to be fully documented.  
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
Despite improvements in the provision of health services and health outcomes, the 
service delivery system was still relatively weak with many glaring shortcomings in the 
spring of 2014. Vertical donor funding streams continued to be apparent, fragmenting 
services at both the facility and community levels. Linkages between the community and 
health facilities were weak, with the community health roadmap just having been 
developed in 2014 outlining recommendations on a more formal and comprehensive 
engagement of community health workers into the existing health system. IPC was 
greatly inconsistent across facilities and staff. Laboratory and diagnostic services were 
limited with no national reference laboratory, resulting in significant delays in 
confirmation of epidemic diseases. clx Infrastructure was inadequate to support 
comprehensive provision of essential health services.clxi HMIS data shown in the above 
graphs clearly demonstrate setbacks that resulted in essentially every indicator following 
the onset of Ebola. 
		
106 
 While the number health facilities increased from 618 in 2010 to 656 in 2014, one 
can see in Table 12 that facility density per 10,000 population remains extremely low. 
Facility density ranged from 1.0 per 10,000 population in Bong County to 2.9 in Sinoe 
County.  
Table 12: Facilities by county and facility density (shaded cells are counties most 
severely impacted by Ebola; >100 cases) 
County 
2015 
population 
projection 
Health 
facility per 
county 
Facility 
density per 
10,000 pop 
Bong  385,701 39 1.01 
Grand Bassa  256,408 29 1.13 
Nimba  534,376 62 1.20 
Grand Gedeh  144,872 18 1.24 
Margibi  242,795 33 1.36 
Gbarpolu  96,446 14 1.45 
Maryland  157,225 24 1.53 
Lofa  320,218 56 1.75 
Montserrado  1,293,349 240 1.86 
Grand Cape 
Mount  146,975 32 2.18 
River Gee  77,248 17 2.20 
Rivercess  82,707 18 2.20 
Bomi  97,291 24 2.50 
Grand Kru  66,982 17 2.54 
Sinoe  117,813 33 2.80 
Total  4,020,406 656 1.63 
Source: Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia 2015–2021 
 In addition to an inadequate number of facilities per capita, there are glaring 
infrastructure issues throughout the health system. The 2010 accreditation report showed: 
• 48 facilities (13%) do not have access to safe water 
• 100 facilities (26%) do not have a sound structure 
• 162 facilities (43%) do not have a functional incinerator 
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• 169 facilities (45%) do not have a primary power source for emergency lighting.clxii 
At the time, a suggested gap was the lack of standards for what constitutes 
appropriate space for the provision of health and social welfare services. A major 
accomplishment of RBHS was the development of building infrastructure standards. clxiii 
Nonetheless, glaring inadequacies in basic infrastructure existed at the onset of the Ebola 
epidemic due to the lack of donor funds available to support infrastructure. 
The Ebola outbreak resulted in significant declines in utilization of health services 
from August to October 2014 compared to the same period in 2012 and 2013, and then in 
2015. Many facilities temporarily closed due to lack of supplies, health workers not 
reporting to work, and lack of utilization due to fear and mistrust of the health system. 
There were multiple incidents of people being turned away at the door of both health 
facilities and Ebola Treatment Unitys due to inadequate capacity.  clxiv 
As seen in the graphs above, deliveries by skilled birth attendant declined by 7% 
from 2013 to 2014; ANC 4th visits dropped by 8%; measles coverage declined by 21% 
from 2013 to 2014; and health facility utilization dropped by 40% (5.5 visits in 2013 to 
3.3 visits per inhabitant in 2014). In addition, all schools in Liberia closed for 10 months; 
setting all students in the country back a full school year. 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes shows that Building Block 1: Health Services, should be the 
government’s second top priority to ensure emergency preparedness, after supply chain 
(BB4).  
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Table 13. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemented 
(2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
6. Service 
delivery  
6.1 Response capacity 
and capability 
SCORE=0.00 
32. Subnational health-sector 
emergency-response plans 0 
33. Surge capacity for subnational 
health-sector response 0 
34. Management of prehospital 
medical operations 0 
35. Management of situations 
involving mass-fatality and missing 
persons 
0 
6.2 EMS system and 
mass-casualty 
management 
SCORE=0.00 
36. Capacity for mass-casualty 
management 0 
6.3 Management of 
hospitals in mass 
casualty incidents 
SCORE=0.00 
37. Hospital emergency-
preparedness program 0 
38. Hospital plans for emergency 
response and recovery 0 
6.4 Continuity of 
essential health 
programs and services 
SCORE=0.78 
39. Continuous delivery of essential 
health and hospital services 1 
40. Prevention and control of 
communicable diseases and 
immunization 
1 
41. Mother-and-child health care and 
reproductive health 1 
42. Mental health and psychosocial 
support 1 
43. Environmental health 1 
44. Chronic and non-communicable 
diseases 0 
45. Nutrition and food safety 1 
46. Primary health care 1 
47. Health services for displaced 
populations 0 
6.5 Logistics and 
operational support 
functions in emergencies 
SCORE=0.25 
48. Emergency telecommunications 0 
49. Temporary health facilities 1 
50. Logistics 0 
51. Service-delivery support function 0 
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While some improvements were seen as a result of the Ebola epidemic in terms of 
the country’s ability to source and build temporary isolation and triage facilities (attribute 
49 under component 6.5), health services in times of emergency remain one of the most 
under-prepared areas in the WHO emergency preparedness framework. 19 
The attributes for components 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 were not included in either the EPR 
plan or the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021. 
However, counties are commencing the process of developing their own EPR plans 
(attribute 32), with one county (Lofa) as of July 2016 having developed a draft. 
Unfortunately, emergency planning is being conducted in parallel to county operational 
planning. Further, it is strictly future epidemic preparedness rather than a broader all-
hazards emergency planning. 
Some attributes under component 6.4 Continuity of essential health programs and 
services, received a score of 1 since the April 2016 draft Epidemic Preparedness and 
Response Plan specifically mentions them, although without clear guidelines for 
operationalization. The EPR plan indicates that once IMS is activated, pillar leads will 
address key areas (e.g., environmental health, psychosocial, nutrition and food safety, 
IPC).  
6.5 Logistics and operational support functions in emergencies are somewhat 
addressed in the EPR plan by a proposed emergency dispatch and toll-free hotline 
																																																								
19 During the Ebola epidemic, a number of donors funded temporary and to some extent semi-
permanent isolation and triage structures in select facilities in Liberia. However, many of these were 
coming unraveled just months after installation. (Personal correspondence with County Health 
Officers at a meeting to discuss temporary vs. semi-permanent triage unit design as part of JSI’s 
OFDA-funded IPC Activity). 
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(attribute 48), but with no details on how to operationalize such a system in the Liberian 
context, with no formal first responders and inadequate equipment (i.e., fire engines, 
ambulances, paramedics).  
None of the other components or sub-attributes are addressed in either the 
Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021 or EPR 
plan. 
Building Block 2: Health Workforce 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014  
Table 14 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 14. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Workforce 
 RBHS Intervention/Technical Support Areas 
Capacity Building 
Level 
Sub-component 
Evaluated in RBHS 
Capacity Assessment of 
MOH 
BB2: 
health 
workforce 
Workforce development (e.g., 
training to upgrade professional 
qualification of midwives) 
Individual, 
organizational 
-Supply and distribution 
-Personnel management 
and performance systems 
-Training (pre-service and 
in-service) 
Changes in the pre-service 
curriculum and teaching methods 
Individual, 
organizational 
Quality improvement: 
performance management/review 
Individual, 
organizational 
Incentives for retention or remote 
area deployment (via PBCs) 
Individual, 
organizational 
	
 Over the course of Liberia’s 14-year civil war, most of the health workforce left 
the country. Following the war, Liberian government capacity was severely damaged and 
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dominated by corruption, and thus very few top graduates sought public sector, civil 
service careers. Before the Ebola epidemic took its toll on an already weakened post-war 
system, the MOH had recognized in its national health plan the critical importance of 
being able to effectively manage a health workforce that is accessible, available, 
acceptable, and provides quality services.clxv  
During the post-conflict period, health training institutions were severely 
resource-limited, faculty and clinical preceptors were inadequately trained in pedagogical 
and clinical supervision skills, and curricula and on-site reference materials severely 
outdated. Governance and regulatory bodies were essentially non-functioning and 
toothless, lacking clear accreditation guidelines inclusive of quality standards.  
RBHS Activities 
RBHS project interventions broadly addressed areas impacting human resources, 
from pre-service education and in-service training, through supporting regulatory bodies 
responsible for accreditation, and promoting a culture of accountability among health 
workers.  
Improvement Collaboratives were introduced, as was an electronic integrated 
human resource information system (iHRIS) (discussed under BB3 Health Information 
below). The pre-service education supported by the project contributed to increasing the 
number of providers across all levels (except doctors), and has strengthened the quality of 
training institutions and the accreditation process. Supportive supervision and 
performance based contracting (both discussed previously under BB1: Health Services) 
strengthened facility staff adherence to standards and HMIS reporting, and also helped 
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reactivate community health structures such as the Community Health Development 
Committees and the County Health and Social Welfare Boards (CHSWBs). 
Government Institutionalization of the Improvement Collaborative Approach 
RBHS introduced the concept of improvement collaboratives in three RBHS-
supported hospitals to help roll-out inpatient clinical standards. An improvement 
collaborative is a quality improvement approach that organizes teams or health facilities 
to work together to rapidly achieve significant improvements in processes, quality, and 
efficiency of a specific area of care.clxvi Following positive results, the MOH took 
responsibility for scaling up the initiative in non-RBHS facilities. As further evidence of 
the lasting effect of the intervention, on a 2015 World Bank funded Ebola-response 
project, the MOH instructed JSI to again implement the improvement collaborative 
approach, this time to increase adherence to IPC practices to prevent Ebola.  
Updated Pre-Service Curricula and Standards 
RBHS trained faculty and clinical preceptors in pedagogical and clinical 
supervision skills, reviewed and updated technical course content and curricula, procured 
on-site reference materials and tools, and supported management practices and skills in 
two major training institutions, Esther Bacon School of Nursing and Midwifery 
(EBSNM) and the Tubman National Institute of Medical Arts (TNIMA). The RBHS 
model was subsequently expanded nationally to include 16 additional health training 
institutions. These institutions train mid-level health professionals, including certified 
midwives, physician assistants (PAs), registered nurses (RNs), and environmental health 
technicians (EHTs). By the end of RBHS, more than 500 RNs, RMs, PAs, EHTs, and 
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MLTs had graduated using the new curricula. All training institutions are now using the 
revised curricula and the PSE performance standards to improve the training of mid-level 
health care providers. clxvii 
Strengthened Regulatory Bodies 
RBHS undertook capacity development interventions with two Liberian 
regulatory bodies: (1) Liberia Medical and Dental Council (LMDC); and (2) Liberian 
Board of Nursing and Midwifery (LBNM). Their responsibilities include conducting 
monitoring, assessment, and accreditation of both training institutions and health 
facilities, as well as revising curricula and continued professional development (CPD) 
processes and licensure using up-to-date standards. RBHS activities were aimed at 
improving the capacity of the bodies to (1) assess facilities and (2) assess training 
institutions on adherence to standards. The RBHS project helped develop tools to assess 
32 sets of standards, each addressing: administration, patient’s care, service delivery, 
equipment and supplies, and waste management.   
During the project, the regulatory bodies were supported to assess 36 major health 
facilities (hospitals, health centers and clinics) in the RBHS three supported counties 
(Nimba, Lofa, Bong) in the second half of the project. The LBNM now uses the tools to 
regularly monitor and evaluate adherence of nurses and midwives, and report the results 
to institutions and the government including the Commission on Higher Education. 
Progress with the LMDC was somewhat less successful than with the LBNM.clxviii  
RBHS also supported the development of standards for accreditation of training 
institutions and professional staff, which enabled the regulatory bodies to make 
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appropriate decisions on accreditation and licensing/re-licensing processes including 
continuing professional development. When baseline assessments of education standards 
were conducted at EBSNM and TNIMA in 2009 by RBHS, 39% of standards were met. 
After quality improvement plans were developed and implemented, a follow-up 
assessment in 2013, now conducted by the capacitated LBNM, revealed that 79% of 
standards had been met at the two schools. As a result, both schools were approved for 
accreditation by LBNM. Improvements were documented in the areas of classroom 
instruction, institutional clinical instruction, and institutional management. The processes 
for accreditation of existing and new schools, licensure and re-licensure, as well as 
continuing professional development, are now being utilized regularly by LBNM. clxix  
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
In 2015, the public health workforce included 117 physicians (0.03 per 1,000 
population), 436 physician assistants (0.08 per 1,000 pop), 2,137 nurses in both RN and 
LPN categories (0.4 per 1,000 pop), and 659 midwives (0.12 per 1,000 pop). According 
to the MOH, this represents a 30% increase for physicians and a 50–60% increase for the 
other three groups since 2009. Between 2010 and 2015, there was a 37% increase in the 
density of health professionals in the public sector from 6.3 to 8.6 per 10,000 population. 
Nonetheless, the 2010 Workforce Optimization Analysis showed that maldistribution 
across levels of care, roles and counties was a major challenge. clxx  
According to the MOH, as of February 2015, only 59% (5,920/10,052) of 
government health workers have been included on the payroll and are receiving pay on a 
regular basis, thus precipitating the four health worker strikes that took place in the six 
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months prior to the first cases of Ebola in Liberia. Table 15 shows the proportion of staff 
not on payroll in each county. Those most severely impacted by Ebola are highlighted. 
Table 15: County distribution of health workforce based on payroll status 
(February 2015)	
County Not on GOL payroll 
On GOL 
payroll Total 
% of staff not 
on payroll 
Bomi  217 311 528 41% 
Bong  339 415 754 45% 
Cape Mount  224 228 452 50% 
Gbarpolu  121 140 261 46% 
Grand Bassa  243 258 501 49% 
Grand Gedeh  434 236 670 65% 
Grand Kru  140 179 319 44% 
Lofa  449 356 805 56% 
Margibi  151 225 376 40% 
Maryland  302 164 466 65% 
Montserrado  595 2505 3100 19% 
Nimba  204 448 652 31% 
River Gee  257 128 385 67% 
River Cess  198 142 340 58% 
Sinoe  258 185 443 58% 
Total  4132 5920 10052 41% 
Source: Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia 2015–2021 
Despite some improvement in human resources in the five years preceding the 
onset of Ebola, according to the MOH, the workforce model is not fit for purpose with 
skills gaps, inequitable distribution, disincentives to performance (e.g., irregular receipt 
of salary), and weak regulation (e.g., insufficient supervision). The supply chain is 
inadequate, budget allocation remains based on historical amounts rather than actual 
needs, and many services remain fragmented according to donor priorities.  As a result, 
there are high levels of attrition and inefficiencies at all levels.clxxi 
Onto this scene descended Ebola in March 2014 where almost one in two health 
workers who became infected died (a case fatality rate of 49%; 184 out of 372 cases). 
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According to the MOH, the total number of health workers in the iHRIS database is about 
10,052. Therefore, 3.7% of health workers developed EVD and 1.7% died from Ebola. 
clxxii According to WHO, during the West African epidemic, health care workers were up 
to 32 times more likely to acquire Ebola than people in the general adult population.clxxiii   
As mentioned previously, many facility-based health care workers stopped reporting to 
work and approximately half of all health facilities shut down during the Ebola epidemic. 
At the community level, gCHVs continued to operate throughout the Ebola epidemic.  
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes indicates that Building Block 2: Human Resources, should be 
the government’s lowest priority to ensure emergency preparedness. However, human 
resources for health is ranked the top priority by the MOH in the Investment Plan for 
Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021. This is the area of largest 
discrepancy from the findings in this report. Similar to these findings, in the EPR, health 
workforce is only mentioned in terms of the need to conduct full drills, table-top 
(conceptual) exercises, specific component exercises of the epidemic preparedness plan. 
Timing and specifics of health workforce improvements beyond that are not provided.  
Table 16. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results	
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components 51 Essential Attributes 
Implemented 
(2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
2. Health 
workforce  
2.1 Human resources for 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.00 
15. Development of human 
resources 1 
16. Training and education 1 
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Building Block 3: Health Information Systems 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014  
Table 17 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 17. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Information 
Systems 
 RBHS Intervention/Technical Support Areas 
Capacity Building 
Level 
Sub-component 
Evaluated in RBHS 
Capacity Assessment of 
MOH 
BB3: health 
information 
systems 
Analysis and visualization of 
data to improve use of 
information for decision-making  
Individual, 
organizational, 
systems 
-Health information 
systems 
-Other management 
information systems 
Scale-up of electronic DHIS2 Individual, organizational 
Integrated data systems and 
enterprise architecture for HIS 
design 
Systems 
Coordination of national 
household surveys (e.g., timing 
of data collection and level of 
sampling) 
Systems 
 
The Liberian National Health Policy and Plan, 2011–2021 gives high priority to 
the development of a decentralized HMIS as an integral part of the national health 
system. The aim of RBHS capacity building under BB3 was to improve HMIS 
performance, defined as the production of quality data, and use of the information 
generated for improved decision-making. This was done through: 1) improving the 
system components required for HMIS functionality; 2) improving individual staff 
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capacity at all levels; and 3) creating an organizational environment conducive to the use 
of information for decision making. RBHS also contributed to the development of HMIS 
policy and strategy documents, data recording and reporting instruments, and computer 
equipment.  
To measure HMIS performance, RBHS used the Performance of Routine 
Information System Management (PRISM) tools that are based on the PRISM 
framework. This framework promotes strengthening HMIS performance through better 
data quality and improved information use. It assesses the technical issues related to data 
generation, and also organizational and behavioral factors that hinder the effective use of 
information. An initial assessment undertaken in Bong, Nimba, Lofa, and Grand Bassa 
counties in May 2012 led to the establishment of a baseline to develop an HMIS 
strengthening action plan. A second assessment was undertaken in May 2014.  
 RBHS Activities 
A strategic and operational plan for strengthening the HMIS in Liberia was 
designed and implemented by RBHS based on these findings. Various interventions to 
strengthen the system components as well as the HMIS individual and organizational 
capacity were implemented from 2012 to 2014. These included: 
• Reviewing the list of essential indicators in 2009 and again in 2014. The process was 
guided by national health priorities and involved stakeholders including data 
producers and users. RBHS assisted with the initial design of community-based 
indicators and data collection instruments for the planned community-level health 
management information system (C-HMIS). RBHS also developed human resource 
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indicators and instruments and facilitated the introduction of integrated human 
resource information system (iHRIS). 
• Replacing the DHIS1.4 with the DHIS2 application for HMIS data management and 
customizing it for use in Liberia. To further strengthen data management, RBHS 
assisted with the design of a C-HMIS data entry and management module as well as 
the introduction and customization of the iHRIS application for HR data 
management. RBHS also assisted with the development of a data warehouse linking 
DHIS2 and iHRIS4 using interoperability standards. 
• Developing and institutionalizing the new HMIS (based on DHIS2 software). NGOs 
contracted to provide the BPHS were required to report directly to RBHS and into the 
government’s HMIS. RBHS triangulated NGO and HMIS data with regular, random 
spot check of registers in health facilities from every NGO to improve the quality of 
data, thus significantly strengthening and operationalizing the new HMIS. RBHS 
supported monthly data reviews with the NGOs and central MOH and CHT 
monitoring and evaluation staff, as well as quarterly data reporting; thus helping to 
build the capacity of the MOH at central and county levels to document health 
services provision and utilization. 
• Operationalizing and institutionalizing data quality assurance (QA) by setting up data 
verification and QA mechanisms based on desk reviews of data before entry at the 
facility and county levels, and regularly comparing data recorded with data reported. 
• Using information for decision making. RBHS assisted with increasing the 
functionality of DHIS2 for data analysis and visualization by creating program 
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specific and county dashboards. RBHS also assisted with creating incentivized 
indicators for performance-based financing. 
• Organizing various HMIS in-service training activities on a range of topics for staff at 
the central MOH, CHT and district-level staff in project counties.  
• Creating an “information culture” within the central MOH and the three counties in 
which it worked, meaning that it helped to create an environment in which 
information is valued for decision-making. Some examples include linking the use of 
HMIS information with operational planning at all levels, institutionalizing data 
review/coordination meetings at the central MOH and county levels, and linking the 
use of HMIS information with PBF in selected counties.clxxiv  
Changes in Health Information System Capacity 
All four county health offices and a random sample of 76 health facilities (19 
health facilities per county) were surveyed, and about 360 health managers and staff from 
these institutions were interviewed using the PRISM framework and tools.  
Data quality varied from facility to facility, depending on the implementing 
partners with which they were associated. Data accuracy ranged from 38% in August 
2011 to 46% in February 2012. While 91% of the health facilities submitted monthly 
reports to the county health offices, only 75% of these reports were submitted by the 
reporting period deadline. In general, use of HMIS information was low at both the 
county and facility levels. Less than 20% of health facilities received feedback on their 
monthly reports. Evidence of use of HMIS findings in the decision-making process was 
observed in only 38% of the facilitiesclxxv.  
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The PRISM assessment was repeated in May 2014. Results showed a substantial 
improvement in HMIS performance. Data accuracy in health facilities increased from 
46% in 2012 to 83% in 2014. At county level, it increased from 78% in 2012 to 88% in 
2014. Data completeness in the facilities increased from 52% to 79%. Use of information 
was estimated at 58%, a substantial increase compared to the 38% of 2012. Also HMIS 
processes such as data analysis and feedback given to health facilities increased 
substantially.clxxvi clxxvii  
 
Table 18: Comparison of PRISM Assessments 2012 – 2014 
HMIS INDICATORS – 
LEVEL: 
Facilities County 
2012 2014 2012 2014 
PERFORMANCE OF THE HMIS 
Quality of data     
Overall accuracy 46% 83% 78% 88% 
Data completeness in facilities 
monthly reports  
52% 79%   
Completeness of monthly 
reports at county level 
  91% 98% 
Timeliness of reports of health 
facilities at county level 
  74% 88% 
Use of information 38% 58%  75% 
PROCESS 
Feedback to health facilities 20% 49%  50% 
Data analysis: Performing at 
least two types  
15% 51%  100% 
Presentation of data 45% 68%  54% 
Source: Improving HMIS Performance: Measurement and Interventions, RBHS project, JSI Research 
& Training Institute, Inc. 2014 
 
As part of the transition plan, RBHS classified interventions into three categories: 
(1) mature interventions; (2) developing interventions; and (3) initiated interventions. 
Mature interventions were ready to be managed independently by the MOH without 
further technical support; however developing and initiated interventions would need 
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further support and resources from donors and partners.20 
Table 19: Status of RBHS-supported HMIS Interventions, July 2014 
TRANSITION STATUS OF HMIS INTERVENTIONS 
Mature Interventions  
 
Developing Interventions 
 
Initiated Interventions 
 
• DHIS2 data entry and 
management 
• PRISM assessment using 
Lot Quality Assurance 
Sampling 
• Use of information based 
on problem solving 
techniques  
• iHRIS data entry and 
management 
• HMIS review: training of 
staff 
• Quarterly health review 
meetings at county level 
• Scaling up of routine DQA  
• Scaling up of C-HMIS 
• Interoperability between 
DHIS2 and iHRIS 
• Use of information at health 
facility level 
• Sustainable management of 
HMIS printed supplies 
Source: Improving HMIS Performance: Measurement and Interventions, RBHS project, JSI Research 
& Training Institute, Inc. 2014 
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
As seen in Table 18 above, as of July 2014, the beginning of the Liberia Ebola 
epidemic, there was not yet a functioning system to collect community-level data (e.g., 
health services provided by gCHVs). Though the iHRIS was in place at the central level 
and interoperability programming with the existing HMIS (DHIS2) underway, human 
resource data was only just being captured and entered, and only for the FARA counties 
(i.e., number of staff, by cadre, at each facility). Due to resistance at multiple levels, 
capturing and correcting long-established double counting and ‘ghosts’ and other 
inaccuracies in the system (e.g., dead people receiving ongoing salaries, people receiving 
salaries for simultaneous posting in two counties), caused the data entry process to be 																																																								
20 Mature interventions: has an institutional home in the MOH (HMIS unit); clear procedures; 
knowledgeable staff at multiple levels of the system; may need more attention to quality; county  
implementation; roll out to additional counties. 
Developing interventions: has an institutional home and/or point person in the MOH; needs 
additional technical assistance in the form of coaching, QA, ongoing scaling up.    
Initiated interventions: started at a relatively small scale, with limited technical or geographic 
coverage; institutional home and/or point person in MOH is not yet formalized; likely to need 
substantial technical support, resources to move through developing and maturing stages. 	
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slow and arduous.  
The vital statistics system was also in its infancy in 2014, with low levels of birth 
and death registration, and the surveillance system had limited capacity to detect and 
respond appropriately to events.clxxviii  Though every county health team had a designated 
position on the books for one or more disease surveillance officers, they may not have 
been fully staffed.clxxix Epidemiologic surveillance and reporting was and continues to be 
a parallel system, not linked with the HMIS. Due to this, county surveillance officers 
were not explicitly targeted by RBHS or implementing NGOs for inclusion in RBHS-
associated activities. 
On the other hand, the completeness of DHIS reporting rates was good prior to 
the Ebola epidemic. On average, 80% of monthly reports were received from health 
facilities, both public and private, during 2012–2013 (n=659 facilities). Excluding 
Montserrado County where the majority of private facilities are—with notoriously low 
reporting rates into the national HMIS—reporting rates then were well over 90%.clxxx 
The Ebola outbreak created additional interest in the iHRIS. RBHS and the MOH 
were approached by other implementing partners interested in building off of the iHRIS 
system to develop a mobile messaging system that would use telephone contacts of staff 
contained in iHRIS to broadcast various types of messages to health workers. This 
became an opportunity to accelerate and expand RBHS’ support to data entry for iHRIS 
beyond the three FARA counties and Montserrado, and to potentially speed up 
communication with health workers in the crisis. RBHS supported clerks for an intensive 
data entry period that resulted in more than 7,000 records from all counties. This massive 
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effort has also provided the Personnel office with a list of unverified personnel; or those 
with missing information, and thus the opportunity to validate and cross-check payroll 
records, which was met with great resistance prior to Ebola.  
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes shows that Building Block 3: Health Information, should be 
the government’s third top priority to ensure emergency preparedness, after supply chain 
(BB4) and service provision (BB1).  
 
Table 20. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemente
d (2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
3. Health 
information  
4.1 Information-
management systems for 
risk-reduction and 
emergency preparedness 
programs SCORE=0.63 
21. Information system for risk 
assessment and emergency 
preparedness planning 
0 
22. National health information 
system 1 
23. National and international 
information-sharing 1 
24. Surveillance systems 0.5 
4.2 Information-
management systems for 
emergency response and 
recovery SCORE=0.00 
25. Rapid health-needs assessment 0 
26. Multi-sectoral initial rapid 
assessment (IRA) 0 
27. Emergency reporting system 0 
4.3 Risk communication 
SCORE=1.00  
28. Strategies for risk 
communication with the public 
and the media 
1 
29. Strategies for risk 
communication with staff 
involved in emergency operations 
1 
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Component 4.1 Information management systems for risk-reduction and 
emergency preparedness programs 
While Liberia now had a functioning HMIS, indicators of emergency 
preparedness are not captured (attributes 22 and 23). In terms of surveillance systems, the 
GOL is working with WHO and CDC to create an integrated disease surveillance and 
reporting and early warning systems (albeit, not integrated with other parts of the health 
system) (attribute 24 under component 4.1 as well as attribute 29 under component 4.3). 
The Investment Plan ranks surveillance and early warning and alert response (EWARN) 
as the third highest priority. However, the plan separates early warning and surveillance 
systems from other types of health information, which overall is assigned a lower rank of 
five out of the six priorities. The EPR Plan makes only cursory mention that ongoing risk 
assessment is needed at county and district levels so that early warning alerts can be 
issued. 
Component 4.2 Information-management systems for emergency response and 
recovery 
The EPR Plan proposes an emergency management dispatch and call center, but 
no suggestion of who would man the center, where it would be housed and supported, 
and how the associated suggested systems will be put in place and supported (e.g., the 
rapid response team membership is up to the County/District Health Officers to identify 
as needed, and without clear ‘first responders’ as in other countries, it may prove to be a 
time-consuming undertaking to identify and convene the team when needed in an 
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emergency).Further, there is a lack of clarity on the proposed call center–is only to be 
established during an emergency? How would it be advertised and promoted? 
Component 4.3 Risk Communication 
As a result of the Ebola epidemic, some strides have been made to improve risk 
communication. There is a newly proposed Press and Public Affairs Unit within the 
MOH, and the EPR Plan emphasizes that solid risk communication is needed both among 
staff and with the public and media. The plan noted that while engagement strategies will 
depend on the situation, they may include media (which would mean primarily radio in 
Liberia), social media (which is not widespread as smartphone ownership is very low), 
mass awareness campaigns and health promotion, social mobilization and 
community/stakeholder engagement. To disseminate risk information to the public during 
emergencies, the plan suggests collaboration between the proposed Press and Public 
Affairs unit at MOH and the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism in order to 
hold regular press conferences during emergencies. However, other than that, the plan 
provides no specificity on how to implement the other recommendations in the Liberian 
context. The EPR plan simply states under risk communication that “Coordination of 
responses requires effective use of tools including mobile telephone, radio, newspapers, 
television, etc.” During the Ebola outbreak, the MOH’s central National Health 
Promotion Unit was tasked with risk communication responsibilities. Effective plans for 
emergency risk communication and the newly proposed Press and Public Affairs Unit 
need to be reconciled with the mandates of existing central ministry divisions and units.  
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Building Block 4: Access to Essential Medicines 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014  
Table 21 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 21. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Supply Chain System 
 RBHS Intervention/Technical Support Areas 
Capacity Building 
Level  
Sub-component 
Evaluated in RBHS 
Capacity Assessment of 
MOH 
BB4: access 
to essential 
medicines 
Stakeholder consensus building 
in FARA counties on gradual 
transfer of supply chain 
management (SCM) functions 
from central level (SCMU-
NDS) to the CHTs  
 
Individual, 
organizational 
-Access and rational use 
-Public–private 
partnerships around 
medicines and 
technologies 
-Supply management 
-Quality and safety of 
medicines 
New approaches to 
pharmacovigilance (e.g., Interim 
Approach) 
Individual, 
organizational, 
systems 
Supply chain management Individual, organizational 
 
Efficient procurement and distributions systems are vital to the provision of the 
essential health services. And in fact, the supply chain has been a priority issue on the 
MOH’s agenda for many years. The Supply Chain Master Plan (SCMP), developed in 
2010 with support from JSI, continues to be the guiding document for supply chain 
improvements in Liberia. The supply chain outlined in the SCMP is a pull system in 
which lower levels (facilities to counties, counties to central) determine needs and place 
orders to higher levels based on the data derived from the current Logistics Management 
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Information System (LMIS). The central-level National Drug Store (NDS) and county 
capacities for warehousing were intended to be used, and deliveries were intended to be 
quarterly from central to county and monthly from county to health facilities.  
However, the system was facing marked gaps, inefficiencies and theft of 
commodities. Factors such as limited road infrastructure, unsuitable storage, limited 
warehousing capacity, inventory and warehouse management practices, and limited 
information sharing have led to frequent stock-outs of commodities, uncertain drug 
quality, and a general lack of confidence.  
As a stop-gap mechanism, CHTs have resorted to direct and local procurement in 
order to manage their own individual supply chains, with the unintended consequence of 
introducing counterfeit, expired, or damaged products into the system from private sellers 
with ill-equipped storage facilities and practices. In addition, the increased fragmentation 
adds to the burden on the national system by adding unnecessary, duplicative costs while 
also contributing to lack of visibility, misallocation of resources, misalignment of supply 
and demand and general underperformance. clxxxi  
To address significant transparency issues, the USAID | DELIVER Project (also 
led by JSI) implemented the “Interim Approach” (IA) in 2014; a system to deliver health 
commodities and conduct data verification, while simultaneously strengthening the 
NDS’s capacity. The IA only included select family planning and malaria commodities 
instead of the complete Essential Drug List of medicines and commodities. An evaluation 
of the IA system and subsequent update of the SCMP took place in 2015.  
There is large variation in how the supply/distribution/storage of essential 
		
129 
medicines is handled in each county. Through the IA, malaria and FP commodities are 
handled from NDS to the county depots and out to the facilities in a top-up model (as 
opposed to the pull model outlined in the SCMP). The rest of the essential medicines are 
fragmented and handled by different NGO programs in each state (Africare, Merlin, etc.), 
who have their own reporting / quantification / storage processes. Further, the IA was 
funded through USAID (via the RBHS bi-lateral) for the three FARA counties (Bong, 
Lofa, Nimba) but via Global Fund for the other 12 counties (via centrally funded/vertical 
programs including HIV and TB commodities); both with separate reporting requirement 
to their respective donors. 
In the FARA counties, the IA drugs were purchased by RBHS, and or managed 
by RBHS implementing partners Africare (Bong and Nimba) and IRC (Lofa), while the 
vertical program drugs were channeled through the central mechanism. The RBHS 
county staff assisted the Supply Chain Management Unit (SCMU), USAID|DELIVER, 
and the RBHS implementing partners to organize the quarterly distribution of drugs in 
the FARA counties. They also assisted facility staff in filling in the Stock Balance 
Reporting and Requisition (SBRR), the main LMIS report. RBHS provided support to the 
SCMU and CHTs to prepare for gradual decentralization of commodity management to 
the county level, and to ensure an uninterrupted delivery of essential drugs in Bong, Lofa 
and Nimba counties.clxxxii  
The 2015 IA assessment found overall availability of products improved during 
the IA, from approximately 28% at the start of the IA to over 70% during the last round. 
However, stock outs are still relatively common, and at the start of almost every 
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distribution round, 40–60% of facilities were stocked out of or had less than two months 
of malaria products while 20–60% of facilities were stocked out of or had less than two 
month of family planning products (rates varied by individual products and counties). 
Despite this, health facility personnel across all counties consistently feel that the 
program products have become much more available under the IA and that stock outs, 
when they occur, do not last as long as they did before the IA.clxxxiii  
 However, the assessment found that the IA has not consistently been delivering 
products according to schedule. Figure 35 shows that even prior to Ebola was declared an 
emergency by the GOL in June 2014, the timing for delivery rounds was off-schedule, 
occurring closer to every four months rather than every three months as designed. 
Figure 35. IA Delivery Schedules from Counties to Facilitiesclxxxiv 
In addition, most county delivery teams across rounds failed to follow order 
fulfillment guidelines across all products and consistently over or under supplied 
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facilities with products by more than five percent of the required amounts.  
At the facility level, most staff are unaware as to the source or system by which 
drugs and commodities are received in the facility, which means they are not able to hold 
the delivery teams or counties accountable for how much product facilities received or 
when it would arrive. To address this with the IA system, as of Round 3 they instituted 
the IA data form, and in the subsequent round facility staff were able to produce signed 
copies of the IA data form (i.e. the delivery round waybill) showing signatures of the 
delivery team, the facility officer in charge, as well as a community representative 
confirming receipt of the products. clxxxv 
According to the 2015 assessment, CHTs also had limited information or 
involvement in NDS deliveries from central to county level, and thus limited ability to 
hold the higher level accountable. At the NDS, however, the IA showed significant NDS 
management improvements likely due to the secondment of a USAID | DELIVER 
PROJECT Warehouse Advisor to the NDS. IA commodities were well organized, 
managed and secured within the NDS compound. The records, both manual and 
electronic, indicate strong inventory control overall.clxxxvi 
Overall, the IA showed some improvements in stock availability, as well as 
notable improvements in data visibility and NDS management, and thus strengthened 
accountability at each level, though communication and coordination between levels is a 
clear gap. Also, both central level management and NDS warehouse management are run 
by external partners and donors, and thus the assessment findings may be masking 
ongoing capacity weaknesses.  
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 Another issue with the IA is financial sustainability. The distribution rounds 
completed since late 2013 to June 2015 have cost approximately $2 million. Not only is 
the IA a costly experiment, but in 2006, the post-war National Health Policy defined the 
Basic Package of Health Services containing clinical services, including pharmaceutical 
services, that could be delivered free of charge to the population.clxxxvii  The continued 
provision of free drugs and commodities to all Liberians is not in line with recent 
rethinking of sustainable health financing schemes currently under development. 
Finally, in addition to central level deficits in the supply chain system and NDS, 
counties face understaffed and inadequate warehouse space with no continuous and 
uninterrupted power supply for most facilities. None of the counties has adequate cold 
chain facilities, requiring the use of county hospital facilities which are already 
overburdened. Last mile distribution is a big challenge due to poor road conditions (only 
about 10% of the roads to county headquarters are paved).clxxxviii  clxxxix 
A more integrated approach is needed, with the SCMP as a backdrop. There are 
several key issues that continue to hinder supply chain performance: (1) limited supply 
chain staff capacity; (2) continued issues with transparency of supply chain data and 
products; (3) need to align and update supply chain processes and procedures (including 
ensuring funds for distribution rounds are available at least one month prior to the 
distribution date); (4) need for integrated / coordinated system inclusive of all products 
on the Essential Drug List; and (5) need for improved coordination, including between 
donors funding various supply chain activities.  
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Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
Despite the achievements of the IA in increasing commodity availability and 
accountability for malaria and family planning commodities, at the time Ebola first hit 
Liberia in March 2014, there was still no comprehensive, integrated, functioning supply 
chain system under the control of the MOH for the provision of the complete list of 
essential medicines and commodities to all health facilities.  
For Ebola-related supplies and commodities, WHO took over procurement to the 
central level; the World Food Program (WFP) was mandated with distribution of 
commodities from the central to county depots, and JSI was responsible for distribution 
to all functioning (~656) public and private health facilities in the country on a monthly 
basis. 
However, for non-Ebola-related supplies and commodities, the system faltered. 
As can be seen in Figure 35 above, there was one national round of IA distribution during 
the active Ebola epidemic in November 2014—both by USAID | DELIVER and by 
Global Fund. Again, these included family planning and malaria commodities, and in 
Global Fund counties also included TB and HIV drugs. According to the MOH, during 
the Ebola epidemic health facilities experienced shortages and stock-outs of 12 tracer 
medicines and vaccines by the second half of 2014. Largely via unregulated donations—
weak regulation by the Liberia Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Authority 
(LMHRA) unable to cope with the influx of product—the market was flooded with 
pharmaceutical products.cxc 
The sudden increase in parallel supply chain systems (importation, storage and 
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distribution) added increased burden on regulatory authorities, plus pressure on NDS and 
county depots to absorb the vast quantities of PPEs and other Ebola-related products. 
According to MOH,  due to uncoordinated donations and the disruption of health services 
during the EVD outbreak, Liberia now has large volumes of expired drugs that need to be 
properly destroyed, and the weak regulation of pharmaceutical products and supplies has 
facilitated the importation of counterfeit medicines. cxci 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes shows that Building Block 4: Medical products, vaccines and 
technology, is the least well performing component of the health system and should be 
the government’s top priority in terms of emergency preparedness. Even following the 
Ebola epidemic—which facilitated some improvements in each of the other building 
blocks in terms of future emergency preparedness—the supply chain saw none. 
Table 22. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemented 
(2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
4. Medical 
products, 
vaccines and 
technology  
3.1 Medical supplies and 
equipment for emergency-
response operations 
SCORE=0.00 
17. Medical equipment and 
supplies for prehospital and 
hospital (including temporary 
health facilities) activities and 
other public health interventions 
0 
18. Pharmaceutical services 0 
19. Laboratory services 0 
20. Blood services 0 
 
While international NGOs filled the gap in laboratory capacity during the 
epidemic (attribute 19), Liberia continues to have marked challenges in this area, 
		
135 
including no national Quality Assurance Laboratory to test all incoming and outgoing 
medicines that circulate in the Liberian market for their quality and safety for 
consumption; no in-house ability to conduct rapid and reliable laboratory confirmation; 
and chronic under-enrollment in lab training schools. The healthcare quality assurance 
assessment of the past three years showed laboratory services receiving the lowest scores. 
There was no evidence to suggest a sustainable increase in systems-level government 
laboratory capacity as a result of Ebola cxcii  
Despite these low scores, the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health 
System, Liberia, 2015–2021 ranks supply chain/medical products, vaccines and 
technology a relatively low priority four out of six priorities. cxciii The plan proposes that 
in the event of an emergency, WHO/CDC will work with the MOH to develop a logistics 
management system and then WFP will be responsible for logistics. Similarly, the EPR 
Plan notes that in the event of a future epidemic, an emergency supply chain system will 
be initiated by MOH and WHO/CDC, with WFP responsible for logistics. During an 
emergency, WHO typically takes over procurement of emergency supplies and 
commodities to central stores, and WFP then transports goods to regional level (e.g., 
counties in Liberia; districts in other countries). Due to the large size of the WFP trucks, 
they typically do not do ‘last mile distribution’, i.e., distribute to health facilities, since 
the vehicles are often unable to navigate poor, rural roads.21 As a result, last mile 
distribution is reliant on the national supply chain management and routine distribution 																																																								
21 In fact, due to challenges in getting up and running in Liberia, JSI took over distribution from 
the central stores to the county level for the first four months of the epidemic while WFP established 
operations. JSI also ensured that drug depots/storage facilities were available at the county level prior 
to the installation of temporary drug units. 
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system. In the case of Liberia, where the system is not functioning, international 
organizations, in this case JSI, needed to take over responsibility of last mile distribution 
to every health facility. The recommendation in the Investment and EPR plans is thus 
incomplete in the Liberian context.  
Overall, the EPR Plan contains critical recommendations and proposed structures 
that would ideally be in place. However, it is clear that the plan is based on plans in 
countries with more robust and established health and emergency response systems and 
infrastructure in place (e.g., the presence of formal first responders such as fire and 
paramedical staff, vehicles and equipment, emergency information systems). As a result, 
many of the recommendations are not feasible to implement unless they are formally 
integrated into existing HSS activities and donor-funded programs.  
Building Block 5: Health Systems Financing 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014  
Table 23 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 	  
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Table 23. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Health Financing 
 RBHS Intervention/Technical Support Areas 
Capacity Building 
Level  
Sub-component 
Evaluated in RBHS 
Capacity Assessment of 
MOH 
BB5: health 
systems 
financing 
Support implementation of an 
electronic accounting system at 
county level  
Organizational and 
systems -Revenue collection and 
pooling 
-Payment mechanisms: 
provider 
-Payment mechanisms: 
beneficiary 
-Resource allocation 
Universal healthcare planning 
(e.g., LHEF) Systems 
Performance based financing Organizational and systems 
Sector wide approaches and 
pool (basket) funding Systems 
 
The National Health and Social Welfare Financing Policy and Plan (NHSWFPP) 
2011–2021 was developed with the goal of ensuring affordable health services and 
preventing catastrophic household costs. The NHSWFPP proposes a mix of health 
funding including sustainable government financing, predictable donor support, 
affordable user fees for selected services, mechanisms for risk pooling and appropriation 
from value-added tax. cxciv 
Performance based financing 
The MOHSW introduced performance-based contracting as a component of its 
five-year transitional National Health Policy and Plan in 2007. The rationale for PBC in 
Liberia was to help build public sector systems and capacity while continuing to harness 
existing service delivery capacity of NGOs during the post-conflict period. From 2009–
2012, RBHS contracted and managed five NGOs (IRC, EQUIP, Africare, MTI, and 
MERCI) to deliver the BPHS in seven counties (Bomi, Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Lofa, 
Montserrado, Nimba, and River Gee). A total of 118 health facilities with a catchment 
population of 770,000 were covered.  
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As noted above under Building Block 1: Health Services, Liberia saw notable 
improvements across a wide range of health services under the JSI-managed PBCs, as 
well as increased access to and utilization of services. cxcv 
Universal healthcare planning 
RBHS was requested by the MOH to explore feasible mechanisms to provide health 
insurance to the Liberian population with the ultimate, eventual goal of sustainable universal 
health coverage (UHC). One of the central aims of UHC is to ensure that all people have 
access to health and health care without the risk of financial impoverishment. Health 
financing reform—specifically health insurance—has been widely recognized as a key 
intervention strategy to increase financial protection and access to health care.  
In 2011, the Liberian government initiated discussions about potential financing 
mechanisms for health to move towards UHC. In 2011, Oxford Policy and Management 
conducted two studies on the pre-feasibility of community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) and social health insurance (SHI) and their potential roles in Liberia’s short- and 
medium-term health financing strategy. The conclusions were that the context in Liberia 
was not yet at a point where these mechanisms could be viable; the investigators argued 
that most of the factors contributing to the enabling environments of CBHI and SHI were 
only “weakly met.” cxcvi 
In 2013 there was renewed interest in health insurance at the MOH and RBHS 
subcontracted the Institute for Collaborative Development (ICD) to support the MOH to 
think through a transition from free care and put in place a health financing mechanism 
that would move Liberia on the road to UHC. With only one year left in the project, the 
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goal was to lay the groundwork for the eventual passing of legislation codifying a 
national health services purchaser. Planned activities were organized around eight 
domains: 1) oversight, policy, and legislation; 2) benefits package and provider payment; 
3) financing; 4) enrollment; 5) purchasing agent and claims management; 6) service 
provision; 7) education / advocacy / marketing; and 8) knowledge acquisition. cxcvii 
In July 2013, RBHS conducted formative research for health financing reform and 
insurance design options, including a high-level meeting with President Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf. This was followed by capacity building including a Ghana study tour to witness a 
live, operational national health insurance system in action. The Liberian delegation 
consisted of senior officials from the MOH in health planning and health services, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Civil Service Agency, USAID, RBHS, and development 
partners. cxcviii  
JSI produced a report entitled Universal Health Coverage in Liberia: Design 
Options and Roadmap, developed and circulated in August 2013. The report emphasized 
a functional (as opposed to model-based) approach to health insurance, recommending a 
customized solution for Liberia that combines elements from various models of insurance 
(e.g., SHI, CBHI). In each function of a health financing system—revenue generation, 
pooling, purchasing, and service delivery—the report presented a range of options and 
suggested the most practical solution for Liberia’s context. Based on these 
recommendations, an indicative roadmap for implementation of a national health 
insurance system, with pre-legislation, post-legislation, and beyond phases, was 
presented to the MOH and USAID. cxcix 
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Ultimately, the MOH proposed a geographically-phased introduction of the 
Liberia National Health Equity Fund (LHEF), to finance key services in the EPHS. The 
path to UHC is a continual process that entails trade-offs based on country context and 
prioritized values. The dialogue to date in Liberia has emphasized population coverage 
and equity—that all people should have access to health care without risk of financial 
burden. However, providing coverage to the entire population means ascertaining the 
amount of funding that can be sourced from the population and being careful with the 
types of services covered. Uncertain revenue generation potential and the experience of 
nearby Ghana have led to a reasoned, limited benefits package being proposed for the 
LHEF, based on the MOH’s EPHS. In other words, the preference currently expressed in 
Liberia is to prioritize providing a limited package of services to the entire population. cc 
The LHEF generated positive momentum and attention at the highest levels of the 
government. Both President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Health Minister Gwenigale 
publically announced and endorsed the forthcoming LHEF on multiple occasions 
including on the occasion of a meeting of West African health ministers in Monrovia 
under the auspices of the West African Health Organization. During this meeting 
President Sirleaf was explicit in her endorsement of the LHEF during remarks which 
drew heavily from a brief prepared for her by RBHS for the occasion. cci 
In January 2014, a first draft of the legislation was completed and submitted for 
review. As of May 2014, the second draft was in progress, but then progress came to a 
standstill with the onset of Ebola. 
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Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
The Ebola impact was immediately and visibly felt in terms of people’s health 
and quality of life, but also felt in terms of dollars spent on healthcare interventions, and 
in lost productivity and educational setback resulting from public schools closing for an 
entire school year. Liberia’s financing system was not only ill-equipped to absorb the 
immediate costs of the outbreak, but will be bearing associated costs in the medium and 
long-term. 
Resource allocation to counties is based on historical trends rather than needs. ccii   
One frustration voiced in the RBHS endline capacity assessment in 2014 was that despite 
increased capacity to plan and budget according to need at the county level, the allocation 
never reflected the needed amount, nor was proportionate to population size or local 
epidemiology. Neither the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development and 
Planning, nor the MOH apply a resource allocation formula for equitable financing. cciii 
Figure 36 highlights the disconnect between need and recent allocations to counties. 
Figure 36: Distribution of MOH spending (USD) by county (2013/2014) 
Source: Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, 2015–2021 
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During Ebola, the GOL had to redirect resources from other sectors to health in 
order to cope with the devastation that EVD caused in communities and health facilities, 
including 372 EVD infections and 184 deaths among health workers in already 
underfunded health facilities.cciv 
Health financing reform also came to a standstill with Ebola. However, on 
February 10, 2016, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf appointed a Cabinet Committee on 
Health Financing. The Committee will serve as the Advisory Council for designing 
health financing reforms including the LHEF, and will include the Minister of Finance as 
Chair, the Minister of Health as lead technical advisor, Minister of Commerce, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, National Investment Commission and the 
President's Legal Advisor.22 
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes shows that Building Block 5: Health Financing is among the 
most equipped health system components to be able to cope with a future emergency. 
However, while renewed progress is being made toward legislation toward universal 
health coverage, Liberia still lacks clear multi-sectoral strategies and mechanisms for 
financing emergency preparedness and management. The Investment Plan for Building a 
Resilient Health System, 2015–2021, ranked Health Financing last in terms of health 
system priorities. 
 																																																								
22 USAID e-mail correspondence February 16,  2016 
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Table 24. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemente
d (2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
5. Health 
financing  
5.1 National and 
subnational strategies 
for financing health-
sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.00 
30. Multi-sectoral 
mechanisms of financing 
emergency preparedness and 
management 
0 
31 Health-sector financing 
mechanisms 2 
 
Building Block 6: Governance and Leadership 
Objective 1: Liberian Health System Capacities, 2009–2014  
Governance and leadership in health are cross-cutting issues that help drive the 
development of policies and ensure adequate oversight and regulation. The ultimate goal 
of effective governance is to ensure accountability at all levels, intrinsic to the success of 
any health system.  
The Liberia MOH developed their decentralization policy in 2008 which included 
capacity building for county and district managers to address significant gaps in capacity 
for the overall coordination and management of services. ccv In 2012, as RBHS was 
shifting from service delivery management to health systems strengthening, governance 
and leadership was one of the central MOH’s strongest areas and one of the weakest for 
the CHTs.ccvi Thus, in addition to continued central-level systems support in the areas of 
human resources and HMIS, a major focus of the RBHS project was to enable and 
empower CHTs to take on leadership roles, thus supporting and strengthening further 
health sector decentralization. 
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Table 25 illustrates interventions that occurred at the central and county levels, 
the level that the intervention was intended to impact, and the areas assessed as part of 
the RBHS baseline and endline capacity assessment, conducted in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 25. RBHS Project Capacity Strengthening for MOH Governance and 
Leadership 
 RBHS 
Intervention/Technical 
Support Areas 
Capacity 
Building Level 
Sub-component 
Evaluated in RBHS 
Capacity Assessment 
of MOH 
BB6: 
governance 
and 
leadership 
Improve communication 
between central and county 
levels  
Individual and 
systems 
-Level of decision 
making 
-Institutional 
arrangements 
-Accountability 
-Scope and location of 
service providers 
-Consumer and 
stakeholder involvement 
Policy development Systems 
Licensure, accreditation, 
registration Systems 
Decentralization Systems 
Sanctions/incentives for 
compliance (e.g., PBCs) 
Individual and 
systems 
MOH Ownership over Capacity Strengthening 
Over the life of the RBHS project, the MOH put several mechanisms in place to 
help sustain and expand the gains in capacity development.  
First, Regional Support Teams (RSTs), led by senior ministry staff, were assigned 
to the five regions. The RST mandate is to be a gateway to ensure timely assistance to 
counties through the provision of technical managerial, programmatic, financial and 
administrative support. Each team was comprised of representatives from various units in 
the MOH, RBHS advisors, and WHO advisors; now without RBHS advisors. RSTs were 
intended to be responsible for working with the counties to identify and respond to 
support and capacity needs at the county level. These needs were to be identified in part 
through Quarterly Review Meetings in which each county would present key health 
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indicators, engaging their RST and CHSWB members in a dialogue about what the data 
was suggesting, what was driving high/low performance, and to problem solve and plan 
for the next quarter. After county support needs were identified, the RSTs would then 
obtain responsive support from the MOH and/or its partners and follow up and document 
the results. Though initiated toward the end of RBHS in 2014, this mechanism seemed to 
have the potential to be a “one stop shop” to address one of the noted communications 
weakness in the system, county communication with the central Ministry.  
Second, during the life of the RBHS project, the MOH hired a full-time capacity-
building coordinator in the County Health Services Division, thus institutionalizing 
leadership and visibility to capacity-building efforts, in particular for the counties. 
A third mechanism is the contracting-in readiness assessment working group, 
also housed within County Health Services, which was established to assess county 
readiness for contracting-in to deliver health services (as opposed to NGOs delivering 
services). This interdepartmental working group took the lead in completing the first 
round of county contracting-in readiness assessments and the County Health Services 
division has the mandate to strengthen county capacity for contracting-in.  
In order to enhance county-level oversight, the County Health and Social Welfare 
Boards were revitalized and operationalized in the three focus counties in the second half 
of the project, and institutionalized support for their continued functioning was secured 
through various mechanisms including the PBF Unit and the contracting-in readiness 
assessment working group. The PBF scheme set up a Steering Committee as a sub- 
committee of the CHSWB to oversee the results of implementation of the scheme. The 
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MOH process for identifying county readiness for “contracting-in” included a review of 
the frequency and substance of CHSWB meetings, as evidenced in meeting minutes. The 
newly formed Regional Support Teams were intended to provide ongoing support as 
needed to strengthen the CHSWBs. 
The development of RSTs and the contracting-in readiness assessment working 
group, as well as identifying staff responsible for capacity development within various 
units at the central MOH, show how the dialogue on capacity development has shifted 
within the MOH. These mechanisms are systems-level interventions with the potential to 
lead county capacity development. They are also indicators of the significance of 
continuous capacity-development within the MOH, especially in terms of moving 
counties toward decentralized management of health service delivery. 
Internal Communications 
The lack of internal communications procedures was a major contributing factor 
to the limited information sharing and dissemination at all levels of the MOH: central, 
CHT and facility. In 2013, RBHS began working with the MOH to improve internal 
communications. JSI first conducted an internal communications assessment at both the 
central and county levels. Four areas were identified as needing immediate attention: (1) 
non-existence of telecommunication channels at the central or county levels; (2) lack of 
SOPs governing internal communications; (3) lack of a communications unit (internal or 
external) within the MOH; and (4) a limited culture of information sharing.  
Together with key MOH personnel, JSI developed an internal communications strategy 
for the MOH. As critical first steps, the MOH installed internet access in most central 
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MOH offices and rehabilitated the internal telephone system at the central MOH 
building. JSI also assisted the Administration Department to seek funding to rehabilitate 
the country’s high frequency radio system, which connects all health facilities and county 
health offices to the central MOH. Following the Ebola outbreak, the MOH has also 
proposed a new unit in the MOH to handle external communications, the Bureau of Press 
and Public Relations (to be staffed with two people). 
Health Workforce Performance Management  
In 2013, the Civil Services Administration (CSA) finalized their Performance 
Management Handbook, the Civil Service Standing Orders and the Code of Conduct for 
the Civil Service. This led to the opportunity to develop and disseminate a MOH-specific 
health workforce performance management handbook. However, the draft guidelines 
were put on hold as attention was turned to the health worker strikes.  
Competing with ongoing human resources challenges, such as the issue of salaries 
and placing workers on the government payroll, engaging leadership in performance 
management discussions was a challenge for RBHS. These issues are also affected by the 
concurrent Public Sector Reform process and the recent Global Fund requirement that its 
supported staff be transitioned to GOL payroll within a defined time frame. However, 
restoring services in the aftermath of Ebola may be creating another opportunity to 
introduce the system as health workers return to work in a changed mindset.  
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Program Management 
In 2013, RBHS initiated capacity building in program management for three 
central MOH units—National Malaria Control Program, Community Health Division and 
the Infrastructure Unit—as well as for the three counties prioritized under the second half 
of the RBHS project—Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties. An organizational assessment 
was completed followed by the development of institutional terms of reference that were 
consistent with the overall direction of the MOH toward leaner overall structures, with 
more focus on policy, strategy and resource mobilization than actual implementation. 
Related organograms (at times representing fewer future central level positions) and job 
descriptions in a format supported CSA were developed. However, it was reported by 
RBHS staff that engaging MOH staff in the development of the program terms of 
reference and individual job descriptions was challenging as the fear of losing jobs 
affected the content and quality of participation.  
Objective 2: Impact of 2014–2015 Ebola Epidemic on the Liberian Health System  
With the onset of the largest Ebola epidemic in history, the still fragile health 
system necessitated another massive humanitarian response, where humanitarian 
organizations once again flooded the country and implemented activities, often with no 
MOH coordination or oversight.ccvii MOH requests for activity reports from Ebola relief 
organizations, through the newly established Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) 
taskforce, were largely ignored.23 The MOH was already dealing with four recent health 
																																																								
23 Personal correspondence with Dr. Luigi Ciccio, former Project Director of JSI’s Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance funded IPC Activity. 
		
149 
worker strikes for insufficient and inconsistent receipt of salaries from the central level, 
including ones in March and April, 2014, right when the first cases of Ebola were hitting 
Liberia.  
Over half of all health facilities shuttered their doors during the Ebola epidemic, 
and lack of functioning internal communication systems prior to the epidemic, plus no 
functioning and integrated disease surveillance and communication system from the 
community-level up significantly impeded the central government’s ability to maintain 
essential health services throughout the epidemic. The lack of clear communication to the 
public, combined with high health worker infections and deaths, further undermined 
confidence in the public health system, and in the government’s ability to govern and 
manage the epidemic. 
Chronically inconsistent under-funding to meet the HSS needs across all six 
building blocks prevented effective delivery of health services prior to Ebola. Over-
burdened and inadequately trained staff receiving inconsistent salaries from central 
government; completely inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in health care 
settings and associated lack of routine universal precautions and IPC practices among 
health staff; incomplete data and surveillance system with no system to gather and 
incorporate data collected at the community level into the existing HMIS; insufficient 
laboratory and diagnostic capacities; no existing experience in contact tracing; a supply 
chain system fraught with seepages and heavily dependent on external implementing 
partners for routine management; and weak MOH internal and external communications 
systems. All these health system weaknesses contributed to a breakdown in the central 
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and county level MOH to respond and manage the Ebola epidemic effectively, which 
essentially diverted almost all of the health sector’s attention to Ebola surveillance and 
response for more than half of 2014. ccviii  This led to the neglect of other health priorities 
and services, as evidenced under health service provision building block 1 above.  
Objective 3: Liberian Crisis-Preparedness Gaps and Government Priorities  
The analysis and priority ranking of the WHO Emergency Preparedness 
Components and Attributes show that some real progress has been made in Building 
Block 6: Leadership and Governance in order to improve the country’s future response to 
emergency management specific to another epidemic. Just as with financing, Liberia still 
lacks clear multi-sectoral frameworks and strategies for managing and preparing for 
future emergencies, caused by infectious diseases or other causes.  
Table 26. Emergency Preparedness Assessment Results 
WHO 
Building 
Block 
16 Key Components  51 Essential Attributes 
Implemente
d (2)  
Planned (1) 
Absent (0) 
1. Leader-
ship and 
governance  
1.1 Legal framework for 
national multi-sectoral 
emergency management 
SCORE=0.00 
1. Laws, policies, plans and 
procedures relevant to national 
multi-sectoral emergency 
management 
0 
2. National structure for multi-
sectoral emergency management 
and coordination 
0 
1.2 Legal framework for 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=1.33 
3. Laws, policies, plans and 
procedures relevant to health-
sector emergency management 
1 
4. Structure for health-sector 
emergency management and 
coordination 
2 
5. Regulation of external health-
related emergency assistance 1 
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1.3 National 
institutional framework 
for multi-sectoral 
emergency management 
SCORE=1.00 
6. National committee for multi-
sectoral emergency management 1 
7. National operational entity for 
multi-sectoral emergency 
management 
1 
1.4 National 
institutional framework 
for health-sector 
emergency management 
SCORE=0.33 
8. National committee for health-
sector emergency management 0 
9. National operational entity for 
health-sector emergency 
management 
1 
10. Mechanisms of coordination 
and partnership-building 0 
1.5 Components of 
national programme on 
health-sector emergency 
management 
SCORE=0.75 
11. National health-sector 
program on risk reduction 1 
12. Multi-sectoral and health-
sector programs on emergency 
preparedness 
0 
13. National health-sector plan 
for emergency response and 
recovery 
1 
14. Research and evidence base 1 
 
The Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021 
ranked Leadership and Governance low; fifth out of six health system priorities. Some 
improvement has been seen under this building block as a direct result of Ebola. With 
funding from the CDC Foundation, Liberia now has a permanent Emergency Operations 
Center in Monrovia located in back of the Central MOH in order to coordinate future 
response efforts and help prepare the country for future health emergencies.ccix 
Component 1.1 Legal framework for national multi-sectoral emergency 
management  
Though not yet validated, the national legislature has passed the EPR Plan 
initiated by the EPR Consortium, including the Liberian National Red Cross Society. The 
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EPR consortium has developed EPR and other plans, however they are not being 
integrated into larger multi-sectoral emergency management plans. According to EPR 
Consortium members, due to the recent push for “One Health” there has been more 
engagement with the Ministry of Agriculture, and regarding the flood response in 
Margibi there has been more engagement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Nonetheless, overall there still seem to be gaps in inter-ministry coordination to respond 
to emergencies.24 
 
Component 1.2 Legal framework for health-sector emergency management  
The National Epidemic Preparedness and Response plan itself is an example of a 
legal framework for health sector emergency management. The recommendations 
contained therein call for initiation of an IMS and associated organogram in the event of 
an epidemic emergency. While this is the best addressed component, effective transfer of 
IMS responsibilities to the MOH, once the current epidemic response IMS is deactivated, 
will be necessary to maintain progress related to this component. An Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) was constructed in back of the central MOH. All counties are 
in the process of developing a disaster management plan that will sit in the office of the 
superintendent—the first one was developed in Lofa in late 2015. 
Component 1.3 National institutional framework for multi-sectoral emergency 
management  
																																																								
24 Personal correspondence with former RBHS staff and current Liberia EPR Consortium 
members. 
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A Presidential Advisory Committee on Ebola (PACE) and a National Task Force 
on Ebola (NTFE) were formed, but as the IMS is being decommissioned, the future status 
of PACE and NTFE are unclear. Further, these are structures specific to Ebola, not to any 
other epidemics and not for emergencies caused by other hazards. 
Component 1.4 National institutional framework for health-sector emergency 
management. While not explicitly mentioned in either of the plans, there is a nascent QA 
unit within the MOH. Further, the IMS serves as the national operational entity for 
health-sector emergency management, though once decommissioned, IMS 
responsibilities will be transitioned over to the National EPR Committee, which will be 
housed in the Division of Disease Prevention and Control with the Division Director 
acting as de facto chair.  
Component 1.5 Components of national programme on health-sector emergency 
management. The April 2016 EPR plan is the national health sector plan for emergency 
response and recovery. It talks briefly about (attribute 14) research and evidence base, but 
not on how to operationalize/integrate into existing systems and efforts. Building on the 
Keep Safe, Keep Serving IPC training and supervision curriculum and SOPs developed 
early in the Ebola epidemic, Safe Quality Services (SQS) curriculum replaced it as the 
national guidelines on recommended facility-based risk reduction. A QA Unit within the 
MOH is still in the early stages of development. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Creating Resilient Health Systems against Modern Disruptions 
Throughout history, there have been numerous events that have caused societal 
disruptions. However, according to Judith Rodin, President of The Rockefeller 
Foundation, three disruptive phenomena are distinctly modern: urbanization, climate 
change, and globalization.ccx Scientist Brian Walker at the Stockholm Resilience Centre 
suggests that evidence points to a future where periods of abrupt change are likely to 
increase in frequency and magnitude.ccxi Such change will come from climate impacts, 
and other drivers related to urbanization and globalization such as land use changes for 
agriculture, livestock, and resource extraction. Abrupt change challenges the adaptive 
capacity of societies and their health systems, underscoring the importance of the concept 
of resilience.  
In the face of a crisis or abrupt change, a resilient health system is one that can 
effectively respond while at the same time maintaining basic functioning, ideally not 
reversing years of realized gains in health outcomes. Maintaining basic functioning while 
addressing a crisis requires that a health system has incorporated emergency preparedness 
at all levels—individual (behavioral), organizational (health unit), systems (policies and 
regulation)—and has aligned everyday public health activities with activities associated 
with emergency management.  
Unfortunately, emergency preparedness and response initiatives are often viewed 
as add-on activities to HSS; not aligned to the core health system functions and 
operations. This is the case in Liberia with the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient 
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Health System, 2015–2021—the national plan developed in response to the 2014–2015 
Ebola epidemic. It was also, until relatively recently, the case in the United States where 
emergency preparedness and response were largely under the purview of law 
enforcement, fire and emergency management agencies, with substantially different 
organizational cultures from public health.ccxii  
The move to integrate emergency management into the US public health system 
has largely commenced following the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 
2001, and subsequently in response to heightened fear of biological weapons. Since then, 
US health systems have been cited as having effective integration of emergency 
management and public health, and thus held up as examples of highly resilient systems. 
For example, during the Boston Marathon bombing, not only did public health, law 
enforcement and emergency management services work seamlessly together during the 
crisis, but the community was both informed of events in real time and actively engaged 
as part of the response (e.g., through identification and coordination of volunteers at the 
scene). ccxiii 
However, rather than broadening the definition of HSS to be inclusive of public 
health and emergency preparedness and crisis management features, as has been done in 
the United States, a discourse on the need to create resilient systems based on new 
academic criteria is evolving for application in the developing world. Despite the myriad 
of new resilience frameworks being developed, none provide additional clarity or utility 
beyond established emergency preparedness concepts in helping countries develop and 
implement resilient health systems, as has been done in the US. 
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Inclusive of emergency preparedness and response initiatives, health systems in 
Liberia and elsewhere can be strengthened to be more resilient, and thus better able to 
anticipate future challenges, adapt to meet the challenges, and then further improve the 
system to be able to anticipate new future challenges. However, strengthening health 
systems so that they are resilient takes resources, including sector-wide/HSS resources 
that can be used to build functioning, integrated systems and skilled, networked 
individuals and groups across sectors.  
The Role of County Governments, Donors and Global Governance 
Keeping track of development needs and funding streams in an increasingly 
complex and interconnected world requires strong global leadership and oversight. With 
the rapidly changing and increasingly complex global aid architecture, more than ever 
before, there is a need for strengthened global governance to track and guide: (1) funding 
patterns across the panoply of donor and their respective priorities, (2) new development 
agencies through which donor funds are channeled, and (3) what countries are receiving 
the funds and for what specific health focus areas.  
Donors finance a significant amount of total health expenditure in Liberia, 82%, 
making the Liberia’s health system vulnerable to donor funding fluctuations. Myopic 
donor priorities may result in short-term outcomes, but without substantial support for 
strengthening whole systems, the ability of those systems to anticipate future needs, and 
indeed to build resilience, is handicapped. 
The West African Ebola epidemic brought to the forefront the need to clarify and 
refine the role of WHO. However, in addition to the need for more relevant and 
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responsive global governance through WHO (top-down), there is the clear concurrent 
need to support strengthened and resilient country health systems, who in turn can 
identify and guide donors (bottom-up) on their top, self-identified health and system 
priorities. Improvements on both ends would help to align donor and government 
priorities to build efficient, integrated health systems that promote and increase resilience 
at all levels and across all building blocks. 
Pre-existing Conditions  
Ebola caused Liberia to come full circle, again. The country was mired in a 
humanitarian response following 14 years of civil war that devastated the health sector, 
among other sectors. Starting in 2008, the GOL and donors began to actively move the 
country out of a humanitarian response mode and into development through increased 
systems strengthening activities. Then, in 2014, the country was thrust back into a 
humanitarian situation; this time in response to the devastating Ebola outbreak that again 
destabilized the health sector.    
The 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic in West Africa has implications for how 
governments, donors and implementing partners design and implement HSS 
interventions. Prior to Ebola, the WHO Health Systems Building Blocks became the most 
prominent framework guiding health systems strengthening projects; Liberia incorporated 
the framework into their National Health Plan, 2011–2021, and health systems 
strengthening activities including JSI’s RBHS project were guided by the framework. 
While the Liberian health system saw many improvements over the life of the 
RBHS project, persistent gaps in Liberia’s health system limited the government’s ability 
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to mount a rapid and adequate response to Ebola in the Spring of 2014. As the Ebola 
epidemic escalated and the health system faltered, the concept of resilience was pushed to 
the forefront of the HSS conversation in Liberia and globally, and was the impetus for 
this thesis.  
This thesis reviewed the Liberian health system for the presence of WHO-defined 
emergency preparedness attributes, and then compared identified gaps against priorities 
outlined in two government documents—1) the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient 
Health System, Liberia 2015–2021, and (2) the draft Epidemic Preparedness and 
Response Plan (April 2016)—in order to identify specific activities to address any gaps 
not already included in Liberia’s planned recovery and resilience interventions.  
At the time Ebola first emerged in Liberia, key gaps in Liberia’s health system 
included:  
• a lack of health emergency risk management preparedness (building block 6); 
• inconsistent infection prevention and control practices (building block 1);  
• inadequate or non-existent basic health infrastructure including health facility access 
to water, soap and sanitation facilities (building block 6);  
• inadequate surveillance (building block 6 and 1);  
• lack of health workforce information management systems, performance 
management, and transfers and placements based on need (building blocks 2, 3 and 
6);  
• weak supply chain (building block 4);  
• inefficient mobilization, distribution and transparent accounting for both financial and 
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material resources (building block 5);  
• lack of formalized mechanisms to engage and communicate between the health 
system and communities (building blocks 1, 3 and 6); and 
• fragmentation of systems and services (building blocks 1, 3, 4, 5).  
Under the pressure of an escalating Ebola outbreak, the pre-existing gaps translated 
into a deep lack of trust in the system on the part of the communities, and lack of 
accountability and ownership of the system on the part of health workers.  
Further, the Ebola epidemic exacerbated the lack of coordination and integration 
within the health sector; the panoply of new donors and implementing partners and 
agencies that subsequently flooded into the country put increased pressure on already 
weak regulatory and management systems at all levels.  
From Near Collapse to Resilience: Overarching Recommendations and Logic Model 
Following the Ebola epidemic, the GOL identified three overarching needs: (1) 
improved health infrastructure, (2) strengthened epidemic preparedness and response, 
and (3) sustainable community engagement.  Corresponding priorities and activities laid 
out in the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021 
are highly-specific to preparing for and responding to a future infectious disease 
outbreaks, such as Ebola, with targeted interventions in those three areas.  
There are two limitations to the GOL resilience plan. The first is only focusing on 
epidemic preparedness instead of taking a more holistic approach to addressing all-
hazards preparedness. The second is proposing additional elements instead of integrating 
the needs and corresponding activities into the existing national HSS framework. To meet 
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these limitations and the gaps identified throughout this thesis, two overarching 
recommendations are proposed below, followed by specific recommendations organized 
under each of the six WHO building blocks. 
Overarching Recommendation 1: Take an All-Hazards Approach 
As was the case with the Ebola outbreak in Liberia, 95 percent of all disasters 
make their initial impact at the community level. The early, chaotic days of the outbreak 
were plagued by poor operational planning as well as a lack of coordination and 
communication, highlighting the vulnerability and lack of capacity of the Liberian health 
system and communities to avert major disruptions to health service delivery. While 
much of the post-Ebola efforts are justifiably focused on preventing another major 
infectious disease outbreak, Liberia is vulnerable to a variety of both natural and man-
made hazards: severe flooding during the rainy season and civil unrest (be it domestic or 
spilling over from neighboring countries) are examples that could easily trigger internal 
displacement, increase food insecurity, and cause disruptions in basic services.  
A fundamental step for Liberia to strengthen the capacity of health facilities and 
their catchment communities to withstand or respond to all hazards is to build local-level 
resilience through a National Incident Management System (NIMS). To be effective, the 
NIMS must be robust enough to respond to all hazards – including but going beyond 
infectious disease epidemic preparedness – and must thus naturally extend beyond the 
health sector (e.g., including Agriculture, Education, Public Works, and Transport).   
Significant post-Ebola strides have been made by the MOH by prioritizing 
epidemic preparedness, surveillance and response, and early warning systems, as outlined 
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in the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021. In 
line with this, multi-lateral efforts have been concentrated on implementing an integrated 
disease surveillance and response system and associated health information systems and 
technologies, and the MOH has established an Epidemic Preparedness and Response 
Division to take over responsibilities in December of the of the current NGO-led EPR 
Consortium.  
 However, to fundamentally increase capacity and reduce the vulnerability of 
communities, health facilities and county health teams in all 15 counties, a cross-sectoral 
NIMS will be required to mainstream disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness 
into health (and other) systems planning at the facility, community and county levels.   
 To do this, the capacity of CHTs must be enhanced to take the lead in responding 
to future disasters to reduce the extent of potential casualties. At the sub-county level, 
health coalitions between health facilities and local communities should be formed, 
including public-private partnerships, and jurisdictions and responsibilities clarified 
within the county health systems.  
Key Definitions: 
Disaster Risk Reduction: Reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to 
analyze and manager the causes of disaster. Includes reducing exposure to hazards, 
lessening vulnerability of people and property, and preparedness. 
Emergency preparedness: Capacity to prevent, protect against, quickly 
respond to, and recover from emergencies, particularly those whose scale, timing, or 
unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine capabilities. 
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 Through initial planning meetings led by the CHTs, local institutions including 
schools, local government, private sector, health facilities and their respective 
communities (e.g., through the Community Health Development Committees (CHDCs)), 
should come together to identify risk factors - hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities, gaps in 
capacities – to inform prevention and mitigation activities and the appropriate required 
response systems. The planning process itself would increase awareness and build 
capacity at the community, health facility, district, and county levels, and result in 
coordinated yet tailored emergency operational plans (EmOPs).These plans, and 
subsequent drills could form the basis of a coordinated response, regardless of the nature 
of the hazard.  
At the sub-county level, the key coordinating mechanism for strengthening 
preparedness could be the establishment of health coalitions. Health coalitions would 
reflect the local context consisting of geographically adjacent health facilities, schools, 
communities, private sector entities, and local government structures. The health 
coalitions would strengthen emergency preparedness by creating a coordinated, 
interoperable, and unified health care effort in the event of a disaster. For example, if one 
facility loses capability during a disaster (as was the case when facilities shuttered doors 
due to lack of capacity to deal with Ebola), unaffected facilities within the coalition could 
step in to fill service delivery gaps. These health coalitions could be supported by 
existing and new donor funds to build upon and formalize local public-private sector 
partnerships to provide needed transportation, fuel, water, and communications in times 
of need. These partnerships could take a wide variety of forms; the key is that they 
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strengthen the collective resilience of communities by pooling available resources. Health 
coalitions would allow for the continued provision of services in the event of unforeseen 
events ranging from the mundane (supply shortages) to the extraordinary (infectious 
disease outbreak). A health coalition shifts the focus from capacity building of individual 
facilities to building collective capacity through a joint risk assessment and EmOP 
planning.  Supporting health coalitions as part of overall health system strengthening 
would be a natural integration of emergency preparedness into health systems 
strengthening activities. 
Functional, contextually-specific EmOPs are needed that clearly establish 
guidelines for resource management and prioritize the coordination of priority actions. 
The plans should consist of a standard set of definitions, protocols and tools, including 
locally pertinent information including hazards, available resources, and contact 
information for key response personnel. The establishment of routine drills and updating 
of EmOPs should be routinely reinforced and linked to existing county operational 
planning processes.  
The importance of fostering community-level cooperation and awareness has 
been widely cited following the Ebola outbreak, and engaging key leaders in each of the 
health coalitions and in EmOP development is a tangible way to operationalize this 
lesson.  
EmOPs should be institutionalized so that emergency preparedness is a job 
function of key positions within each of the entities comprising the health coalitions (i.e., 
health facilities, schools, government structures, CHDCs). Thus, shifting the paradigm 
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for emergency preparedness and management from a reactive to a proactive approach 
will increase the likelihood of continued provision of services in the event of a crisis.  
Collaborative planning and implementation will facilitate the development and 
dissemination of national standards, guidelines, and protocols, including the developed 
EmOPs. Integrating an all-hazards approach into overall health systems strengthening 
initiatives is fundamental to building health system resilience. A first step is through the 
development of an NIMS, inclusive of county-level EmOPs. 
Community Resilience 
Inclusive of taking an all-hazards approach to crisis preparedness is the promotion 
of community resilience. As noted above, 95 percent of all disasters make their initial 
impact at the community level, and often, by the time major interventions arrive, an 
epidemic is already under control.ccxiv Though the epidemic was far from under control 
when major interventions arrived in Liberia, with the health system unable to provide 
care for all those in need during the height of the epidemic, and with many health 
facilities closed, patients in Liberia turned to community leaders requesting IPC guidance 
and support in order to provide community-based care.ccxv The role of community care 
providers in helping to ultimately curb the Ebola epidemic at the community level has yet 
to be fully documented. ccxvi 
Community engagement is implicitly a cross-cutting feature of building blocks 1 
Health Services, 2 Human Resources, 3 Health Information, and 6 Governance and 
Leadership. However, not explicitly addressing it in the framework has led to limited 
examples of significant, effective and sustained activities to effectively engage 
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communities in health promotion and maintenance. Community engagement is now a 
stand-alone priority in the Liberian post-Ebola planning document; however it is not 
integrated into the larger building block framework that guides health system 
improvements, meaning that community engagement activities are likely to be stand 
alone and fragmented. 
Further, community engagement, in and of itself, should not be the ultimate 
objective. Rather, a broader objective should be the promotion of community resilience, 
inclusive of community preparedness. According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, community preparedness requires active, ongoing community engagement in 
order to: (1) determine local risks to the health of the community, (2) build community 
partnerships to support health preparedness, (3) engage with community organizations to 
foster public health, medical and mental and behavioral health social networks, and (4) 
coordinate training or guidance to ensure community engagement in preparedness 
efforts.ccxvii  
According to Wells, et al.: 
“Much of traditional emergency preparedness is conducted “top-down,” but 
immediate response in the first 72 hours and long-term recovery falls on 
communities following a bottom-up” approach. A central message in 
preparedness training is for communities to be prepared to survive for a period of 
time on their own, but this message is not necessarily delivered to communities 
predisaster or coupled with a long-term commitment by responders to assist them 
in preparing. There can thus be a real or perceived disconnect between the goals 
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and approach of preparedness initiatives and the needs of communities to respect 
their priorities.”ccxviii  
The integration of emergency planning within each of the six building blocks in 
the WHO health system strengthening framework would effectively provide a mechanism 
to enhance community resilience in part through formalizing clear roles of community 
members as part of health coalitions, prioritizing communication systems and resources, 
community relationships, communication processes, and community attributes.ccxix 
Specific outcomes of effective community resilience activities integrated into health 
system strengthening include:  
• Community Resilience Capacity 
• Linkage to Vulnerable Populations 
• Community Volunteerism 
• Agency Partnerships 
• Community Knowledge of Risks/Assets 
• Household/Agency Emergency Plans 
• Coordination/Trust in Government 
• Staff Attitudes, Knowledge, Practice 
• Individual and Family Preparedness. ccxx 
Overarching Recommendation 2:  An Integrated WHO Building Blocks Framework 
Another critical step for Liberia toward strengthening the capacity of health 
facilities and their catchment communities to withstand or respond to all types of hazards 
is to integrate emergency preparedness into the existing framework upon which the 
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National Health Plan 2011–2021 is based (i.e., WHO Building Blocks). The Investment 
Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021 proposes adding new 
stand-alone components to be addressed largely through donor-funded initiatives. This 
will very likely draw donor attention and funds away from general health systems 
strengthening and thus reduce the GOL’s progress toward meeting overall health system 
targets laid out in the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 
2015–2021.  
Despite the original premise of the WHO Building Block framework where it was 
intended to simultaneously address all six building blocks, due to donor funding interests 
we are now siloing building blocks whereas before it was siloing diseases. Adding 
separate surveillance and early warning systems will simply amplify the siloed effect.  
Financing is linked to information, and the information being prioritized and collected is 
linked to commodities or specific sub-components.ccxxi Thus, until we place an increased 
emphasis on sector-wide interventions and corresponding data collection that captures the 
interrelationships and interdependencies between the building blocks—which in part is 
what an effective NIMS aims to achieve—we will remain stuck in a silo; be it a disease 
or building block.   
In order for any proposed recommendations to be effectively and sustainably 
operationalized, they will need to be built upon and integrated into the existing systems 
and frameworks, rather than simply applying a new ‘resilience’ framework on top of the 
existing HSS framework in place. If not, the risk of continuing with the status quo and 
creating new, fragmented, vertical systems is high.  
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While dealing with multiple other public health priorities, public health 
preparedness went largely unaddressed in pre-Ebola Liberia. The government, donors, 
and implementing partners were focusing on strengthening basic health services through 
a rapidly decentralizing system. The lack of integration of public health preparedness into 
HSS interventions left the country vulnerable to public health emergencies. 
Part of the role of a MOH is to ensure that the largest drivers of health, the 
primary determinants in a country, are adequately being addressed through the myriad of 
health-related interventions and programs in the country, which should be inclusive of 
emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction. This requires adequate resources and 
staff, health financing based on need and local epidemiology, adequate flow of 
information between community, facility, county and central levels, and nimble, 
redundant systems able to cope with a crisis while maintaining basic functioning. 
Moreover, all of this requires strong leadership and governance whose hands are not tied 
by myopic donor funding priorities.   
An Integrated Logic Model 
The following logic model reflects the integration of emergency preparedness 
activities into the classic HSS approach and shows how system level components provide 
the inputs in support of comprehensive services that are in turn translated into desirable 
outputs and outcomes. It is intended to succinctly summarize how the GOL—and donors 
and implementing partners—can further HSS efforts while simultaneously strengthening 
the country’s emergency preparedness by integrating emergency preparedness activities 
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within each of the existing six health system building blocks (rather than adding 
additional blocks as proposed by the two plans). 
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Figure 37. Logic Model Integrating Emergency Preparedness into Health Systems Strengthening 
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Detailed Recommendations by Building Block 
This section provides detailed recommendations for each health system building 
block that address specific gaps not clearly identified in either the Investment Plan for 
Building a Resilient Health System, Liberia, 2015–2021 or the draft EPR Plan. The 
building block framework is built on the premise that all building blocks should be 
simultaneously strengthened. However, acknowledging limited resources that may 
prevent the implementation of all recommendations simultaneously, the specific 
recommendations within each building block are organized by priority. 
Building Block 1: Service Delivery  
One of the criticisms of the WHO Building Block framework is that it is heavily 
provider-based without the explicit and significant inclusion of community at all levels.  
Incorporating emergency planning into each of the building block components in part 
will address this through ensuring a clear point of engagement between the community 
and health system. The following service delivery recommendations guide the 
incorporation of emergency preparedness and community engagement activities into 
health services provision. 
(1) Shift focus from preparing and responding specifically to infectious disease 
epidemics to a broader all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness. Establish a 
National Incident Management System. This includes the formation of health 
coalitions between health facilities and local communities, including public-private 
partnerships, and clarify jurisdictions and responsibilities within the county health 
system. 
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(2) Integrate emergency preparedness planning into country operational planning 
processes resulting in county-specific EmOPs as a subset to the county operational 
plans. EmOPs should be institutionalized so that emergency preparedness is a job 
function of key positions within each of the entities comprising the health coalitions 
(i.e., health facilities, schools, government structures, CHDCs). Shifting the paradigm 
for emergency preparedness and management from a reactive to a proactive approach 
will increase the likelihood of continued provision of services in the event of a crisis.  
(3) Regularly involve the community as well as other sectors in emergency 
preparedness planning at national and county level: include, at a minimum, CHDCs, 
education, transportation, post and telecommunications, and security, with pre-
established points of contact across all other ministries. This could be done through 
supporting Regional Support Team quarterly review meetings with multi-sectoral 
representation. Use the RST forum to identify risk factors - hazards, exposures, 
vulnerabilities, gaps in capacities – to inform prevention and mitigation activities and 
the appropriate required response systems. Incorporate findings into county-specific 
EmOPs. This would also serve to strengthen operationalization of the new RST 
structure. 
Building Block 2: Health Workforce  
Some progress has been made in terms of improving the availability of services 
(e.g., supervision strengthening, provision of/staff competence in the BPHS), but more is 
needed to expand provision to include the full package of essential health services (e.g., 
psychosocial and school health services), to integrate emergency preparedness into 
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supportive supervision tools and practices, and to get health workers on the government 
payroll and regularly paid. 
(1) Get all active staff (including laboratory staff) on the government payroll and 
pay them, on schedule, every month. This involves completing and routinely 
updating the capture of human resource data (active employees, and deleting all 
others and duplicates) into iHRIS, and finalizing interoperability with DHIS2 
(also related to building block 3). This also necessitates strong governance and 
leadership to overcome individual resistance to cleaning up the payroll (building 
block 6).  
(2) Regular and substantial community involvement into health services is clearly a need. 
CHDCs, community health workers, and in particular gCHVs are a key link between 
the community and formal health services. Form stronger engagement with CHDCs 
by actively including them in EmOP planning. Also, better integrate gCHVs in the 
health sector by identifying a role for them in collecting community-level data for 
capture into a new community-HMIS system (also building block 3).  
(3) Poor infection control practices lead to increased transmission to health workers and 
patients, with negative spiraling impact on the health system in terms of decreased 
trust in the system, and thus decreased ability of the system to mount an effective 
response to future epidemics. The protection of health care workers must be 
paramount. This necessitates regular supportive supervision on IPC, as well as 
sufficient water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in health care settings, and adequate 
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supply of IPC commodities, thus necessitating a seamless supply chain (also building 
block 4).  
(4) Integration of emergency preparedness drills and exercises into routine county-led 
capacity exercises with facilities and communities in their catchment. Ideally, this 
would occasionally involve stakeholders from other sectors in relevant drills 
including education, transportation, police, as well as the private sector. 
(5) Widely integrate emergency preparedness skills and activities into pre-service 
curricula, supportive supervision tools, accreditation and re-licensure criteria, and into 
basic qualifications for health personnel at each level. 
Building Block 3: Health Information 
As noted above, the failure to mount a timely response on the part of the government, 
NGOs and international agencies was in part due to the lack of timely and accurate 
information, as well as the demands of addressing significant competing priorities within the 
fragile health system. Continuous and accurate information derived from facility- and 
county-level management systems needs to be supplied back to the central MOH to 
inform priority setting, adjustments to inputs, and new innovations and research. 
Information should routinely include data from the community, surveillance data, health 
worker professional development and supervision data, health promotion provision and 
effectiveness, and evidence of the use of data for decision-making at all levels 
(community, facility, county, regional, national). There are eight recommendations 
specifically related to improving health information. 
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(1) Finalize the governance of the iHRIS, including where it resides and which offices 
play which roles in terms of maintaining data; maintaining the hardware and 
software; access and use rights, including mobile messaging. At the end of RBHS in 
February 2015, the critical HR functions were located in two departments: the policy 
and planning functions, which can be supported by iHRIS, are housed in the Planning 
and Policy Department in the HR Unit; the administration of personnel, including 
recruitment, selection, processing CSA requirements, payroll and benefits, and 
performance management are housed in the Personnel Unit in the Administration 
Department. The Training Unit is also located in Policy and Planning. This has 
caused confusion in terms of ownership and delays in the roll-out of the new system.  
(2) Train users to routinely capture facility staff professional development and 
training data into iHRIS. Conduct training on data collection, entry and 
management of human resource data using the iHRIS application for central and 
county staff. Engage cooperation of all of the vertical programs, partners who provide 
training, and the county human resource officers who can also directly input data into 
the system. To realize this, job descriptions of all responsible parties (e.g., human 
resource officers, CHSAs, vertical program staff, bilateral project staff) need to be 
adjusted and trained accordingly.  
(3) Develop and operationalize capture of community-level data into a new C-HMIS. 
Link system with newly ongoing efforts to improve surveillance and early warning 
systems at the county and community levels.  
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(4) Develop interoperability of surveillance data system (e.g., IDSR and eWARN) 
with DHIS2 and iHRIS, and train central MOH and selected county staff on how 
to query data linked from all three systems. 
(5) Regularly use data linked between surveillance, DHIS2, and iHRIS to assess 
health worker training and distribution against health outcomes.  
(6) Develop and incorporate indicators of emergency preparedness into the 
quarterly health review meetings at regional and county level. Invite school health 
officials and representatives from other sectors as appropriate. 
(7) Building upon the newly established high-frequency radio system, strengthen risk 
communication through the development of an emergency broadcast system that 
can also be used for health promotion during non-emergencies. With relatively low 
cell phone coverage and very low levels of smartphone ownership, radio is still the 
most widespread form of technology in Liberia. 
(8) Conduct operational research to identify new factors which facilitate the emergence 
and transmission of epidemic-prone diseases, including mapping and risk assessments 
to determine areas at risk of epidemic-prone diseases, strengthen early warning 
systems, and strengthen laboratory capacity. These were activities listed as secondary 
priorities in the EPHS (following the first phase which was continued scaling up and 
strengthening of largely maternal, neonatal and child health services, as prioritized in 
the earlier BPHS). 
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Building Block 4: Medical products, vaccines, and technology 
The Liberian supply chain system has notable weaknesses from the national 
regulatory bodies to the central MOH management unit, down to the systems and 
operationalization at the county level. An efficient, transparent and effective supply chain 
is critical under routine circumstances to ensure sufficient forecasting and requisition and 
distribution of essential medicines and supplies; it is equally critical in times of crisis. 
There are eight critical recommendations to strengthen the Liberian supply chain system: 
(1) Integrate supply chain into larger HSS activities. Promote a broader understanding 
of the importance of supply chain in achieving health outcomes by routinely 
reporting on supply chain system-level indicators at RST quarterly review meetings. 
(2) Strengthen LMHRA to be able to adequately regulate drugs and commodities across 
all donor/funding streams, as well as via donations during an emergency. 
(3) Strengthen central level SCMU capacity and leadership. 
(4) Fast-track National Drug Stores warehouse construction to reduce seepage of 
commodities.  
(5) Ensure adequate drug storage facilities at county/facility levels. 
(6) Ensure adequate laboratory facilities at county level. 
(7) Train facility and county staff in quantification and correct use of SBRR and other 
tools. 
(8) Update SCMP based on lessons from Interim Approach. Develop a system that 
ensures integrated, coordinated supply of drugs and commodities across the entire 
EPHS and inclusive of EPR/IPC supplies. 
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Building Block 5: Health Financing  
As noted in the findings section, annual deviations between estimated budget 
needs and actual provision of funds have been substantial; in FY2010/11 it was 33% 
below, and in FY2011/12, 36% below estimates. ccxxii In part, this is because the central 
MOH has limited control of its budget where not only is the total health budget allocation 
determined by Congress, but specific county allocations are determined by Congress, not 
MOH. Such discrepancies between estimated and actual make it challenging to plan and 
implement activities, and have implications for building the sustainable capacity and 
resilience of the health system. 
Also documented in the Findings section above, noted progress was made 
regarding improved access under the RBHS project, from constructing new and 
renovating existing health facilities, mapping facility catchment areas to better normalize 
access/distribute services within counties, and beginning work on drafting the LHEF. 
More, however, needs to be done to reach the goal of UHC, starting with the 
identification of who and what services will be covered under LHEF, and what services 
will be covered through the existing PBF mechanism. Following, there are two key 
recommendations related to health financing: 
(1) Adequately fund MOH and allocate funds across counties based on need (local 
epidemiology, population, etc.) rather than historical funding levels. 
(2) Identify services in EPHS to be provided under the LHEF and supported by 
taxes, and those to continue being supported through the PBC mechanism to 
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maximize coverage for the poor and to subsidize non-poor informal population 
segments. 
Building Block 6: Leadership and Governance 
The above logic model recommends strengthening governance structures that 
support all-hazards emergency preparedness at all levels: individual, organizational and 
systems. To achieve this, there are seven specific recommendations related to leadership 
and governance: 
(1) The newly established EPR unit, to be incorporated into the Division of Disease 
Prevention and Control (taking over activities from the current NGO-led EPR 
Consortium), is the national committee for health-sector emergency management, but 
specifically mandated to coordinate the response to future infectious disease 
outbreaks. The EPR unit should expand to take and all-hazards approach to 
emergency preparedness. 
(2) Further, the GOL should develop a NIMS, inclusive of a national structure and 
committee for multi-sectoral emergency management that takes an all-hazards 
approach.  
(3) Expand county-level epidemic preparedness plans to broader emergency 
preparedness plans, addressing potential hazards beyond infectious disease 
epidemics. Integrate the emergency planning process with general county operational 
planning processes.  
(4) Formalize and strengthen Central MOH capacity to oversee IPC training and 
practices throughout the health sector (e.g., via the new Quality Assurance Unit). 
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(5) Provide ongoing government support for Regional Support Team quarterly review 
meetings as means of formalized data-based planning. Regularly include all-hazard 
emergency preparedness data (including data from iHRIS, DHIS2, surveillance) 
into quarterly review meetings to help identify emergency planning activities and 
needs. Ensure community representation (e.g., via CHDCs) at quarterly review 
meetings. Include multi-sectoral representation, especially from education, at RST 
meetings. 
(6) Strengthen regulation of external health-related emergency assistance (e.g., 
LMHRA to regulate drug donations, EPR Unit to activate and directly coordinate an 
IMS as needed)  
(7) In addition to getting staff on payroll, develop a health workforce performance 
management handbook based on the national guidelines and code of conduct. 
Finally, one of the three identified GOL priorities stemming from the Ebola 
epidemic is improved health infrastructure; indisputably a need and clear priority in 
Liberia. However, as noted in the literature review above, one-fifth of deaths in Liberia 
are attributed to water and sanitation problems (also clearly an amplifier of the Ebola 
epidemic). Noting this, the historical lack of DAH and GOL allocation for water and 
sanitation is perplexing. Without increased attention to and funding for water supply and 
sanitation improvements, there can be little sustainable impact on morbidity and mortality 
associated with water and sanitation. 
Further, 11 largely preventable diseases accounted for 73% of years of life lost in 
Liberia in 2010. The low investment in prevention (and the systems that support 
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prevention activities), combined with very low levels of overall budgetary support and 
water and sanitation investment limits Liberia’s flexibility to address what the country 
prioritizes as key developmental challenges. The paradoxical situation is that Liberia 
needs investment in these areas in order to build its capacity to adequately forecast, 
request and direct funds to self-identified priorities, but to date program and project 
support has largely been dictated by the interests and priorities of donors, which tend to 
favor investment in specific diseases, or more recently, individual health sector 
components.  
Arguably, the Liberian health system is more resilient than it was a decade ago. 
Though it took a matter of months—clearly not ideal—Liberia was nonetheless able to 
resume normal operations following Ebola quicker than it did following the civil 
conflicts; indicating a gain in resilience. However, it is evident that a lot more is needed 
to further increase the resilience of the health sector, and the country, in responding to 
and recovering from crises.  
The MOH has been actively trying to move the country from relief to 
development once again, to quickly identify and restore recent (health outcomes and 
health system) gains lost due to the Ebola epidemic, and ultimately build a more resilient 
health system to better withstand future challenges. While the popular language these 
days is “resilience,” a review of the national and international response plans and actions 
following the West African Ebola epidemic indicates a patchwork response that is far 
from truly promoting resilience. Further, by the GOL focusing solely on epidemic 
preparedness, as opposed to taking an all-hazards approach, Liberia will not find itself—
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even within the health system—better able to cope in the event of other types of crisis 
(e.g., casualties following civil unrest around upcoming elections, natural disasters such 
as floods and landslides).  
On the other hand, the West African Ebola epidemic has opened the global 
conversation about what health system strengthening entails, or should entail, and thus 
opens the possibility for the GOL to better guide donors toward funding sector-wide 
health system strengthening activities, inclusive of integration of all-hazards emergency 
preparedness into each of the existing WHO identified health system building blocks.  
Effectively doing so would not only increase the resilience of the Liberia health system 
but would also pave the way for other countries to similarly influence and shape the 
substance of their health system strengthening interventions. 
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DISSEMINATION PLANS 
Planned mechanisms to dissemination findings and recommendations include the 
following: 
(1) Summary report and recommendations on the design of HSS programs and 
interventions disseminated to key stakeholders (e.g., Liberia MOH, JSI, 
USAID)  
(2) Publishable manuscript for a peer-reviewed journal  
(3) Conference abstract submission (e.g., American Public Health Association, 
Global Health Council’s Global Health and Innovation Conference, 
Consortium of Universities for Global Health annual conference, Global 
Symposium on Health Systems Research) 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Liberia Background Maps 	
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1 The International Wealth Index (IWI) is a comparable asset based wealth index for 
measuring households wealth in low and middle income countries. Iwi runs from 0 to 
100, with score 0 for households who have none of the included assets and 100 for 
households who have all. 
Smits, J & R. Steendijk (2014). "The International Wealth Index (IWI)". Social Indicators		 	
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Annex 2. Individuals Interviewed in the 
RBHS Mid-term Evaluation, May/June 2011  
	
List of Interviewees for PBC Assessment  
(Interviewer: Deirdre Rogers) 
 
RBHS 
• Dr. Richard Brennan, Chief of Party 
• Chip Barnett, Director of M&E and Partner Coordination 
• Mike Mulbah, M&E Officer 
• Rufus Domah, County Coordinator, Bong 
• Luogon Willie-Paye, County Coordinator, Nimba 
 
MOHSW 
• Benedict Harris, Policy and Planning 
• Dominic Togba, PBC Focal Point Person 
 
MTI (Monrovia) 
• Dr. Teferi Fissehatsyone, Project Director 
• Anthony Kollie, M&E Officer 
 
EQUIP (Monrovia) 
• David Waines, Country Director 
• Justin Pendarvis, Deputy Country Director 
 
EQUIP (Ganta, Nimba) 
• Kristen Cahill, Medical Coordinator 
• Olive Teah, HIV/TB Supervisor 
• Lawrina S. Dinkey, RH Supervisor 
• John G. Nenwah, Data Supervisor 
• Genevive T. Nuah, RH Supervisor 
• Alimso G. Paygar, Clinical Supervisor 
• Gayflor Barnar, HIV/TB Supervisor 
• David Z. Membah, EPI Supervisor 
• Abraham D. Tozay, Clinical Supervisor 
 
Merci (Monrovia) 
• Dr. Tete Brooks, Executive Director 
 
Africare (Monrovia) 
• Ernest Gaie, Country Director 
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Africare (Gbarnga, Bong) 
• Dr. Benjamin Vonhm, Health Coordinator 
• Eric G. Sackie, M&E Officer 
• 9 field staff  
 
Africare (Kpaai Clinic, Bong) 
• G. Browne, OIC and other facility staff 
 
IRC (Monrovia) 
• Allan Freedman, Country Director 
 
IRC (Sanequellie, Nimba) 
• Nick Low, Program Manager 
• Peny, Clinical Supervisor 
• 9 field staff  
 
Nimba County Health Team (Sanequellie) 
• C. Paul Nyanzee, County Health Division Director (CHDD) 
• Dr. Cuallau Jabbe-Howe, CHO 
• Isaac B. Cole, gCHV/County Health Surveillance Officer 
• Jonathan S. Tokpah, County M&E Officer 
• Priscilla S. Mabiah, County RH Supervisor 
• Sarah W Layweh, County Registrar/Data Manager 
 
List of Interviewees for Community Health Assessment  
(Interviewer: Mary Carnell) 
 
RBHS 
• Dr. Richard Brennan, Chief of Party 
• George Kaine, County Coordinator, GCM 
• Luogon Willi-Paye, County Coordinator, Nimba 
• J. Mehnmon Tokpah, County Coordinator, River Gee 
• Rufus Domah, County Coordinator, Bong 
• William Kowah Zazay, County Coordinator, Lofa 
 
MOHSW 
• Dr. Bernice Dahn, Deputy Minister & CMO 
• Boima Tamba, Director, CHSD 
• Daniel Wessih, Deputy Director CHSD 
• Margaret Korpkor, County Health Team Coordinator, CHSD 
• Xavier Modol, Consultant, MOHSW Ten-year Health Plan 
• Frank Baer, Consultant, MOHSW Ten-year Health Plan 
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NMCP 
• Tolbert Nyanswah, Program Manager 
• Asatu Dono, CCM Focal person  
 
GFATM 
• David Logan, Coordinator 
 
NLTCP 
• Dr. Catherine Cooper, Program Manager 
• Deddeh Kessele, Deputy Program Manager 
• Su Su Thompson, Field Coordinator 
 
PPAL 
• Emree Mukum Bee, Program Manager 
• Regina Hodges, Medical Service Delivery Officer 
• Comfort Kolle, Youth IEC & Public Relations Officer 
• Louise Gausi, Supervisor Market-based FP Program 
 
BRAC 
• Dr. Haroun Or Rashid, Technical Health Manager 
Africare 
• Dr. Benjamin Vonhm, Health Coordinator 
• Anthony Yeakpalah, Clinical Supervisor 
• James Kolliem, Community Health Assistant 
• Patricia N. M. Amarah, Maternal Nurse 
• Zowah Nenyeah, RH Supervisor 
• John Gleekiah, Child Survival 
• George Teo, Jr, Communicable Disease Supervisor 
• Michael S. Bondo, Community Health Assistant Nutrition Supervisor 
• Eric G. Sackie, M&E Officer 
• Nelly K. Harris, Community Health Supervisor 
• Aloyosius  Nyan, Clerical Assistant 
 
Bong County Health Team 
• Melepalay K. Sumo, gCHV Supervisor 
• Tokpa S. Wakpolo, TB/HIV Supervisor 
• Jerries L. Walker, Human Resource Manager 
• Stephen S.B. Cooper, CHT Supervisor 
• Taywah Bombo, Liberia Prevention of Maternal Mortality Focal Person 
• Gormah M. Cole, RH Supervisor 
• Arthur Loryoun, Pharmacist 
 
Nimba County Health Team 
• C. Paul Nyanzee, CHDD 
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• Dr. Cuallau Jabbe-Howe, CHO 
• Rufus G. Saye, County Supervisor 
• Isaac B. Cole, gCHV/County Health Surveillance Officer 
 
IRC-Nimba 
• Nicholas Low, Project Manager 
• Larwuo Wuah, Reproductive Health Office 
• Joseph M. Barkolleh, IRC Community Health Supervisor 
• Perry P. Koffa, Clinical Officer 
• Veleh L. Donzo, Database Manager 
 
Equip- Nimba 
• Kristen Cahill, Medical Coordinator 
• Joseph K. Kilikpo, County Coordinator 
• Roland T. Suomie, National Coordinator 
• Sam Dahn, Regional Supervisor 
• Edward B. Zaindo, Assistant Supervisor 
• Esther M. Bartuah, Regional Supervisor 
• Cooper S. W. Siaway, Assistant Regional Supervisor/BCC Focal Person 
• P. Meney K. Hurlay, PHC Regional Supervisor 
• Emmanuel S. Johnson, Regional Supervisor 
• Alimso G. Paygar, Clinical Supervisor 
• Blamah Molley, Regional Supervisor 
• J. Emmanuel Tarr, Assistant 
• Yeh G. Gweh, Regional  Supervisor 
• Joseph Z. Suomie, Wash Field Coordinator 
 
Group discussions in Bong and Nimba counties 
• 32 staff at 4 health facilities  
• 20 mothers of children under-5 years 
• 24 gCHVs  
• 47 TTM/TMs  
• 25 CHCs/CHDCs  
  
List of Interviewees for BCC Assessment  
(Interviewer: Carol Hooks) 
 
RBHS 
• Dr. Richard Brennan, Chief of Party 
• George Kaine, County Coordinator, GCM 
• J. Mehnmon Tokpah, County Coordinator, River Gee 
• Luogon Willie-Paye, County Coordinator, Nimba 
• Rufus Domah, County Coordinator, Bong 
• William Kowah Zazay, County Coordinator, Lofa 
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MOHSW 
• Tamba Boima, Director, CHSD 
• Daniel Wessih, Deputy Director, CHSD 
• Dr. Saye Baawo, Director, FHD 
• Rev. John Sumo, Director, HPD 
 
NACP 
• Sonpon Sieh, Director 
 
NMCP 
• Daniel Soma, BCC Coordinator 
• Joseph Tamba, IEC/BCC Officer 
• Bismark Wleh, IEC/BCC Officer 
 
National Traditional Council of Liberia, Montserrado County 
• Asulana Garsbah, Chief 
 
Crusaders for Peace, Monrovia 
• Julie Endee, Executive Director and Cultural Ambassador 
 
Radio Cape Mount, 102.4 
• Osmasa Mark, Director 
 
Bong CHT 
• Alphonso Kofa, CHDD 
• Joe E. Smith, HP Focal Person 
 
Africare 
• Markonee Zar, Health Program Liaison & BCC Focal Person 
 
Phebe Hospital OPD 
• Emmanuel Dweh, OIC 
• Nurses, ANC 
• Group discussion with 16–29 year old mothers of children under-5 years 
 
Suakoko group discussions 
• Caregivers & TTMs 
• Traditional Chiefs 
• Girls 15–24 years 
• Boys 16–23 years 
 
Salala Clinic 
• Miatta Yekee, OIC 
• Mary Tennie, CM 
		
194 
• Group discussion with gCHVs 
 
Grand Cape Mount CHT 
• Theresa Alpha, CHDD 
• John Kallon, Clinical Supervisor 
• Varney C. Massaquoi, HP Focal Person 
 
MTI, Senje 
• Jerry Zangor, Head of Field Office, Bomi and Montserrado 
• Florence Rogers, BCC Focal Person and SBC/Supervisor 
• Community Health Promoters 
• Interview with 16 year old girl in 11th grade 
• Group discussion with boys 17–25 years 
• Group discussion with 16–26 year old mothers of children U5 
 
Bo-Waterside Clinic 
• Patricia Gboyo, CM 
• Elizabeth, Dispenser 
• Joseph Kpaka, Vaccinator/Nurse Aide 
• Jennih M. Gray, Registrar 
 
Tiene Clinic 
• Mayango M. Akoi, OIC 
• Maria S. Freeman, CM 
• Mambudu Kroma, Registrar 
• Varney Ferka, Lab Technician 
• Group discussion with boys 15–18 years 
• Group discussion with girls 14–21 years 
  
List of Interviewees for Capacity Building Assessment  
(Interviewers: Beth Gragg and Deirdre Rogers) 
 
RBHS 
• Dr. Richard Brennan, Chief of Party 
• Chip Barnett, Director of M&E and Partner Coordination 
• Mike Mulbah, M&E Officer 
• JK Ofori, BCC Advisor 
• Sarah Hodge, EmONC Advisor 
• Maima Zazay, FP/RH Advisor 
• David Franklin, Mental Health Advisor 
• Lauretta Nagbe, HIV/TB Advisor 
• George Kaine, County Coordinator GCM 
• Luogon Willie-Paye, County Coordinator, Nimba 
• J. Mehnmon Tokpah, County Coordinator, River Gee 
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• Rufus Domah, County Coordinator, Bong 
• William Kowah Zazay, County Coordinator, Lofa 
• Gyanu Tamang, Former Intern 
 
MOHSW 
• Dr. Bernice Dahn, Deputy Director & CMO 
• Rev. John B. Sumo, Director, HPD 
• Dr. Meiko Dolo, Director, Mental Health Unit 
• Ellen George-Williams, Consultant, Mental Health Unit 
 
NACP 
• Sonpon Sieh, Program Manager 
• Dr. Julia Toomey Garbo, Deputy Program Manager 
 
Nimba CHT 
• Rancy W. Leesola, County Health Service Administrator 
• Isaac B. Cole, gCHV/County Health Surveillance Officer 
• Karntey Deemie, Clinical Supervisor 
• Jonathan Tokpah, County M&E Officer 
• Priscilla Mabiah, County RH Supervisor 
• Sarah Lewah, County Registrar 
• Lewis Momo, County Pharmacist 
• Nelson Kartie, Environmental Health Coordinator 
• Jerry Manneh, County Accountant 
• Harris Nyankaryah, County HRM Officer 
• Austin G. Mehn, EHT 
 
IRC (Nimba) 
• Nicholas Low, Coordinator RBHS Program 
• Kofa Perry, Clinical Supervisor 
 
St. Mary’s Clinic (Nimba) 
• Celestine Yenneh, OIC 
• Mercy Gullsiah, CM 
• Emmanuel Dahn, Lab Technician 
 
EQUIP (Nimba) 
• Kristen Cahill, Medical Coordinator 
• Olive Teah, HIV/TB Supervisor 
• Lawina S. Dinkeh, RH Supervisor 
• John G. Nenwah, Data Supervisor 
• Genevive T. Nuah, RH Supervisor 
• Alimso G. Paygar, Clinical Supervisor 
• Gayflor Bamar, HIV/TB Supervisor 
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• David Z. Membah, EPI Supervisor 
• Abraham D. Tazay, Clinical Supervisor 
 
Hope Clinic (Nimba) 
• Susannah Dolo, CM and Acting OIC 
 
Africare (Bong) 
• Dr. Benjamin Vonhm, Health Coordinator 
• Eric Sackie, M&E Officer 
 
Africare 
• Markonee Willie, RH Supervisor 
 
Yila Clinic (Bong) 
• Sarah Suah, OIC 
• Eunice Neahn, CM 
• Samuel M. Gweh, Vaccinator 
• David Dolo, Registrar 
 
Bong CHT 
• 4 patients at Hope & Yila Clinics 
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Annex 3. Individuals Interviewed in the 2012 and 2014 Capacity Assessments 
 
May 19–20, 2014: 
 
RBHS staff briefing 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Heather 
 
May 21, 2014:  
 
RBHS Staff Interviews 
Assessment Team: Kumkum, Kate 
Attendees:  
Theo Lippeveld  (Financing) 
Sarah Hodges, Maima Zazay (FHD) 
Catherine Gbozee, Theo Lippeveld, Marietta Yekee, Teah Dogmah (Community Health) 
Catherine Gbozee, Theo Lippeveld, Judith Oki (County Health Services) 
Joe Moyer (Infrastructure) 
Bal Ram Bhui, Theo Lippevel (HMER) 
Zaira Alonso(HR Unit/Personnel Unit) 
Marion Subah(Training Institutions & Boards) 
Floride Niyuhire (PBF) 
Marietta Yekee, Teah Dogmah (NHPD & NMCP) 
 
Nimba CHSWT 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Heather, Rose, Adolphus (MOHSW), J. Mehmon Tokpa, 
Imenteelea Grimes 
Attendees 
Collins  S  Bowah(CHO),C. Paul Nyanzee (CHDD), Priscilla Mabia (RH Supervisor), 
Kou Yelabo (Mental Health),  Jerry  Mannah (Accountant), Wilson Dolo (Logistician),  
Rancy Leesala (CHSA),  
Steven Wongbay (Nutritionist), Barnard Lakpor (EPI Supervisor), Nelson Kartee (EHT), 
Harris Nyankaryah (HR Officer),  John G. Nenwah (Africare M&E), J. Gonleyen Dahn 
(M&E Officer CHT).  
 
May 22, 2014: 
 
Esther Bacon School of Nursing and Midwifery (EBSNM) 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Heather, Judith, Adolphus (MOHSW), Caleb, Pauline 
Attendees: Harriet Dolo, Esther Toloco, Rebecca Seleweyan, Anna Kybuku, Kebe 
Koroyon, (+ 2 recent graduates working in obstetrics ward) 
 
Tubman National Institute of Medical Arts (TNIMA)  
Assessment Team: Kumkum, Kate 
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Attendees: Sarah Kollie (Administrator), Ada Brown (Acting Director, School of Nursing 
and Midwifery), Kerkula Kollie (Director, School of Environmental Health Technicians), 
Vachel Harris (Instructor, School of Nursing and Midwifery), Edwin Beyan (Instructor, 
School of Nursing and Midwifery), Lassana Kelleh (Instructor, School of Nursing and 
Midwifery), Jestina Cole (Instructor, School of Nursing and Midwifery), Musu Kiawon 
(Instructor, School of Nursing and Midwifery), Dorothy Dagaboi (Instructor, School of 
Nursing and Midwifery), Cecelia Massaline (Instructor, School of Nursing and 
Midwifery), Fatu Kettor (Instructor, School of Nursing and Midwifery), Mr. Barclay 
(Instructor, School of EHT), Hector Weah (Instructor, School of Nursing and 
Midwifery), Abraham Zayzay (Instructor,  School of Nursing and Midwifery), Augustus 
Reeves (Librarian), Rebecca Kiazer Timbo (Instructor, School of Nursing and 
Midwifery), James Dogba (Instructor, School of EHT), Rebecca Scotland (Instructor, 
School of Physician Assistant) 
 
NMCP  
Assessment Team: Kumkum, Kate 
Attendees: Oliver Pratt (Program Manager, NMCP) 
 
May 23, 2014: 
 
Lofa CHSWT  
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Heather, Judith, Adolphus Clark (MOHSW), Caleb, Pauline 
Attendees: Aaron Kollie (CHO),  Dorfelson Jayguhwoiyan (District Health Officer), 
Howard Yokie (EPI Supervisor), Wolobah Y. Moore (County Pharmacist), Abraham 
Flomo & John Akoi (Clinical Supervisors), Gunkanue Monwan, (HIV Focal Person), 
Edmund Eisah, (Director of Community Health), Prince Sesay (Director of County 
Health Services), John B. Arku (Logistician), Elizabeth Tamba & Esther Y. Argba (MCH 
Supervisors)   
 
PBF Unit 
Assessment Team: Kumkum, Kate 
Attendees: Louise Marpleh (FARA Manager), 
Dominic Togba (Acting Coordinator PBF), Tendra Tenwah-Gweh (PBF Officer), 
Mildred Harris (PBF Officer) 
 
Mental Health 
Assessment Team: Kate 
Attendees: Meiko Dolo (Director Mental Health Unit) 
 
HMER Unit 
Assessment Team: Kumkum, Kate 
Attendees: Luke Bawo (Coordinator M&E, HMIS & Research) 
 
 
		
199 
May 26, 2014: 
 
Infrastructure Unit 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: David Jallah (Director), Edwina Robinson (Secretary), Solomon (Snr. 
Engineer), Sumo (Snr. Engineer) 
 
National Health Promotion Division 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Rev. JohnSumo (Director) 
 
County Health Services 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Vera Mussah (Director), Byron Zahnweah (Contracting-in Coordinator), 
Precellia Goanue (Quality Assurance Coordinator), John Kollie (Improvement 
Collaborative) 
 
Personnel Unit 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: James Beyan (Personnel Director) 
 
Community Health Services 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Tamba Boima (Director), Olasiford Wiah (River Gee), Patience Sorsor (River 
Gee) 
 
Family Health Division 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Sarah Layweh (Acting for Director Caullau Jabbeh-Howe) 
 
May 27, 2014: 
 
Bong CHSWT  
Assessment Team: Kate, Heather, Marion, Justin Korvayan (MOHSW), Luogon Willie-
Paye, Mohammed Massaley 
Attendees: Dr. Samson Arzoaquoi (CHO), Getrude Cole (RH Supervisor), (Jerries 
Walker ( HRO), Fatuma Jusu ( CHSA), Peter Tiah ( Child Survival Focal Person), 
Saturday Kollie (County Diagnostics Officer), John Gleekiah ( Clinical Supervisor), Peter 
Yarkpawolo ( HIV/AIDS Coordinator), James Juman (EHT Supervisor), James Sibley 
(TB/Leprosy Focal Person), Prince Dolo (Logistics Officer), Melvin Fania ( Data Clerk), 
William Gbelee (Nutrition Focal Person),Darkermue Kollie ((Mental Health Focal 
Person), Korwan Flomo (Accountant),  Samuel Gayflor (Pharmacist/Supply Chain Chief) 
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Central MOHSW Building Block 2: Human Resources 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees:  Matthew Flomo (Deputy Minister for Administration), James Beyan 
(Personnel Director) 
 
Central MOHSW Building Block 3: HMIS 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Stanford Wesseh (Assistant Minister, Vital Statistics), Stephen Gbanyan 
(Acting Director, HMIS Unit) 
 
May 28, 2014: 
 
Central MOHSW Building Block 5: Health Care Financing  
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees:  Benedict Harris (Assistant Minister, Planning), Momolu Sirleaf (External Aid 
Coordinator), Louise Marpleh (FARA Manager), Schiffer Sowandi (FARA Accountant- 
OFM) 
 
May 29, 2014: 
 
Central MOHSW Building Block 1: Delivering Essential Health Services  
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Dr. Bernice Dahn (Deputy Minister, Health Services/Chief Medical Officer), 
Cllrr. Tolbert Nyenswah (Assistant Minister, Preventive Services), Vera Mussah 
(Director, CHS Unit), Tamba Boima (Community Health), Sarah Layweh (FHD) 
 
Central MOHSW Building Block 4: Access to Essential Medicines 
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum 
Attendees: Reverend Tijli Tarty Tyee, Logistics/Supply Chain Manager 
 
Liberian Board of Nursing & Midwifery (LBNM) 
Assessment Team: Heather, Kate, Nowai 
Attendees: Cecelia A. Morris (Chairperson LBNM), Darboi G. Korkoyah (M&E 
Director), Cecelia C.K. Flomo (Registrar), Velma Okoro (Finance Officer), Elizabeth 
Bemah Slewion (Mental Health M&E Officer) 
 
 
May 30, 2014: 
 
Central MOHSW Building Block 6: Leadership and Governance  
Assessment Team: Deirdre, Kumkum, Rose Macauley, Judith Oki 
Attendees: Dr. Bernice Dahn (Deputy Minister, Health Sciences/Chief Medical Officer), 
Justin Korvayan (Director of Planning & Decentralization), Cllr. Tolbert Nyenswah 
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(Assistant Minister, Preventive Services), Matthew Flomo (Deputy Minister for 
Administration), Cllr. Vivian Cherue (Deputy Minister, Social Welfare) 
 
Liberian Medical Dental Council (LMDC)  
Assessment Team: Heather, Kate Nowai Johnson (RBHS) 
 
Attendees: Dr. Moses Pewu, Dr. Mark Kieh (Acting Registrar-General & Clinical 
Coordinator), Andrew Tulay (Field Clinical Coordinator)  
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Annex 4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Case Study Design 
Advantages of the case study methodology:  
 
1. Allows for a deeper evaluation of and potentially new insight from the recent 
Ebola epidemic in Liberia and the impact on the health system. A qualitative case study 
methodology allows for a description of complexity. 
2. Has the potential to stimulate new research. Documenting capacity gains 
through a ‘traditional’ WHO HSS building blocks lens, and then reanalyzing the same 
systems and capacities through a resilience lens may stimulate new research and thinking 
into how traditional HSS interventions are designed.  
3. May contradict or build upon established theory or practices. The methodology 
allows for an in-depth analysis of whether we are asking the right questions in 
‘traditional’ health systems strengthening interventions.  
 
Disadvantages of the case study method: 
 
1. The researcher’s subjective feelings may influence the case study resulting in 
researcher bias in both the data collection and interpretation. All RBHS mid-term 
evaluation and capacity assessment tools were developed collaboratively by the 
researcher, members of the RBHS project team, and members of the MOH, and in 
consultation with USAID. The researcher was involved in all qualitative data collection 
taking place between 2009 and 2015, and personally conducted key informant and group 
interviews (see Annexes 2 and 3 for lists of individuals interviewed). Though this 
consistency is highly valuable on the one hand, it is possible that her interpretations 
influenced the way that the data were collected (e.g., what follow-up and probing 
questions were asked and how questions were asked).  
2. Memory distortions. Interviews with MOH and NGO staff required that they 
recall information about past experiences, situations, and events. Since people tend to 
focus on factors that they find important themselves, they may have been unaware of 
other possible influences. In an attempt to address this in the RBHS mid-term evaluation 
in 2011, and the two capacity assessments conducted in 2012 and 21014, interviews were 
conducted with a very wide range of stakeholders, combined with extensive supporting 
document review and secondary data analysis (see data sources below). 
3. Does not facilitate estimations of impact on coverage or other population-level 
health indicators. Further, it is not possible to replicate findings. As a result, there are 
problems in generalizing case study results obtained from unique individuals or groups to 
other people or groups because the findings may not be representative of any particular 
population.ccxxiii  ccxxiv  
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